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Abstract 
 
My thesis argues that Rawls’s attempt to discredit utilitarianism as a viable theory 
of justice was ultimately unsuccessful.  I shall follow the example of Robert Paul 
Wolff’s 1977 book Understanding Rawls in treating A Theory of Justice ‘not as a 
single piece of philosophical argument to be tested and accepted or rejected whole, 
but as a complex, many-layered record of at least twenty years of philosophical 
growth and development’.  Paying close attention to the wording of different 
variants of Rawls’s arguments as they developed over the years, I shall reconstruct 
my own argument using the most coherent parts of Rawls’s arguments, along with 
contributions from various commentators. This will uphold the classical principle of 
utility, as a principle of distributive justice that is entirely suited to Rawls’s 
conception of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, with that 
conception’s commitment to conceiving obligations of justice as essentially 
obligations of reciprocity.  In doing so, I hope to show that the case against 
utilitarianism is unproven as is the case that justice requires the recognition of 
inviolable rights.  My argument should also explain Rawls’s continued modification 
of his arguments as largely due to his failure to successfully refute utilitarianism. 
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Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is 
answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, 
every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and 
the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to 
observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. 
- John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 1859. 
 
Preface 
 
In John Rawls’s Preface to the original edition of A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls wrote 
 
Passage P1 (T of J orig) 
 
During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory 
has been some form of utilitarianism…Those who criticized them [i.e. the 
great utilitarians such as Hume, Smith and Mill] often did so on a much 
narrower front.  They pointed out the obscurities of the principle of utility and 
noted the apparent incongruities between many of its implications and our 
moral sentiments. But they failed, I believe, to construct a workable and 
systematic moral conception to oppose it.  The outcome is that we often seem 
forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism.  Most likely we 
finally settle upon a variant of the utility principle circumscribed and 
restricted in certain ad hoc ways by intuitionistic constraints.  Such a view is 
not irrational; and there is no assurance that we can do better.  But this is no 
reason not to try. 
What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order 
of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.  In this way I hope that the theory seems to offer 
an alternative systematic account of justice that is superior, or so I argue, to 
the dominant utilitarianism of the tradition.  The theory that results is highly 
Kantian in nature. - A Theory of Justice (1971)1 
 
Although Rawls seldom explicitly described it as such until later works, his theory is, in my 
opinion, best thought of as a theory of ‘justice as reciprocity’.2 Justice as Reciprocity 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1971 p. viii 
2 Rawls 1995 p.17. Rawls first described his theory of Justice as Fairness as one of Justice as 
Reciprocity in the first of his essays entitled ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1957 p. 661) In Political 
Liberalism Rawls endorsed Allan Gibbard’s reading of his theory as such, in preference to Brian 
Barry’s interpretation of it as ‘hovering uneasily’ between ‘justice as impartiality’ and ‘justice as 
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construes our obligation to act ‘justly’ as one of constraining our behaviour in accordance 
with certain rules of conduct in order to give fair return to others for the benefits we receive 
from the similar constraint of others.  The point behind Rawls’s generalizing and carrying 
‘to a higher order of abstraction the traditional social contract theory’ was to work out what 
the rules conforming to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity should be.  Rawls named 
his idea that the correct rules to govern society conceived of as a cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage were those that would be chosen in the appropriately constructed social 
contract, ‘justice as fairness’. 
 
Utilitarianism, by contrast, Rawls conceived of as stemming from the conception of ‘Justice 
as Benevolence’. He never described it explicitly in those actual words,1 but that 
description seems to me to fairly capture his view of the matter.  Rawls’s conception of 
‘Justice as Benevolence’ is captured in the passages repeated below. The first is taken from 
his book Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), which, as the title suggests, was a 
restatement of the contract view of A Theory of Justice, albeit with some significant 
revisions, which was published shortly before Rawls’s death. The second is from ‘Justice as 
Fairness’ (1958) 
 
Passage P2 (J as F:AR 2001) 
 
In the history of democratic thought two contrasting ideas of society have a 
prominent place: one is the idea of society as a fair system of social 
cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal; the other is the idea 
of society as a social system organized so as to produce the most good 
summed over all its members, where this good is a complete good specified 
by a comprehensive doctrine.  The tradition of the social contract elaborates 
the first idea, the utilitarian tradition is a special case of the second. 
Between these two traditions there is a basic contrast: the idea of 
society as a fair system of social cooperation is quite naturally specified so as 
to include the ideas of equality (the equality of basic rights, liberties, and fair 
opportunities) and of reciprocity (of which the difference principle is an 
example).  By contrast, the idea of society organized to produce the most 
good expresses a maximizing and aggregative principle of political justice.  In 
                                                                                                                                                    
mutual advantage’. (Rawls 1995 p. 17) He repeated this endorsement in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement. (Rawls 2001 p. 49).  See also Barry 1989 and Gibbard 1991. 
1 I have not come across this terminology elsewhere in the literature, so as far as I know this name 
for a ‘conception of justice’ originated here.  
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utilitarianism, the ideas of equality and of reciprocity are accounted for only 
indirectly, as what is thought to be normally necessary to maximize the sum 
of social welfare. - Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001)1 
 
Passage P3 (J as F 1957) 
 
This conception of justice (i.e. the conception of justice as reciprocity) differs 
from that of the stricter form of utilitarianism (Bentham and Sidgwick), and 
its counterpart in welfare economics, which assimilates justice to benevolence 
and the latter in turn to the most efficient design of institutions to promote the 
general welfare.2 
 
These three passages should provide enough material for me to set out the main thrust of 
my argument in this thesis. ‘Justice as Benevolence’ would view the obligations of justice 
as a matter of our being obliged to produce as much good as possible.  Classical 
utilitarianism is, to use the terms of Passage P2, ‘a special case’ of the conception of 
‘Justice as Benevolence’ which defines the good in terms of happiness, and thus holds that 
we are obliged to produce as much happiness as possible.  And, as Rawls observes in 
various places, in answer to the question of how we should be motivated to produce as 
much happiness as possible, utilitarians tend to appeal to the power of sympathy.3  We feel 
pain at the prospect of others feeling pain, and pleasure at the prospect of others feeling 
pleasure, and these feelings impel us to promote the greatest aggregate of pleasure over 
pain overall.4  But, Rawls maintained, while that may be a laudable way to behave that is 
not what justice is about.  Justice is about being motivated to return benefits fairly to the 
people who you owe such return to. 
 It should be clear from the forgoing, I hope, that ‘Justice as Benevolence’ and 
‘Justice as Reciprocity’ draw on two very different motives, and so, in advance of an 
argument to the contrary, might be expected to prescribe very different principles of 
distribution for society.  The overriding aim of this thesis is to provide that argument to the 
contrary, and I shall do so by attempting to argue that Justice as Reciprocity is fully 
reconcilable with adoption of the principle of utility, interpreted on classical utilitarian 
                                                 
1 Rawls 2001 p.96 
2 Rawls 1957 p.660 
3 Rawls 1999 pp. 24, 155, 162, 426 
4 E.g. see Mill 2003 p. 204  
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lines, as the predominant principle of distribution for society.1 Two analogies will help to 
clarify this aim, and my forthcoming argument, here.  Imagine someone who had never 
studied economics before being told that individuals who were purely motivated by the 
pursuit of their self-interest would actually behave in the way most conducive to promoting 
the public good.  Their initial reaction might be one of incredulity.  But Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations demonstrated that individual pursuit of self-interest could be the most 
effective way of promoting the good of all, given the right market conditions and 
observance of the rule of law acting as a constraint on self-interested behaviour.  As he put 
it, ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.’2  
 Adam Smith’s point was that the butcher, brewer and baker do not act from the 
predominant motive of providing the public with good quality, and affordable, meat, beer 
and bread.  Instead their predominant motive is to maximize their own profit. But seeking 
to promote their own interest leads them to compete with each other in terms of quality and 
price, and so they end up promoting the good of society at large, though that was not the 
main motivation behind their behaviour. 
 The first analogy with my argument is this.  Imagine an ‘ideal legislator’ charged 
with the task of designing institutions, which might include both legal restraints and 
customs, most suited to the conception of Justice as Benevolence, that is, most suited to 
promoting the greatest overall good.3 Just as it might seem unlikely to the person ignorant 
of economics that people motivated by self-interest might nonetheless effectively promote 
the general good, so it might seem to a political philosopher approaching the issue in 
question, highly unlikely that an ideal legislator whose motivation was to come up with 
rules suited for the conception of Justice as Benevolence might nonetheless produce rules 
suited for the conception of Justice as Reciprocity. I think it is fair to speculate that Rawls 
approached the issue, at least at first, with a strong conviction that the two conceptions of 
                                                 
1 I have been careful to specify a ‘classical interpretation of the principle of utility’ rather than ‘classical 
utilitarianism’ here, as classical utilitarianism, as ordinarily understood, is not reconcilable with justice 
as reciprocity without an important modification, as I shall explain later.  
2 Smith 2007 p.10 
3 The ideal legislator is a figure evoked by Rawls in his essays ‘Justice as Fairness’ and in A Theory of 
Justice, to explain how utilitarianism, as he interprets it, might be derived.  
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justice would inevitably yield drastically different policy recommendations.1  But, I shall 
argue, they don’t. 
 A similar analogy concerns the behaviour of citizens in the just society.  The 
motivation of citizens, according to Justice as Reciprocity, should not be to act out of 
sympathy and promote the general good, but to return benefits fairly to society in 
return for the good that society has done for them.  But, I shall argue, if people were 
to ask themselves what principle an ideally benevolent person (who is motivated by 
sympathy, rather than reciprocity) would endorse, and then to seek to have that 
principle adopted as the predominant principle of distribution for society, the chosen 
principle would still be entirely compatible with the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity.   
 I won’t succeed in providing a watertight case that Justice as Reciprocity mandates 
the acceptance of the classical principle of utility, and the second to last sentence of the 
paragraph above can be used to provide some indication as to why not.  There is nothing 
inherent in the notion of an ‘ideally benevolent person’ which commits such a person to 
classical utilitarianism.  It could be, and has been, argued that ideal benevolence commits 
us to prioritizing the worst off.2   And, as already remarked, within those theories that do 
stipulate that benevolence should require maximization of the good, utilitarianism is only a 
‘special case’.3 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully consider the question of whether 
the ideally benevolent person should choose to maximize happiness, or do something else.  
Instead I shall argue that if the ideally benevolent person would choose to be a classical 
utilitarian then the classical principle of utility (as I shall call it from now on) is 
reconcilable with Justice as Reciprocity.  This argument is enough for my central purpose 
of demonstrating that the classical principle of utility is compatible with the conception of 
justice as reciprocity.  I may as well state up front what will become quite apparent with the 
progress of this thesis, which is that I am quite sympathetic towards the classical principle 
of utility myself.  It has, it seems to me, major advantages in dealing with the problem of 
                                                 
1 Though he does, at times, admit to nagging doubts that they won’t. E.g. Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.24.   
2 Notably by Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism.  Although Nagel writes of ‘altruism’ rather 
than ‘benevolence’, the difference in terminology appears to me to be insignificant.   
3 John Broome has argued in Weighing Goods that ‘teleology’ with its commitment to maximization can 
accommodate a wide variety of precepts such as fairness, that are not accommodated by classical 
utilitarianism. 
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intergenerational justice, the severely disabled, and non-human animals, all of which are 
poorly dealt with by Rawls’s theory of justice.  It has also, I think, been treated very 
unfairly recently at the hands of its critics, particularly, as I shall demonstrate, John Rawls.  
I hope to redress the balance to some extent.  
Championing the classical principle of utility in this way should make some 
important points even to those who remain entirely unsympathetic to the principle.  
Showing the classical principle of utility to be reconcilable with Justice as Reciprocity, 
should show that Rawls failed to establish his important, and influential, claim; that to take 
the notion of justice seriously involves the acknowledgment of inviolable rights.  
In fact, I shall argue that, despite Rawls’s failure to establish that claim, taking the 
notion of justice seriously does involve the recognition of inviolable rights, though not to 
nearly such an extensive degree as most believers in rights would like.  This recognition is 
forced by the need to reconcile the classical principle of utility with the demands of Justice 
as Reciprocity.  Classical act-utilitarianism places all agents, no matter what position they 
might be in, under an obligation to perform one of those acts that would maximize utility.  I 
shall argue in Chapter 4 that the logic of Justice as Reciprocity grants those who would 
benefit insufficiently from their cooperation in a society ordered by the classical principle 
of utility the right to not cooperate.  This significant modification of traditional classical 
act-utilitarianism is sufficient to justify my labelling the position arrived at, ‘Reciprocal 
Classical Utilitarianism.' 
 My approach in this thesis has been heavily influenced by Robert Paul Wolff’s book 
Understanding Rawls (1977).1 I had been struggling, and failing, to make sense of some 
key passages where Rawls argued against utilitarianism. Wolff read A Theory of Justice 
‘not as a single piece of philosophical argument to be tested and accepted or rejected whole, 
but as a complex, many-layered record of at least twenty years of philosophical growth and 
development’, continuing that ‘[t]he labyrinthine complexities of A Theory of Justice are 
the consequences of at least three stages in the development of Rawls’s thought, in each of 
which he complicated his theory to meet objections others had raised to earlier versions, or 
which he himself perceived.’2 Wolff also remarks on the ‘numerous serious inconsistencies 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Wolff first pointed out to me that my approach to A Theory of Justice was similar to 
Robert Paul Wolff’s and that I would profit by reading it. 
2 Wolff 1977 p.4 
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and unclarities that make it appear that Rawls could not make his mind up on some quite 
fundamental questions’.1 This reading shed considerable light on the difficulties I had faced 
in understanding Theory.  I couldn’t make sense of certain passages because they didn’t 
make sense.  They were the result of attempts to patch up arguments he had put forward in 
previous essays, by substituting new premises for old ones.  It was possible to see this by 
comparing passages from Theory side by side with the ones that were their obvious 
antecedents from his earlier essays.  But the problem was that the new premises didn’t 
provide effective patches. 
My diagnosis of the fundamental problem with Rawls’s theory, however, is 
different to Wolff’s.2 As might be predictable on the basis of the preceding paragraphs, my 
explanation for Rawls’s continuous revision of his arguments - which went on for another 
three decades after the publication of Theory (1971), to the publication of Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement (2001), is that he was never able to defeat classical utilitarianism.  
On the basis of his first model (as Wolff refers to it3), it must have looked as though the 
claims Rawls was obviously determined to make in favour of his principles of justice and 
against the principle of utility could be easily upheld.  The subsequent revisions of his 
theory should be read as (sometimes quite desperate) attempts to invent new ways to make 
his charges against the classical principle of utility stick. 
 In order to make good this case it is necessary for me to devote much more attention 
to the actual wording of Rawls’s arguments than might normally be regarded as interesting 
or productive with so modern a philosopher.  But the specific wording of Rawls’s 
arguments is revelatory of the problems that he was struggling with, and by analysing the 
wording of earlier arguments and comparing it with that of later versions it is possible to 
discern the underlying reasons motivating his explicit stance.4  
                                                 
1 Wolff 1977 p.3 
2 Wolff argued that Rawls’s reliance on ‘formal models of analysis drawn from the theory of rational 
choice’ and ‘the use of the concepts and models of utility theory, welfare economics and game theory’ 
was ‘fundamentally wrong’ and ‘the wrong way to deal with the normative and explanatory problems of 
social theory’ (Wolff 1977 p.10) 
3 Wolff 1977 p.25 Wolff identifies and describes three models of Rawls’s theory in Understanding 
Rawls.  I believe I have identified another model in Rawls’s essay ‘Constitutional Liberty and the 
Concept of Justice’ (1963) which lies halfway between Wolff’s first and second models.  Appropriately 
enough, I refer to it as model 1.5 and its distinguishing features play an important role in my argument 
of Chapter 4. 
4 This reading of Rawls again echoes Robert Paul Wolff’s reading. Wolff remarks of Rawls’s 
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 There is a secondary purpose to my preoccupation with the wording of Rawls’s 
arguments.  If, as I hope to show, his ‘official’ arguments against utilitarianism are 
unsuccessful, the influence his work has undoubtedly had in persuading people that 
utilitarianism is incompatible with distributive justice, is largely due to the rhetorical and 
emotive language his arguments are couched in. By revealing it to be such, I hope to undo 
some of the damage.  
 Because of my close attention to pointing out various inconsistencies and 
incoherencies in the wording of Rawls’s works, I did for a time toy with the title 
‘Unravelling Rawls’ for my thesis. But as I also have the more positive aim of 
demonstrating that Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity can be reconciled with, 
what I believe to be an attractive principle of benevolence, the classical principle of utility, 
I settled for a correspondingly positive title for my thesis:  Reconstructing Rawls: A 
Utilitarian Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Justice.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
engagement in ‘elaborate speculative moral psychology’ in justification of his stipulation that the parties 
in the original position would not be prone to envy, that ‘those speculations are strictly post hoc.  The 
real reason for the assumption of non-envy is purely technical, and has to do with the assumptions 
required by the modes of quasi-economic reasoning that Rawls wishes to deploy.’(Wolff 1977 p. 29)  
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Chapter by Chapter Outline of Thesis 
 
Chapter 1, entitled ‘The Promise’ can be thought of as an introductory chapter.  explains 
the important, and complicated, concepts that the rest of the thesis will deal with, including 
the core conceptions of justice, Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity; Rawls’s 
conception of Justice as Fairness; Rawls’s two principles of justice and classical 
utilitarianism and the ‘three tenets of deontological liberalism’, as I shall refer to them.1   
 
The chapter also explains the very real attraction of Rawls’s project in terms of its 
‘promise’ to account for the tenets of deontological liberalism by grounding them firmly in 
the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.   
 
But Chapter 2 will go on to expose problems for Rawls’s project that can be discerned by 
inconsistencies and unclarities in the text of A Theory of Justice; problems that I claim 
Rawls was never able to resolve satisfactorily.   
 
In Chapter 3, I examine closely what Robert Paul Wolff called the ‘first form’ of Rawls’s 
model, as set out in Rawls’s two essays entitled ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1957 & 1958).  The 
purpose of this examination will be to demonstrate how much more effective the first form 
of Rawls’s model would have been than subsequent models in sustaining two separate, but 
related, claims. First, that the conception of Justice as Reciprocity would only be 
compatible with Rawls’s two principles of justice and secondly; that the classical principle 
of utility would likely not be compatible with the conception of Justice as Reciprocity – it 
would, in fact, only be compatible with the conception of Justice as Reciprocity in the 
circumstance that the policy recommendations of the classical principle of utility exactly 
coincided with the policy recommendations of the two principles of justice.2 
 
                                                 
1 The three tenets of deontological liberalism will be fully explained in Chapter 1. 
2 My assertions here that the classical principle of utility would probably not be compatible with the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity and would be unlikely to coincide with the policy 
recommendations of the two principles of justice is intended to capture the spirit of Rawls’s 
arguments in his essays of the first model. I suggest below (§1.5.2) that it is quite likely that the 
classical principle of utility would yield similar policy prescriptions to the two principles of justice. 
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So Chapter 3 will have left Justice as Reciprocity in need of a tiebreaker between the two 
principles of justice and the principle of classical utility.  Chapter 3 will undertake an 
investigation of Rawls’s repeated, and varied, claims in his essays and books – starting with 
‘Distributive Justice’ (1967) and continuing through the original and revised editions of A 
Theory of Justice (1971& 1999) to Justice as Fairness: Restatement (2001) – that the 
principle of utility would clash with the conception of Justice as Reciprocity by violating 
some other requirement of reciprocity than Rawls’s central claim that it would not be 
chosen by the parties in a hypothetical contract.  I shall argue that these other requirements 
suggested by Rawls are not plausible requirements of the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity.  
 
In Chapter 3 I shall also conclude the argument, started in Chapter 1 and continued in 
Chapter 2, that ‘Justice as Fairness’ – Rawls’s name for his hypothetical contract device – 
is unfit for the purpose of constructing principles suited to the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity.   
 
The position my argument will have reached by the end of Chapter 3 will be that Rawls 
failed to demonstrate that the classical principle of utility is incompatible with the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  Relatedly, he also failed to demonstrate that the 
demands of Justice as Reciprocity diverge from the demands of Justice as Benevolence.   
 
In Chapter 4 I argue that the classical principle of utility is reconcilable with Justice as 
Reciprocity.  For this purpose, I do not need to show that the classical principle of utility is 
uniquely suited to Justice as Reciprocity.  I just need to maintain that it is, as Rawls 
concedes it is, a reasonable conception of the good.1  This is enough, I shall argue, to allow 
an ‘ideal legislator’, charged with the task of choosing principles suited to the conception of 
Justice as Reciprocity to select the classical principle of utility, without fear that she or he 
                                                 
1 Rawls acknowledges the utilitarianism of Bentham and Sidgwick as a ‘reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine’ in ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus.’ (Rawls 1996 pp. 169-170) 
15 
 
would violate any requirement of Justice as Reciprocity.1 
 
However, I shall go on to suggest that the selection of the classical principle of utility by 
the Ideal Legislator (Reciprocity) does not result in classical utilitarianism as it is ordinarily 
understood.  This is because classical utilitarianism, as it is ordinarily understood, obliges 
everyone, no matter what position they might be in, to always act so as to maximize the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number.  I shall argue that Justice as Reciprocity, when 
combined with the selection of the classical principle of utility, would exempt some people 
from that obligation.  It is beyond the remit of this thesis to decide the question of who 
precisely should be exempted from this obligation, though I will put forward some 
considerations on this point.  But for the purpose of the argument of this thesis, I do not 
need to resolve this question.  This is because whoever those who should be exempted from 
the obligation to maximize utility might turn out to be, their exemption will not interfere 
with the right of others to maximize utility.  And to show that people would have this right 
is enough to show that the classical principle of utility is reconcilable with Justice as 
Reciprocity.2 
 
The justification for the exemption of some from the obligation to maximize utility is based 
in the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  Justice as Reciprocity provides three potential 
reasons for exempting certain people from this obligation.  The first is that some people 
may be psychologically incapable of cooperating, in which case they do not qualify as 
cooperating members of society to whom the obligation of reciprocity applies.  The second 
is that they may not be in the circumstances of justice.  And the third is that the ‘benefits’ 
that would accrue to them from their cooperation may not be sufficient for their cooperation 
to count as ‘advantageous’ to them.  All three of these reasons for exemption point, I 
                                                 
1 The ‘ideal legislator (Reciprocity)’ is an abbreviation of ‘the ideal legislator charged with the task 
of choosing principles suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  This is a character I shall 
introduce in Chapter 4 for the purpose of explaining the argument of that chapter.  It is based on the 
‘ideal legislator’ referred to by Rawls in Theory, whose task it is to design institutions suited to the 
conception of Justice as Benevolence.  
2 The reason that the exempted people’s right to not cooperate does not interfere with others’ rights 
to maximize utility is because their right is a ‘liberty-right’ not a ‘claim-right’.  The distinction 
between these two types of right is explained below (§1.1.2).  This summary of the argument of 
Chapter 4 should be more comprehensible after the explanation of this distinction and the argument 
of Chapter 4. 
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believe, to a ‘threshold’ view, where the obligation to fully cooperate kicks in after 
cooperation affords a certain level of overall life prospects. 
 
The resulting conception of justice I call ‘Reciprocal Classical Utilitarianism’ and differs in 
its demands from classical utilitarianism only in allowing for the exemption just described.  
But this difference is not as insignificant as it might first appear.  The argument that the 
Ideal Legislator (Reciprocity) has the right to select reciprocal classical utilitarianism but 
not classical act-utilitarianism will demonstrate that Rawls was right on two important 
points.  Firstly, that Rawls turned out to be right in his conviction that the demands of 
Justice as Benevolence would differ from the demands of Justice as Reciprocity.  Secondly, 
that the conception of Justice as Reciprocity does uphold the core tenet of deontological 
liberalism; it would grant some people inviolable rights that classical utilitarianism would 
be prone to violate. 
 
But this result is a disappointing one as judged from the perspective of the initial promise 
of Rawls’s project.  That, as I demonstrate in Chapter 1, would have upheld all three tenets 
of deontological liberalism and decisively rejected the classical principle of utility.  Instead, 
I shall conclude, Justice as Reciprocity is reconcilable with the classical principle of utility 
and the remaining two tenets of deontological liberalism remain unaccounted for. 
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Chapter 1.  The Promise and the Problems 
 
In this chapter, I provide some background, introduce some terminology and set the stage 
for the argument of subsequent chapters.  In the Introduction to this chapter, I show how 
two competing conceptions of justice, Justice as Reciprocity and Justice as Benevolence, 
both appeal to everyday notions of right and wrong, but appear to provide conflicting 
recommendations as to what we should do.  In Section 1 I briefly explain how 
‘deontological liberalism’ is to be understood for the purpose of this thesis and in Section 2 
I put forward an account of classical act-utilitarianism and explain how it is unable to 
accommodate ‘three tenets of deontological liberalism’ that possess much intuitive appeal 
and that deontological liberalism is able to accommodate.  I then turn in Section 3 to a 
discussion of the merits and demerits of competing conceptions of justice to provide some 
background for the two that are the primary focus of this thesis; Justice as Reciprocity and 
Justice as Benevolence.  I also explain Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity in 
more detail; my interpretation is based on and coincides with one given by Allan Gibbard.    
 
Section 4 sets out the defining features of Justice as Reciprocity.  The argument of this 
thesis will revolve around my attempts to refute Rawls’s efforts to show that utilitarian 
conceptions of justice are incompatible with Justice as Reciprocity as defined by those 
three features.   
 
In Section 5 I describe utilitarian liberalism with particular reference to the arguments of its 
greatest historical exponent, John Stuart Mill.  The purpose of this is to present an 
alternative philosophical foundation for liberalism in contrast to the ‘deontological 
liberalism’ of Section 1 which is espoused by Rawls and to point out its drawbacks.  In the 
brief Section 6 I put my view that the attractiveness of Rawls’s approach to distributive 
justice lies largely in its promise to provide a foundation for deontological liberalism with 
Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
Section 7 describes Rawls’s particular theory of Justice as Reciprocity, Justice as Fairness, 
in some detail and Section 8 describes Rawls’s conception of Justice as Benevolence.   
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Section 9 outlines the problems that I maintain that Rawls was never able to surmount and 
Section 10 explains their significance for the rest of the thesis. 
 
Introduction 
 
1.0.1 I first approached John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice with two worries in mind.  I was 
sympathetic to utilitarianism and had been unconvinced by some of the criticisms I had 
read of it in various other writings that lay more in the field of moral than political 
philosophy.1  And utilitarianism seemed to capture my intuitions about the requirements of 
benevolence.  So I believed that insofar as I had the right to be benevolent, and insofar as I 
had a duty to be benevolent, it would be right to maximize happiness even if that meant 
providing more benefits to better off people at the cost of lesser benefits to worse off 
people.  But I had the worry that justice in distribution required people to fairly repay those 
they owed for the advantages that they received from them, and that this requirement would 
conflict with utilitarianism, however adequate utilitarianism might be as a theory of how 
best to be benevolent.  
 
1.0.2  The second worry was that utilitarianism seemed to conflict with the idea that we 
should have the right to live our own lives the way we chose, so long as we respected other 
people’s freedom.  The American poet Robert Frost once said ‘I hold it to be the inalienable 
right of anybody to go to hell in his own way,’ and I sympathized with that view, even 
while holding that it wouldn’t be particularly laudable to use your inalienable right in that 
way.2  The problem would be how to set limits on the exercise of that right.  Going to hell 
in one’s own way could mean driving as fast as you could in the wrong direction down the 
M4.  But that would very likely take a number of people with you, and surely you didn’t 
                                                 
1 One such writing was Bernard Williams’ influential A Critique of Utilitarianism (1973) 
2 Robert Frost would arguably have more appropriately referred to an ‘inviolable’ rather than an 
‘inalienable’ right and my sympathies should have been with that revision of his view.  ‘Inalienable 
rights’ are rights the possessor of which is not at liberty to divest herself of.  ‘Inviolable rights’ are 
rights which place limits on the legitimate actions of others.  Frost, presumably, intended to say that 
people having the right to go to hell in their own way meant that others should not interfere with a 
person’s right to decide to go to hell. 
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have the right to do that. 
 
1.0.3 To illustrate the first of these worries with a simple example.  I have an unexpected 
lottery win of £100.  A friend of mine recently fixed my van for free as a favour when I was 
broke, when normally I’d have paid her £100.  Now I know that she’s quite hard up (but not 
destitute) and I set out to give her the money. On the way I am waylaid by a charity 
fundraiser for UNICEF.  He persuades me that by donating £100 to their cause, UNICEF 
can buy enough vaccines to save 100 children’s lives in Africa.  The expected benefits of 
my giving the money to the charity appear, then, to exceed the expected benefits of 
returning the favour to my friend.  So my benevolent instincts favour giving the money to 
the fundraiser from UNICEF.  But I am worried that justice requires me to give the money 
to my friend.  I owe her the money in return for the work she carried out on my van.  
However much good I might do for children by giving to the charity, they have done 
nothing to benefit me and consequently I owe them nothing.  Furthermore, justice requires 
me to repay debts to the people I owe before I start thinking about the amount of good I 
could bring about. 
 
1.0.4 The second worry can be explained as the worry that utilitarianism would limit my 
freedom to go to hell in my own way (traffic regulations can surely be justified by 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis), at too high a cost.  It doesn’t appear to give me any right to 
do anything at all apart from promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number.  To 
take a statement of the utilitarian creed from one of its most widely known and 
uncompromising contemporary advocates, Peter Singer 
 
In its simplest, classical form, utilitarianism is the theory that an act is right 
only if it does at least as much to increase happiness and reduce misery, for 
all those affected by it, as any possible alternative act.1  
 
So according to this code, it wouldn’t just be my right to give the £100 to UNICEF, it 
would be my duty.  Utilitarianism doesn’t appear to allow people any freedom to live their 
                                                 
1 Singer 1981 p.64 
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lives the way they choose.1   
 
1.0.5 Underlying the first worry is the suggestion that there may be another source of 
moral motivation than benevolence that grounds our fundamental obligations of justice in 
distribution: reciprocity, which for now can be defined just as the requirement that we give 
fair repayment for our advantages to those who provide them.  I think the example above 
serves to illustrate the difference between the two sources of moral motivation well enough, 
though it should not be taken to provide an illustration of what the actual demands of 
reciprocity might turn out to be, as a moment’s reflection should show.  Suppose we accept 
that the motive of reciprocity as just described grounds our fundamental obligations of 
justice in distribution. Following various commentators, most notably Allan Gibbard and 
John Rawls himself, I shall call this conception of distributive justice, Justice as 
Reciprocity.  The example is set against background institutions of society which are all 
open to question.  It may turn out, when the demands of Justice as Reciprocity are fully 
cashed out, that the mechanic had no right to own the garage I took my van to, or that I had 
no right to the van or the money in my pocket, or all, some, or none of the above.  But 
given the very different nature of the two sources of moral motivation under consideration, 
whatever the requirements of Justice as Reciprocity turn out to be, when fully cashed out, it 
seems likely that they will conflict with utilitarianism when utilitarianism is assumed to 
depend on the motive of benevolence for its foundation. 
 
1 Deontological liberalism   
 
1.1.1 The second worry would be solved by the existence of ‘inviolable rights’ that 
protect the individual’s rights to live the life they choose from the demands of utilitarianism 
while also imposing bounds on acceptable behaviour to live the life of their choice so long 
as they don’t violate others’ right to do the same.  So I should have the freedom not to give 
every last penny to good causes while not having the freedom to drive the wrong way on 
the motorway.  And so should everybody else.  This position is deontological liberalism 
                                                 
1 Samuel Scheffler argued that consequentialism could, and should, be adapted so as to allow moral 
agents more freedom through an ‘agent-centred prerogative’ in The Rejection of Consequentialism 
(1994).  More recently the criticism that utilitarianism denies people sufficient freedom has been 
upheld by Peter Vallentyne in his essay, ‘Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (2006).   
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and I hope its appeal is already obvious from the account I’ve given of it above.  
Deontological liberalism I take to be defined by the acceptance of one or more of three 
tenets.  The first, which I shall call the core tenet of deontological liberalism, is that 
people have the right not to maximize the aggregate sum of advantages, however 
advantages may be defined.  The second is that the rights that people have impose some 
limits on what people can rightly do to others.  Robert Nozick offers a useful account of 
this second tenet of deontological liberalism in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia, ‘[a] 
line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space around an individual.  Locke 
holds that this line is determined by an individual’s natural rights, which limit the action of 
others.  Non-Lockeans view other considerations as setting the position and contour of this 
line.’1  
  
1.1.2 It is useful here to distinguish more clearly between the core tenet of deontological 
liberalism and the second tenet of deontological liberalism.  The core tenet of deontological 
liberalism bestows on people rights that were famously categorized by the legal theorist 
Wesley Hohfeld as ‘liberty-rights’.   A ‘liberty-right’ accords a person the right to do 
something without placing others under any correlative duty to restrain their behaviour in 
respect for that right (without limiting the actions of others, in Nozick’s words).  In the 
present context, this would mean that that those who have the liberty not to maximize 
utility are under no obligation to maximize utility.  But it would not place anyone else 
under any obligation to respect their freedom to not maximize utility.  If there were people 
strong enough to force others to maximize utility against their will, the strong would have 
the right to do so.  What would be needed for the weak to be protected against the strong in 
this case are Hohfeld’s ‘claim-rights’ that would be bestowed by the second tenet of 
deontological liberalism.  A ‘claim-right’ not only gives people a right to something, it 
places others under an obligation to respect that right (in the words of Nozick it would 
                                                 
1 Nozick 1974 p.57.  Robert Nozick counts as a Lockean whereas Rawls, I think, would be a non-
Lockean in Nozick’s terms as the deontological rights he defends are not ‘natural’ ones, but ones that 
are derived from a hypothetical social contract.  It is worth noting that on more than one occasion Rawls 
appears to subscribe to a different definition of ‘natural right’.  So, in A Theory of Justice (henceforth 
Theory) he writes that ‘[e]ach member of society is thought to have an inviolability on justice, or as 
some say, on natural right, which even the welfare of everyone else cannot override’ and he maintains 
that his hypothetical contract can account for this ‘common sense conviction’ of justice (Rawls T of J 
Rev 1999 p. 24-25).  
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‘limit the action of others.’)1 
 
1.1.3 This distinction is important as my argument of Chapter 4 that ‘reciprocal classical 
utilitarianism’ would only respect the core tenet of deontological liberalism involves 
demonstrating that it would only grant ‘liberty-rights’ and not ‘claim-rights.’ 
 
1.1.4 The third tenet of deontological liberalism is that the rules of justice that define 
peoples’ rights should be, at least in some way, neutral between different conceptions of the 
good. 
 
2 Utilitarianism: Act and Reciprocal 
 
1.2.1 Utilitarianism, as it is commonly understood, is classical act utilitarianism.  
Classical act utilitarianism is unable to accommodate any of the three tenets of 
deontological liberalism. The statement from Peter Singer above (§1.0.4) provides, I think, 
a good statement of that form of utilitarianism and can be used to explain just why it is 
unable to accommodate of these three tenets.  The core tenet of deontological liberalism 
holds that people should have the right not to maximize the sum of advantages. But all are 
obliged, according to Singer’s statement, to perform only those acts that do at least as much 
to increase happiness and reduce misery as any possible alternative act. Then all are obliged 
to perform those acts that maximize the ‘sum of advantages’, on classical utilitarianism’s 
understanding of the notion of ‘maximizing the sum of advantages’. It follows that classical 
utilitarianism does not grant me the right to not perform the acts that maximize the sum of 
advantages.  So classical act utilitarianism is unable to accommodate the core tenet of 
deontological liberalism which holds that I do have the right not to maximize the sum of 
advantages. 
 
1.2.2 It is also unable to accommodate the second tenet.  If I am obliged to perform that 
act which maximizes advantages, then I am certainly permitted to perform that act, and so 
                                                 
1 My account of Hohfeld’s distinction between ‘liberty-rights’ and ‘claim-rights’ follows that given 
by Eleanor Curran in ‘Blinded by the Light of Hohfeld: Hobbes’s Notion of Liberty’ (Curran 2010 
pp. 100-102) 
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no limits can be placed on my right to perform that act.  But the second tenet of 
deontological liberalism, as the quotation of Nozick’s illustrates, claims precisely that 
people have rights which would limit what I could permissibly do in the pursuit of 
maximizing the sum of advantages.  A variant of a well-known example against 
utilitarianism imagines a doctor in a hospital who has four patients who will shortly die 
unless they receive an organ transplant.  One needs a new liver, the second a new lung, the 
third a new pancreas and the last a new heart.  As chance would have it, there’s a little old 
lady fast asleep on a bench around the back of the hospital.  Concerned that she need needs 
friends and relatives to come and collect her, the doctor goes through her handbag in search 
of an address book.  He doesn’t find one, but does find an organ donor card, certifying that 
all her organs had been checked the week before and are in phenomenal condition for 
someone of such advanced years.  He also happens upon a copy of her will which declares 
that since she has no friends and relatives she intends to leave what little money she has to 
the International Charity for Animal Welfare (ICAW): a charity which spends the bulk of 
its revenue on manufacturing toy animals to give to its donors as rewards for their 
donations. A quick calculation persuades the doctor that the utility maximizing action 
would be to suffocate the old lady, then have her found and wheeled in for her organs to be 
harvested.  But the second tenet of deontological liberalism claims that she has some kind 
of right, perhaps the right to life, that would be violated by the contemplated homicide and 
that thereby renders such an act morally impermissible.  Because act utilitarianism holds 
that utility maximizing acts are permissible it cannot accommodate the second 
deontological precept of justice, which sets limits on what we may permissibly do to others 
in the name of the greater good. 
 
1.2.3 Utilitarianism is also unable to accommodate the third tenet of deontological 
liberalism.  The term ‘conception of the good’ referred to above (§1.1.3) can be thought of 
as a choice of a particular kind of life.  It is convenient here to exemplify the idea of 
‘conception of the good’ rather than to define it precisely.  The dominant forms of religion 
all prescribe different conceptions of the good to their followers by directing them to act in 
different ways.  Muslims and Jews are directed to not eat pork and Hindus are directed to 
not eat beef.  The person who wants to go to hell in his own way has a particular conception 
of the good, as does a classical act utilitarian who accepts that we are obliged to perform 
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only those acts which do at least as much to increase happiness and reduce misery as any 
other available act.  And there lies the problem.  If we are obliged to act in accordance with 
utilitarian criteria, then there is no room for any competing criteria to determine how we 
may behave.  We should eat pork or beef if and only if doing so maximizes the sum of 
advantages. Thus, the doctrine of classical act utilitarianism allows no room to respect the 
right of Hindus to not eat beef and Muslims to not eat pork if they choose to do so on 
religious grounds.  Classical act utilitarianism specifies that there is only one conception of 
the good that may legitimately order our lives: classical act utilitarianism.  It is not neutral 
between itself and other conceptions of the good. 
 
1.2.4 The variant of utilitarianism considered so far has been classical act utilitarianism, 
which defines the advantages to be maximized in terms of pleasure minus pain.  Those 
utilitarian theories which define the good to be promoted in this way are known as 
‘hedonistic.’  Classical act utilitarianism not only defines the advantages to be maximized 
in terms of happiness, but also aims to maximize the total sum of such advantages.  
Another possibility would be to aim at maximizing the average level of utility in society.  
This alternative is ‘average utilitarianism’ and is the variant Rawls considers to be the main 
rival to his principles of justice. There are also other ways in which ‘advantages’ may be 
defined by different variants of utilitarianism.  Alternatives to hedonistic utilitarianism 
include those variants which define the advantages to be maximized in terms of preference 
satisfaction or something similar.  Despite their considerable differences, all the versions of 
utilitarianism considered by my account so far could embrace the notion that all moral 
agents are morally obligated to perform those acts that maximize, or could be expected to 
maximize, the sum of advantages, however this may be defined. They would then, by 
definition, all be variants of act utilitarianism.  But there are other variants of 
utilitarianism that haven’t yet been considered, which are often described as ‘rule’ or 
‘indirect’ utilitarianism.  These do not require the moral agent to always perform those acts 
that maximize, or could be expected to maximize, the good.  Instead, they direct people to 
act in accordance with rules that derive their ultimate justification from some kind of idea 
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that they are the rules with the greatest propensity for maximizing the good. 1  
 
1.2.5 For the purpose of this thesis I shall set rule (or indirect) utilitarianism aside and be 
concerned with act utilitarianism.  I shall also be arguing on behalf of the classical principle 
of utility, so my arguments should often be read as assuming ‘utilitarianism’ to refer to 
‘classical act utilitarianism’.  But I believe that much of my argument on behalf of classical 
act utilitarianism might be coherently extended in support of other variants of 
utilitarianism, including variants of rule utilitarianism, though it is beyond the remit of this 
thesis to extend them so far.  It is, however, very important to my argument to introduce the 
new variant of utilitarianism of my own devising, that I have referred to as ‘reciprocal 
classical utilitarianism’.  Reciprocal classical utilitarianism acknowledges the classical 
principle of utility as the predominant principle of distribution for society, but allows that 
some individuals may be exempt from the obligation to maximize the good.  This 
distinction is necessary, I shall argue, as the logic of Justice as Reciprocity points to those 
for whom cooperation with others holds sufficiently dismal prospects to be relieved from a 
duty to cooperate. I shall argue that while the charge that Rawls makes, that classical 
utilitarianism is unjust, because it involves a violation of rights, be made to stick, the same 
charge would not be upheld against reciprocal utilitarianism.   
 
1.2.6 In contrast to classical act utilitarianism, reciprocal classical utilitarianism can 
accommodate the core tenet of deontological liberalism.2  However, my argument will not 
provide much consolation for deontological liberals as they are typically committed to the 
other two tenets of deontological liberalism as well.  And reciprocal utilitarianism is, I shall 
show, unable to accommodate the other two.  This demonstration won’t be fully completed 
until Chapter 4, but I can here give an indication of its implications.  In contrast to act 
utilitarianism, reciprocal utilitarianism would relieve people of a duty to perform utility 
maximizing actions if performing those actions would jeopardize their prospect of having a 
life worth living.  But, by not upholding the second tenet of deontological liberalism, 
                                                 
1 A comprehensive overview of the different variants of utilitarianism, including more obscure ones 
such as ‘scalar utilitarianism’, is given by Julia Driver in Consequentialism (2012). 
2 I also suspect that other variants of utilitarianism, including rule utilitarian variants, would face 
insurmountable difficulties in accommodating the core tenet of deontological liberalism though it is 
beyond the remit of this thesis to prove this. 
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reciprocal classical utilitarianism would always permit someone to perform utility 
maximizing actions.  So in the context of the anti-utilitarian example given above (§1.2.2), 
reciprocal classical utilitarianism would permit the doctor to murder the old lady and 
harvest her organs, without construing such an action as a violation of her rights.  It would 
also not be neutral between conceptions of the good.  Insofar as someone has an obligation 
to act reciprocally, that is, if they are not exempted from the obligation to perform the 
action in question on the grounds that doing so would jeopardize their prospect of having a 
life worth living, they are obliged to maximize utility at the expense of promoting any other 
value.   
 
3 Competing conceptions of justice 
 
1.3.1 I think it is fair to speculate that Rawls initially approached the subject of 
distributive justice with similarly conflicting worries to those of mine that I described 
above (§1.0.1 - §1.0.5).1 The way he resolved them, on the reading of his theory that I shall 
uphold for the purpose of this thesis, was to put forward a theory of Justice as Reciprocity.  
According to Rawls’s theory of Justice as Reciprocity, the rules that people should follow 
in order to provide fair repayment for their advantages to those who provided them would 
be rules that also instantiated the three tenets of deontological liberalism.  The particular 
theory of Justice as Reciprocity Rawls put forward, he named Justice as Fairness, and it 
relied on the device of a hypothetical contract to construct principles suitable for the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  In the next section I shall describe Rawls’s theory of 
Justice as Fairness in more detail.  But here I clarify the broader conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity by setting it out alongside rival conceptions of justice.  Doing so will enable 
me to flesh out the conception of Justice as Reciprocity in more detail, and compare some 
of its advantages and disadvantages with those of its rivals, including, most pertinently for 
this thesis, the conception of Justice as Benevolence. 
                                                 
1 This may sound surprising to those who are only familiar with his works from ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
onwards, as those works display little sympathy with utilitarianism as a theory of distributive justice, 
though they do show some admiration for its method and its exponents.  But Rawls’s early essay ‘Two 
Concepts of Rules’ (1955) is best read as an attempt to put forward a kind of rule-utilitarianism and is 
certainly sympathetic to the general aims of utilitarianism.  
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1.3.2 The easiest way for me to explain some of the important features of different 
conceptions of justice is against the backdrop of a debate between Allan Gibbard and Brian 
Barry over how Rawls’s overarching philosophical project should best be understood.  My 
sympathies in this debate lie entirely with Gibbard’s suggestion that Rawls’s theory is 
essentially a version of Justice as Reciprocity, and I shall start by giving an account of 
Gibbard’s position in that debate. 
 
1.3.3 Gibbard argued that Rawls should be understood as putting forward a theory of 
Justice as Reciprocity in his article ‘Constructing Justice’, a review of Brian Barry’s book 
Theories of Justice.  To understand Gibbard’s position, it will help to first have an idea of 
the main theme of Barry’s Theories of Justice.  Theories of Justice examines Rawls’s 
particular theory of justice in the light of what Barry takes to be the two main strands of 
thought on distributive justice, throughout the history of philosophy.  The first strand is 
what Gibbard, following Barry, calls ‘Justice as Mutual Advantage’.  This takes the motive 
to act justly to be an egoistic one: people should act justly because it is in their own interest 
to do so.  The historical name most associated with this approach towards justice is the 
seventeenth century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who shall receive more attention 
in this chapter and in Chapter 4, but elements of the conception of Justice as Mutual 
Advantage are found in Plato’s Republic, relates Barry.1 Much more recently, a 
contemporary of Rawls, David Gauthier, put forward a Hobbesian theory of justice in his 
book Morals by Agreement in 1986.   
 
1.3.4 Justice as Impartiality has a vaguer history, according to Barry, but its ‘general 
approach, which calls on people to detach themselves from their own contingently given 
positions and take up an impartial standpoint…is a product of the enlightenment, and 
everyone who follows it acknowledges a debt to Kant’.2 The defining feature of Justice as 
Impartiality, Barry stipulates, is its adoption of the motive for behaving justly as ‘the desire 
to act in accordance with principles that could not reasonably be rejected by people seeking 
an agreement under conditions free from morally irrelevant bargaining advantages and 
                                                 
1 Barry 1989 pp. 3 - 9 
2 Barry 1989 p. 8 
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disadvantages.’1  Barry interprets Rawls as being torn between these two approaches to 
justice, uneasily combining elements of both in A Theory of Justice.  
 
1.3.5 However, Gibbard suggests, as an alternative interpretation of Rawls’s project to 
Barry’s, that ‘Rawls long ago seemed to have his eye on a third perch: one he called Justice 
as Reciprocity’.2 This conception of justice should be distinguished from Justice as Mutual 
Advantage by its espousal of an alternative motive to be just.  As Gibbard describes this 
alternative motive 
 
Passage 1a: (CJ) 
 
If I return favor for favor, I may be doing so in pursuit of my own advantage, 
as a means to keep the favors rolling.  My motivation might, however, be 
more intrinsically reciprocal:  I might be decent to him because he has been 
decent to me.  I might prefer treating another well who has treated me well, 
even if he has no power to affect me. We tip for service in strange 
restaurants.3 
  
1.3.6 The motive Gibbard describes as central to Justice as Reciprocity is essentially the 
same as the motive I described in my example above (§1.0.3 - §1.0.5).  But where my 
example was designed to illustrate an intuitive conflict between the demands of 
benevolence and reciprocity, Gibbard’s example nicely illustrates the distinction between 
acting egoistically, the motive behind the conception of Justice as Mutual Advantage, and 
acting reciprocally.  We have a self-interested motive for tipping in a local restaurant 
because, if we don’t, the waiter might spit in our food on our next visit.  But we have no 
self-interested motive for tipping in a restaurant that we won’t return to.  To tip in these 
circumstances is to draw on another source of motivation: reciprocity.  Justice as 
Reciprocity takes that source of motivation to be our motive to be just. 
 
                                                 
1 Barry 1989 p. 8.  Barry takes his description of the motive underlying Justice as Impartiality from 
Thomas Scanlon’s ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’.  But Barry’s interpretation of Scanlon as a 
theorist of Justice as Impartiality is contentious, so I have not referred to Scanlon as a theorist of 
Justice as Impartiality.  I am grateful to Mike Otsuka for pointing the contentiousness of Barry’s 
interpretation of Scanlon out to me. 
2 Gibbard 1991 p. 266 
3 Gibbard 1991 p. 266. 
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1.3.7 Despite the different ‘motives to be just’ underlying Justice as Reciprocity and 
Justice as Mutual Advantage, advocates of the two competing conceptions of justice agree 
on the point that society should be conceived of as a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage.  This agreement over the fundamental conception of society appears to have led 
to an agreement between the main contemporary proponents of the rival approaches, John 
Rawls and David Gauthier, on the scope both of persons who have any obligation of 
justice, and of those to whom it should be extended.   My reciprocal obligation to the waiter 
in the strange restaurant, if I have one, says that because they have benefited me, I should 
benefit them. The beneficiary of the favour has an obligation to return a favour to his 
benefactor. But an obligation of reciprocity or mutual advantage would not extend to 
providing benefits for people in developing countries who have done nothing to benefit me, 
or for some of the congenitally disabled, who have not done, and cannot do, anything to 
benefit me.1  And here lies a simple difference between Justice as Reciprocity and Justice 
                                                 
1 I am here passing swiftly over two complicated issues.  The first is that of whether Justice as 
Reciprocity excludes the congenitally disabled from its scope. My interpretation of Rawls here 
follows that of Barry who writes in Justice as Impartiality that ‘the grim logic of justice as 
reciprocity excludes them [i.e. the congenitally disabled] from its scope’. (Barry 1995 p.60).  
Barry’s evidence for Rawls’s exclusion of the congenitally disabled is that ‘[i]n Political 
Liberalism, Rawls says that among the problems left over by his theory, which assumes that 
‘persons are normal and cooperating members of society over a complete life’ is the question of 
what is owed to those who fail to meet this condition, either temporarily (from illness and accident) 
or permanently’ (p.21).  He adds that he thinks the theory ‘yields reasonable answers…to part of 
[this question], to the problem of providing for what we may call normal health care.’  Barry reads 
this as an ‘an implicit admission that Rawls cannot, any more than could Gauthier…accommodate 
the idea that justice demands support of the congenitally disabled.’ (Barry 1995 p.60).  Rawls did 
not widen the scope of his theory to include the congenitally disabled in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement (2001) where he reaffirmed his view of ‘political society…as a fair system of social 
cooperation…where those engaged in cooperation are viewed as free and equal citizens and normal 
cooperating members of society over a complete life.’ (Rawls 2001 p. 4 my italics).  So my 
interpretation of Rawls’s theory is in accordance with Barry’s in holding it to exclude the 
(sufficiently) congenitally disabled from either having obligations of reciprocity themselves or 
being those to whom obligations of reciprocity are owed. I shall, however, suggest in Chapter 4 that 
the logic of Justice as Reciprocity may extend to including some of the congenitally disabled within 
the scope of those to whom obligations of reciprocity are owed.  The second contentious issue is 
whether the logic Justice as Mutual Advantage is extended too far in including within the scope of 
persons to whom obligations of mutual advantage are owed those who have no power to harm us if 
we don’t provide them with benefits.  Gauthier’s theory of mutual advantage concurs with Rawls’s 
theory in extending the scope of persons to whom obligations of justice are owed to include all 
normal cooperating members of society.  But many of those, such as the waiter in the strange 
restaurant, would have no power to harm us if we did not fulfil our obligations to them, so a 
question arises as to why we should be motivated by self-interest to fulfil such obligations.  
Gauthier’s answer is, roughly, that rational self-interested behaviour should be evaluated at the level 
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as Impartiality, at least as Barry conceives of it.  Justice as Impartiality, as described by 
Barry in Theories of Justice and its sequel Justice as Impartiality, extends the scope of my 
obligations of justice to include anyone who might be affected by an agent’s behaviour.  
People in developing nations who could benefit from my making a small donation to 
UNICEF might be affected by my behaviour as whether or not I make that donation could 
make a difference to their lives.  So they should, arguably, be included in the class of 
people who might reasonably reject any principle that exempted me from making such 
donations.  Justice as Impartiality, as put forward by Barry, would include more people 
within its scope than Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
1.3.8 However, as Gibbard remarked in ‘Constructing Justice’, ‘Justice as Impartiality 
may be too vague to be a clear, distinct alternative’ to Justice as Mutual Advantage or 
Justice as Reciprocity.1 He exemplified this point by showing how justice’s requirement of 
equal treatment, an element of Rawls’s theory that Barry admires and interprets as an 
element of Justice as Impartiality within Rawls’s theory, could be reconciled with 
utilitarianism.  As Gibbard puts it ‘[u]tilitarianism treats everyone equally, in the sense that 
every person is told that his interests will be overridden only when otherwise others would 
have to forgo a greater interest.’2 Gibbard then questions the need for Justice as Impartiality 
to go beyond the equal treatment that is compatible with utilitarianism, as Barry asserts that 
it should, in favour of a more egalitarian theory of justice.  So Gibbard effectively asserted 
that the motive to act impartially was neutral between utilitarianism and the more 
egalitarian approach to distributive justice favoured by Barry and Rawls. 
 
1.3.9 Barry responded by subsequently putting a case for Justice as Impartiality’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
of disposition rather than action.  In terms of this example, if I were the kind of person who 
wouldn’t leave a tip the waiter would be aware of this from the start and not provide me with good 
service in the first place, so it is not in my self-interest to be the kind of person who would not leave 
a tip.  Gibbard offers some convincing (to my mind) objections to this aspect of Gauthier’s theory in 
‘Constructing Justice’ as does Parfit in Reasons and Persons. (1984 pp. 16 - 23) For the purpose of 
my thesis I can afford not to enter any further into this debate, as I touch on the conception of 
Justice as Mutual Advantage only to provide some insight into the conceptions of Justice as 
Reciprocity and Justice as Benevolence.  A proper evaluation of the viability of Justice as Mutual 
Advantage is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
1 Gibbard 1991 p. 266 
2 Gibbard 1991 pp. 277-278 
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incompatibility with utilitarianism in his book Justice as Impartiality, based on the idea that 
the principle of utility is a principle that could be reasonably rejected by those who would 
be worst off under its application, and so would not meet Justice as Impartiality’s 
motivational requirement described above (§1.3.3).1  I find Barry’s case unconvincing, but 
do not have space to argue against it here.2  But I will offer one consideration in favour of 
the rejection of Justice as Impartiality as an appealing alternative conception of justice, at 
least as Justice as Impartiality is put forward by Barry.  One of the advantages of Justice as 
Impartiality over Justice as Mutual Advantage appeared to be its ability to extend the scope 
of those to whom obligations of justice are owed to ‘third parties’ such as the congenitally 
disabled and future generations. As I remarked above (§1.3.5), Justice as Impartiality, 
Barry maintains, would include these third parties within its scope because they are people 
who could ‘reasonably reject’ principles that neglected them.  Many people intuitively feel 
that we have a moral duty to provide for those who are unable to provide for themselves 
and Barry’s theory of Justice as Impartiality purports to offer one way to underwrite this 
intuition. 
 
1.3.10 But would Barry’s Justice as Impartiality really cover the ‘third parties’ who are 
future generations?  If we take the motivational requirement of Justice as Impartiality 
literally, they are arguably beyond its scope as well. Future generations could not 
reasonably reject our refusal to bring them into the world, because in order to reject it they 
would have to exist, or at least be identifiable as people who are (at least probably) going to 
come into existence.  Barry’s Justice as Impartiality looks as though it may be unable to 
underwrite a strong intuition that many people share: we have a duty to preserve the planet 
for the sake of future generations. 
 
1.3.11 In that regard Justice as Benevolence has a definite advantage.  It could, and should, 
extend its scope to include future generations.  If our motive to be just directs us to produce 
as much good as possible then we may have obligations to bring happy people into the 
world, regardless of whether we owe them in return for the benefits they provide for us 
                                                 
1 See Barry Justice as Impartiality 1995 pp 61 - 67 
2 I put forward some considerations against in in Chapter 2 (§§ 2.5.2 ) 
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(which they don’t) as Justice as Mutual Advantage would require, and regardless of 
whether they could reasonably reject a principle that didn’t bring them into the world (they 
probably couldn’t) as Barry’s Justice as Impartiality would require.  Justice as Benevolence 
would have the widest scope of all the conceptions of justice described in this section, 
extending to the congenitally disabled, future generations, non-human animals and even 
extra-terrestrials (if they do, or could, exist). 
 
1.3.12 Unfortunately, despite what I take to be its very considerable advantage in holding 
out a prospect of underwriting an obligation to future generations, Justice as Benevolence 
doesn’t strike me as a very plausible conception of justice.  I shall say a bit more about this 
in Section 6 of this chapter. 
 
1.3.13  It would be too much of a distraction from the main aims of this thesis to evaluate 
the conceptions of Justice as Impartiality and Justice as Mutual Advantage in more detail.  
The point of raising them was primarily to provide some context for the conceptions of 
Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity.  But I shall end this section with a 
couple of remarks as to why I think they would ultimately prove unviable. 
 
1.3.14 Justice as Mutual Advantage would prove unviable because its motive to be just 
does not provide an adequate motive for just behaviour, as it is normally understood, as 
requiring a constraint on the pursuit of self-interest. Gauthier’s attempts to sustain the 
theory by applying the notion of rational self-interest to disposition rather than action have, 
in my opinion, been effectively rebutted by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons.1   
 
1.3.15 Barry’s Justice as Impartiality seems to me, as it did to Gibbard, to be an unstable 
compromise.  I find it hard to see a rationale for its contractualist motivational requirement 
once the conception of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage is dispensed 
with, as it is, by Barry.  And it has the disadvantage already considered above of being at 
least unclear in its support for obligations to future generations.  Justice as Benevolence, as 
remarked above, shares Justice as Impartiality’s commitment to equal treatment without 
                                                 
1 See Parfit 1984 pp. 17 - 23 
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being saddled with its contractualist motivational requirement. 
 
1.3.16 So the contest that I am concerned with in this thesis is between Justice as 
Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity, with Justice as Mutual Advantage and Justice as 
Impartiality set to one side.  A couple more remarks are required about how I shall 
understand Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity in this thesis and once again I 
follow Gibbard’s account from ‘Constructing Justice.’  
  
1.3.17 As Gibbard relates 
 
Passage 1b (CJ) 
 
Rawls proposes that justice is fairness in exchange, but on a grand scale: it is 
fairness in the terms governing a society-wide system of reciprocity.  The 
system consists in each person’s supporting a basic social structure and 
drawing benefits from it.  The citizen of a well-ordered society is motivated 
to return benefits fairly, and this general motivation becomes a motivation to 
conform to the rules of a social structure he considers fair.1  
 
Gibbard fleshes out this account of Rawls’s theory of Justice as Reciprocity by going on to 
suggest that ‘the prime question Rawls addresses’ is 
 
Passage 1c (CJ) 
 
“Why limit myself in pursuit of my own advantage?”  This is a question that 
can be asked also by a well-off person: he has much but why not go for 
more?  Rawls, in effect, gives this answer: “You have what you have only 
because others constrain themselves, in ways that make for a fair cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage.  Constrain yourself by these rules in return, 
and you give them fair return for what they give you.”  Whether this answer 
moves a person depends on his sentiments of fair reciprocity.2 
 
4. The defining features of Justice as Reciprocity 
 
                                                 
1 Gibbard 1991 p. 265 
2 Gibbard 1991 p. 269 
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1.4.1 Passage 1c (CJ) I take to define the essence of the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity and it sets the requirement that principles of justice have to meet, when society 
is conceived as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, in order to be suited to the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  Three important points about it should be noted.  The 
first is that Justice as Reciprocity requires constraint on the part of those who are required 
to act justly.  I shall call this the constraint requirement. The second is that the reply 
Gibbard imagines Rawls might give makes reference to a fair cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage.  The implication is that a necessary condition that must be met for any 
individual participating in society to have a duty of reciprocity, is that the rules governing 
society are fair.  I shall refer to this as the fairness condition, and in the course of this 
thesis will argue that Rawls never produced a satisfactory stipulation of the fairness 
condition.  The third is that the cooperative venture is for mutual advantage.  This implies 
that a second necessary condition that must be met for any individual cooperating with the 
rules of society is that society affords them some prospect of ‘advantage’. I shall call this 
the mutual advantage condition.1 How ‘advantage’ should appropriately be defined for 
the conception of Justice as Reciprocity, is a difficult question, and another one that I shall 
maintain Rawls never satisfactorily resolved.  It should be understood as advantage with 
respect to the relevant situation of equal liberty, whatever that might turn out to involve.  
The reason Rawls never managed to resolve the question of the mutual advantage 
condition, I shall argue, is because he never managed to come up with a relevant situation 
of equal liberty that yielded the results he wanted.2 
 
1.4.2 My Preface concluded by claiming that a reasonable argument can be reconstructed 
that favours the classical principle of utility as a principle suited to the conception of Justice 
as Reciprocity.  The features of the conception of Justice as Reciprocity that I have just 
highlighted are at the heart of my case, and also at the heart of Rawls’s case that 
                                                 
1 The justification for this term, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, is to pick one that Rawls didn’t 
use himself at various points to describe other conditions. 
2 In the first model of his theory it appeared to be the greatest liberty compatible with an equal 
liberty for all guaranteed by the first principle of justice (§§2.1.1 – 2.1.27). In the second model it 
appeared to be with respect to a vaguely described state of nature which wasn’t as dismal as a 
‘Hobbesian’ one (§§1.9.4 – 1.9.31).  In model 1.5 it was an imaginary society where people were 
secure in their possession of constitutional liberties.  In the third model it was a ‘Hobbesian’ state of 
nature of general egoism. 
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utilitarianism is not suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  So I can set out here 
the broad outline of my argument, in relation to these features.   
 
1.4.3 Rawls’s case that the utilitarian conceptions of justice are unsuitable for the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity revolved around his attempts to show that they could 
not meet either the fairness condition or the mutual advantage condition.  As I describe in 
Chapter 3, his first model of Justice as Fairness looked able to support those contentions.1  
But he was forced to change that model when he realized that it didn’t work, and never 
found a satisfactory substitute for the assumptions which, had they worked, would have 
sustained the charge that utilitarianism2 would not meet the fairness or mutual advantage 
conditions.  The result was that, according to the new assumptions of Theory, utilitarianism 
would meet the mutual advantage and fairness conditions.  As I show in detail in Chapter 4 
he devoted much energy and many words to trying to find some alternative mutual 
advantage condition that the two principles of justice would meet, but that utilitarianism 
would fail to meet.  But, I shall maintain, he never succeeded in that endeavour.  The only 
charge that he could, and did, continue to level against the principle of utility is that, in 
contrast to the principles of justice, it would be prepared to sacrifice the prospects of the 
less advantaged for the sake of greater advantages to the more advantaged.3  
 
1.4.4 So the argument in this thesis revolves primarily around the question of whether 
reciprocal classical utilitarianism instantiates the three defining features of Justice as 
Reciprocity set out above (§1.4.1). 
 
5 Utilitarian liberalism 
 
1.5.1   Rawls’s project should certainly not be understood as simply trying to prove that the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity would repudiate utilitarianism.  An equally important 
                                                 
1 In fact, as I show in Chapter 2 (§§2.3.1 – 2.3.11) on the assumptions of the first model any 
principles of justice that met the mutual advantage condition would also meet the fairness condition 
and vice versa. 
2 To make for easier reading I shall sometimes use the term ‘utilitarianism’ to stand for all the 
various utilitarian conceptions of justice, bar reciprocal classical utilitarianism. 
3 This is the essence of the ‘principle of reciprocity’ referred to in several places in Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement (e.g. Rawls 2001 p.77) 
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concern of his was to show that Justice as Reciprocity would provide a philosophical 
grounding for deontological liberalism, and he hoped to do this with his particular theory of 
Justice as Reciprocity: Justice as Fairness.  I shall describe Justice as Fairness in some 
detail after first describing an alternative, and historically very influential, foundation for 
liberalism: utilitarian liberalism. Utilitarian liberalism would support the kind of liberal 
rights that Rawls was concerned to justify philosophically.  But it would do so only 
tenuously and would rely on the problematic conception of Justice as Benevolence. Rawls 
evidently did not find this approach to the liberal values he held dear satisfactory and 
explicitly said as much in Theory.1 The enormous influence Rawls’s theories of justice and 
political liberalism can, I believe, be attributed to his championing of deontological 
liberalism, which appeals to philosophers who share Rawls’s liberal values, and his disdain 
for the utilitarian justification of those values.2  Many of those philosophers care little to 
nothing for Rawls’s attempt to ground them in his theory of Justice as Fairness.  However, 
in Chapter 4 I shall suggest that in the light of the failure of Rawls’s project to provide a 
foundation for deontological liberalism through his theory of Justice as Reciprocity, 
utilitarianism may provide the strongest philosophical support for liberalism that is 
available.  So I offer a sketch of utilitarian liberalism and the putative drawbacks of the 
utilitarian approach to liberalism here. 
 
1.5.2 There is some irony in the fact that although Rawls’s deontological liberalism and 
utilitarian liberalism have very different philosophical foundations, they would, in my 
opinion, be likely to prescribe quite similar policies in terms of both individual rights and 
economic distribution.  The principle Rawls came up with to govern economic distribution, 
                                                 
1 See Theory Chapter 6 (Rawls T of J Rev1999 p.25) 
2 Brian Barry provides an example of a philosopher who admires Rawls’s liberal values but cares 
nothing for Justice as Reciprocity or the hypothetical contract device of Justice as Fairness.  In 
Justice as Impartiality Barry writes: ‘For the purpose of this book, I shall simply excise from 
Rawls’s theory any reference to justice as reciprocity.  If we do this we get a coherent theory of 
justice as impartiality.’ (Barry 1995 p.60)  Barry goes on, correctly in my view, interpret Rawls’s 
theory of Justice as Fairness, as deriving its rationale from Justice as Reciprocity.  But he then 
dismisses Justice as Fairness as an inadequate device as inadequate from the point of view of Justice 
as Reciprocity, remarking ‘[i]ts justification must come from its being the only way of producing 
the desired outcome.  But then the redundancy of the whole contraction is patent.’ (Barry 1995 
p.61).  I have much sympathy with Barry’s criticism of Justice as Fairness from the perspective of 
Justice as Reciprocity and briefly offer a similar line of criticism in Chapter 3. 
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the difference principle, was one that would probably be met with considerable sympathy 
by most utilitarians.  For the difference principle holds that the economic position of the 
worst off group in society should be made as well off as possible.  Utilitarianism would 
also tend towards promoting the position of the worst off in society, at least in comparison 
with what it would have been in Western liberal societies such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  This tendency of utilitarianism can be explained as follows: if we make 
the reasonable assumption that people have similar utility functions (utility could be 
defined as happiness or in terms of some other quantity as far as the present point is 
concerned) along with the other assumption of diminishing marginal utility, which holds 
that the utility of additional units of any good (including money) to a person declines after a 
certain point is reached, then utilitarianism would recommend at least rough equality, as 
that is where utility would be maximized.1 
 
1.5.3 But, despite utilitarianism’s natural bias towards economic equality, it is easy to 
understand how Rawls’s Theory could hold a lot of appeal for left leaning liberals when it 
was first published, and ever since, as it appears to offer the hope of retaining what seems 
best about Western liberalism; its protection of people’s right to choose how to live their 
lives free from coercion, while repudiating the worst; the economic inequality and poverty 
that ‘free market society’ could give rise to.  And it should be noted that utilitarianism’s 
bias towards economic equality outlined above depends on questionable contingent 
empirical assumptions.  Should these turn out to be false then utilitarianism would have no 
such bias.2  
 
                                                 
1 It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that often the first encounter undergraduate students of political 
philosophy have of utilitarianism is through reading A Theory of Justice, since Theory in several places 
depicts utility being maximized by bestowing advantages on the more advantages at the expense of the 
less advantaged.  That utilitarianism would be prepared to contemplate giving greater advantages to the 
more advantaged in circumstances where the difference principle wouldn’t is undeniable, but the 
impression that might be gained from the diagrams in Theory and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement is 
that this would be almost inevitable.  See Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.81 and Rawls 2001 p. 62. 
2 Robert Nozick (1974 p.41) raised the prospect of ‘utility monsters’ who gain much more than others 
from additional units of goods than others lose.  If they existed, then utilitarianism would recommend 
redistribution from the less advantaged to these monsters, which seems unjust.  But Allan Gibbard has 
offered an effective rebuttal of his point in Reconciling Our Aims.  Gibbard observes that even if such 
monsters did, or could, exist, utilitarianism would pay regard to the ‘incentive effects’ and deprive such 
monsters as a means to discouraging others from emulating their example.  See Gibbard 2008 p.72 
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1.5.4 If utilitarianism’s bias towards equality depends on questionable empirical 
assumptions, then any bias it may have towards liberalism depends on assumptions that are 
far more questionable.  The most famous political philosopher to uphold both liberalism 
and utilitarianism was John Stuart Mill (1808 - 1873).  In On Liberty Mill argued strongly 
in favour of liberal rights on the grounds that granting people the right to live as they chose 
so long as they didn’t harm others (and in many cases, such as in fair free market 
competition, allowing them the right to harm others) would promote a better and happier 
society in the long run, as the human race would naturally develop into a better, more utility 
maximizing species.  As Mill eloquently described his position in On Liberty, the object of 
his essay was 
 
Passage 1d (On Liberty 1859) 
 
to assert one very simple principle…that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
society, against his will, is to prevent harm to others…It is proper to state 
that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the 
idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility.  I regard utility as the 
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest 
sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being.1  
 
1.5.5 However, many critics from both left and right of the political spectrum have 
questioned whether it is true that ‘the permissive society’ would lead to a better and happier 
society in the long run as Mill hoped.  And even if Mill’s predictions were correct, there 
would be two more strong objections that could be levelled against his liberalism.  The first 
is that Mill does not offer a sufficiently robust defence of rights: even those rights that he 
held were protected by the ‘harm’ or ‘liberty’ principle (as the principle of Passage 1d (On 
Liberty 1859) is variously described), he did not hold to be ‘inviolable’ but ‘rights’ which 
might justly be violated in exceptional circumstances.  This compromise of Mill’s often 
comes as something of a surprise to those who are primarily acquainted with Mill’s On 
Liberty.  But Mill quite explicitly asserted that such compromises might not only be 
                                                 
1 Mill 2003 pp. 94-95. 
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morally permissible but required in Utilitarianism where he wrote that 
 
Passage 1e (Utilitarianism 1863) 
 
…particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so 
important, as to overrule any one of the general maxims of justice.  Thus, to 
save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, 
the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate the 
only qualified medical practitioner.  In such cases, as we do not call anything 
justice which is not a virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to 
some other moral principle, but that what is just in ordinary cases is, by 
reason of that other principle, not just in the particular case.  By this useful 
accommodation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to 
justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that 
there can be laudable injustice.1  
 
1.5.6 The second objection to Mill’s utilitarian liberalism is that insofar as it defended 
individual rights it did so for the wrong reasons.  Mill defended the 'right of anybody to go 
to hell in his own way,’ with great vigour (but not, as I have just pointed out, as inviolable) 
on the grounds that to do so would be good for society, as allowing people to go to hell in 
their own way would provide a salutary example to others.2 This certainly doesn’t seem to 
capture the spirit of the ‘right’ that Robert Frost believed in.  To be sure, the ’right to go to 
hell in one’s own way’ might be a right that many would not want to defend, including 
some who could fairly be described as ‘deontological liberals’, for some who answer to that 
description would want to add a proviso that liberalism should only respect rational 
choices, and to choose to go to hell in one’s own way is surely irrational.  But deontological 
                                                 
1 Mill 2003 p. 234.  This quotation provides compelling evidence that Rawls’s accusation that 
‘utilitarianism seeks to account for [’our convictions about the priority of justice’] as a socially useful 
illusion’ (Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 25) could be fairly levelled at Mill.  It raises other questions over the 
controversy over whether Mill should be regarded as primarily a ‘rule’ or ‘act’ utilitarian.  Henry West 
(if I understand him correctly) seems to take Passage 1e as evidence that Mill might be interpreted as a 
rule-utilitarian on the grounds that it assumes that our behaviour should be governed by ‘secondary 
rules’ (the ‘general maxims’ of the passage) except when a direct appeal to the principle of utility is 
needed to decide between them (West 2004 pp. 87-88).  But mightn’t the fact that Mill allows 
arbitration by direct appeal to the principle of utility rather than insisting on ordering rules by priority be 
instead used as grounds for interpreting him as essentially an act-utilitarian?  I prefer to interpret Mill as 
an act-utilitarian who (rightly) sets great store in the usefulness of abiding by strong rules of thumb, 
which isn’t far from West’s conclusion that ‘Mill is neither a pure act-utilitarian nor a pure rule-
utilitarian’. (Mill 2004 p. 95) 
2 Mill 2003 On Liberty Chapter 4.  
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liberals could go on to press their case against utilitarianism with more examples of rights 
whose defence would command much wider support, including the freedom to practice the 
religion of one’s choice.  Mill was very concerned to defend the freedom to practice 
religion, including Mormonism, despite his protestation that ‘[n]o one has a deeper 
disapprobation than [Mill] of this Mormon institution’.1 But ultimately, this defence still 
rested on the long term interests of man as a progressive being.  The deontological liberal 
would want to argue that whether Mormonism was or was not in the long term interests of 
man as a progressive being was beside the point.  So long as the practitioners of 
Mormonism were genuinely consenting (Mill had in mind the practice of polygamy) it was 
none of anybody else’s business. 
 
1.5.7 The final objection to utilitarian liberalism is at the foundational level.  As Rawls 
correctly observed, the utilitarian tradition has tended to rely on an assumption that we are 
naturally motivated, or have an obligation to, promote ‘the good’.  Its usual foundation is 
Justice as Benevolence.  And this may seem to be an inadequate foundation, particularly if 
we accept Rawls’s conception of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.  
 
6 The promise 
 
1.6.1 I hope that the narrative of this chapter so far has conveyed something of what I 
take to be genuine advantages of the deontological liberalism that Rawls was concerned to 
uphold in comparison to the utilitarian liberalism of John Stuart Mill, in terms of their 
respective intuitive appeal.  Deontological liberalism is able to accommodate the widely 
held belief that people have rights that can’t (justly) be trampled over in pursuit of the 
greater good.  
 
1.6.2  Rawls’s theory also has, to my mind, great advantages over utilitarianism, as 
usually understood, in terms of its underlying motive to be just.  Utilitarianism has seemed 
                                                 
1 Mill 2003 p. 161. This might be an instance of Mill protesting too much.  But, then again, it might not 
as he does go on to describe his aversion to it as ‘a direct infraction of that [the liberty] principle, being 
a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community [women], and an emancipation of the other 
half [men] from reciprocity of obligation towards them.' 
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to many to be an implausible ethical theory because of its inability to supply a compelling 
reason to be just.  As explained above, Rawls took the underlying motive to be just to be 
one of reciprocity, of giving one’s due to whom one owed one’s due.   
 
1.6.3  This may seem to many (including myself) to offer a better answer to the question 
of why we have a duty to act ‘justly’ than the idea that to do so would produce more good 
in the world.  It is intuitively easier, I feel, to embrace the idea that one has a duty of justice 
to repay the people you owe in kind for what they have done for you than to embrace the 
idea that one has a duty of justice to promote the greatest good wherever that might be best 
achieved.  That is not to rule out the possibility that there may not be other moral 
considerations that should direct us to promote the greatest good where we can, but if they 
do they are not duties of justice.  Justice as Reciprocity is a more plausible conception of 
justice than Justice as Benevolence.1 
 
1.6.4 I am also very sympathetic to the tenets of deontological liberalism.  In the words of 
the song, we feel that ‘it’s my life and I’ll do what I want’2, captures the essence of what it 
is to have freedom or individual rights (though we would want to add a verse including 
caveats setting limits to our legitimate pursuit of what we want designed to protect the 
equal rights of others to do the same).  ‘It’s my life and I’ll do what I want – so long as 
doing so maximizes utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a 
man as a progressive being’ doesn’t sound such a compelling refrain. 
 
1.6.5 The very real attraction of Rawls’s project then, at least to my mind, was the 
promise it held out to underwrite strong and attractive intuitions about justice and the 
                                                 
1 Disappointingly, I have no stronger argument for this position that I share with Rawls than that it 
feels intuitively sound.  If no stronger argument is ultimately available then there is no objective 
basis for Justice as Reciprocity.  It is of some consolation to note that, in my opinion, more 
ambitious recent attempts to found an objective morality on the concept of practical reason have 
also failed.  David Gauthier’s attempt to ground a contractualist moral theory by taking the rational 
pursuit of self-interest as foundational has, to my mind, been successfully defeated by objections 
such as those of Allan Gibbard and Derek Parfit mentioned earlier.  And I am not convinced by 
Derek Parfit’s attempts in Reasons and Persons  to show that it the pursuit of self-interest is 
irrational, that could be read as an attempt to support the idea that Justice (or morality) as 
Benevolence is uniquely rational.  
2 Written by Roger Atkins and Carl D'Errico and first performed by The Animals (1965) 
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inviolability of rights with an equally strong and attractive account of their moral 
foundation.   
 
1.6.6 Nevertheless, my argument is that attractive as Rawls’s position may appear to be, it 
is ultimately unsustainable.  I shall presently highlight some of the problems he faced by 
looking closely at the words he used to summarize the essence of his case that utilitarianism 
was incompatible with Justice as Reciprocity, early in Theory, and contrasting it with the 
very similar, but critically different, words he used to press the same charge against 
utilitarianism in his earlier essay, ‘Distributive Justice’ (1967). 
 
1.6.7 But this comparison of passages will not make much sense without first introducing 
some more of the key elements of Rawls’s own theory of Justice as Fairness, as it was 
presented in A Theory of Justice, and going into his understanding of utilitarianism in 
greater depth. 
 
7 Justice as Fairness 
 
1.7.1 As explained by the passages cited in my Preface, Rawls’s starting point is that 
society should be conceived of as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.  This is a 
society of citizens who have personal interests that they are legitimately concerned to 
pursue.  They could be described as non-altruistic in the sense that their primary concern 
may not be to promote the good of others, but to pursue these legitimate interests of their 
own.1  But this does not mean that they are immoral.  They respect other citizens’ rights to 
pursue their legitimate interests and are prepared to restrain the pursuit of their own 
interests to give others a fair opportunity to pursue theirs.  So this conception of society will 
need rules of justice to ensure that everyone gets a fair chance to pursue their own 
legitimate interests while respecting the rights of others to pursue theirs.  But, in Rawls’s 
theory, these rules of justice are not immediately obvious just from this conception of 
society.  Instead, Rawls believed they needed to be constructed through the use of a 
carefully designed thought experiment.  This is his conception of justice as fairness.  
                                                 
1 This does not exclude the possibility that some citizens’ primary ‘personal’ interest might be to 
promote the good of others. 
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Justice as Fairness holds that the correct principles to govern society conceived of as a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage are whichever ones would be chosen in an 
appropriately specified hypothetical contractual situation.  So to the end of discovering 
these, Rawls did exactly what Mill wrote would serve no purpose in my Epigraph from On 
Liberty; he invented a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it.  Rawls’s 
hypothetical contract model is rather complicated and a rough summary will suffice for the 
time being. 
 
1.7.2  Rawls imagined representatives of the different social groups in society abstracted 
from their real world conditions.  The circumstances they were to be imagined in he called 
‘the original position’.  These representatives are shielded by a ‘veil of ignorance’ from 
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances that might unfairly bias their choice of 
principles, such as their natural abilities and talents, their class position and social status, 
the level of development of society and even which generation they belong to.  They do, 
however, ‘know the general facts about human society.  They understand political affairs 
and the laws of human psychology.  Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever 
general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice.’1 They also know that they are in 
‘the circumstances of justice’, which are, roughly, that the conditions they will find 
themselves in once the veil of ignorance is lifted won’t be so harsh that cooperative 
schemes will break down, but also that resources aren’t so abundant that there is no need 
for rules to decide how those resources should be allocated amongst competing claims.  
Importantly, the parties in the original position are to be conceived of as free and equal, 
rational and self-interested.  
 
1.7.3 Rawls maintains that the parties in the original position would choose his two 
principles of justice.  The first principle is the equal liberty principle, which stipulates that 
each person should have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a 
similar liberty for all.2 ‘Liberty’ in Theory is defined in terms of a set of ‘basic liberties’; 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 119 
2 Rawls later changed the formulation of the equal liberty principle in response to criticisms by H.L.A 
Hart.  His essay ‘The Basic Liberties and their Priority’ in Political Liberalism (1996) substitutes ‘a 
fully adequate scheme’ for Theory’s ‘the most extensive system.’  
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these include ‘political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of 
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, 
which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and 
dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law’.1 Rawls’s 
second principle of justice is divided into two parts.  The first part holds that social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that a) the position of the worst off group in 
society is maximized and b) the positions and offices to which these inequalities are 
attached are open to all.  This part Rawls calls ‘the difference principle’.  The second part 
is ‘the equality of opportunity principle’.   
 
1.7.4 From the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity, the two principles of justice should 
be regarded as subordinate to Rawls’s conception of Justice as Fairness.  Whichever 
principles would be chosen by the parties in the original position would, according to 
Justice as Fairness, be those that should be rightly regarded as ‘just’, whether they are the 
two principles of justice, utilitarianism, or any of the other conceptions of justice available 
for consideration by the parties.  It is only if, as Rawls maintains they would be, the two 
principles of justice emerge as the choice of the parties in the original position that they 
should ultimately earn the designation ‘just’ on the definition of ‘just’ given by Justice as 
Fairness.  This point needs to be spelt out, as at points in A Theory of Justice Rawls 
inappropriately uses the term Justice as Fairness to designate the two principles of justice in 
contexts when it is the very question of which conception of justice the parties would 
choose which is at stake.2   But early in Theory he is quite explicit that his principles of 
justice derive their “fairness” from the fact that they would be selected by the hypothetical 
contract.  So he writes 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Rawls (T of J Rev 1999 p. 53) introduces this list with the words ‘[i]mportant among these are’, 
implying that the list should not be viewed as exhaustive. 
2 I point out Rawls’s inappropriate use of the term ‘justice as fairness’ in Chapter 3. 
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Passage 1f (T of J Rev) 
 
The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and 
thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.  This explains the 
propriety of the name “justice as fairness”: it conveys the idea that the 
principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.1 
 
1.7.5 The outline just given of Rawls’s theory shows how it could be read as a theory of 
Justice as Reciprocity, with individuals behaving in accordance with the two principles of 
justice being motivated by reciprocity.  Through compliance with the two principles of 
justice, co-operating members of society give fair return to others for the benefits that those 
others’ compliance affords them.   
 
1.7.6 So Rawls’s two principles of justice may turn out to be the principles of justice most 
suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  Whether they do or not depends on two 
arguments going through.  The first is that the parties in the original position would pick the 
two principles of justice over any other conception of justice.  The second is that Justice as 
Fairness is the right way to go about constructing principles suitable for the conception of 
Justice as Reciprocity.  Both of these arguments can be questioned.  The first, in particular, 
has come under considerable fire, even from critics who are sympathetic to Rawls’s two 
principles.2 The second has received less attention, but I shall subject it to some criticism of 
my own in the course of this thesis. 
 
1.7.7 However, from what has been said so far, it may also be the case that the principle 
of utility, in either its average of classical version, may turn out to be the conception of 
justice most suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.   
 
8 The utilitarian conception of society 
 
1.8.1 Rawls, in Theory, conceived of utilitarianism as starting from a very different point; 
he saw it as a theory of Justice as Benevolence.  And as I remarked in the Preface; given the 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J 1999 p. 11   
2 For example Brian Barry in Theories of Justice (1989 pp. 214 – 215) 
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very different conceptions of Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity, it seems, 
on the face of it, probable that they will yield different practical recommendations.  In order 
to assess whether they would or not it is also necessary to explain how Rawls conceived 
that utilitarianism might be constructed.  He sets out one possible foundation for 
utilitarianism thus 
 
Passage 1g (T of J Rev) 
 
 [t]he most natural way, then, of arriving at utilitarianism (although not, of 
course, the only way of doing so) is to adopt for society as a whole the 
principle of rational choice for one man.1  
 
1.8.2 Rawls’s idea here is that the idea of applying the principle of rational choice for one 
man occupies an analogous position in the construction of utilitarianism as the device of the 
hypothetical contract does in the construction of the two principles.2  It is arguably rational 
for an individual to accept lower prospects of life than they had to for some periods of their 
life in order to have greater or more prolonged enjoyment at other stages.  So it could be 
rational for someone to work extremely hard and not have much fun for a few years in 
order to qualify as a doctor and enjoy a comfortable life thereafter.  Or it could be rational 
to party now and suffer later.  Here is an illustration of this second alternative with a 
somewhat fanciful example.  Suppose you suffered from a genetic disorder that you knew 
would strike you sometime in the last few years of your life, but you don’t know when it 
will strike.  This genetic disorder would make your final years ‘not worth living’ (though 
not absolutely unbearable) unless you made major sacrifices throughout your life to provide 
for those final years, lifting them over the ‘worth living’ threshold.  Imagine also that this 
condition when it struck would make you paralyzed so suicide wasn’t an option.  Then it is 
arguably rational to choose the alternative of having a pretty good life for most of your life 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp. 23-24 
2 In ‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda’ (1968), Rawls writes ‘the idea of the initial contractual 
situation involves many elements and can be defined in various ways. This situation is the analogue, 
in the contract theory, of the point of view of the impartial sympathetic spectator in utilitarianism’ 
(p.69). Since, as I recount below, Rawls, in Theory, maintains that the device of the impartial 
sympathetic spectator amounts to the same thing as the device of adopting the principle of rational 
choice for one man, my description of the device of applying the principle of rational choice for one 
man as occupying an analogous position to the device of the hypothetical contract seems fair. 
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with a below-worth-living stretch for a few years at the end rather than having a mediocre 
but just-worth-living life throughout your life. 
 
 1.8.3 Although, as Passage 1g (T of J Rev) shows, Rawls concedes that utilitarianism 
could be arrived at from other starting points, he generally conceives of it in Theory as 
being founded on the idea of adopting for society the principle of rational choice for one 
man, and maintains that it is on this basis that utilitarianism might claim to be the most 
rational conception of justice.1 I shall refer to this starting point as the utilitarian 
conception of society. 
 
1.8.4  To illustrate how unlikely it might seem that Justice as Benevolence and Justice as 
Reciprocity would recommend the same principles to govern the well-ordered society, we 
can consider what the consequence of applying the principle of rational choice for one man 
might turn out to be.  As the example in §1.8.2 illustrated, it might be rational for an 
individual to be prepared to live a proportion of their life – perhaps 10% - at a not-worth-
living level for the sake of living a pretty good life for a much larger proportion of their 
life.  But applying the same principle across society might make it rational for society to 
allocate resources so that 10% of the population had no prospect of having lives worth 
living while a much larger percentage enjoyed the prospect of leading pretty good lives! It 
is hard to see how a motive of reciprocity could apply to this 10%.  If this 10% were to be 
motivated to act justly at all it could only be through sympathy, for thought of the damage 
their failure to act justly would do to the better off, rather than reciprocity.  (And it would 
be hard for society to cultivate the kind of sympathy required to motivate that 10% to act 
justly.)  This example seems to me to provide a fairly strong counterexample to both the 
utilitarian theory of justice and to utilitarianism’s potential to be reconciled with Justice as 
Reciprocity.  It provides a counter example to the utilitarian theory of justice because it 
seems intuitively unjust.  So if it is the result of applying the utilitarian theory of justice, 
this provides an argument against that conception of justice and in favour of an alternative 
conception of justice such as Justice as Reciprocity.  It also argues against the possibility of 
                                                 
1 In fact, he only adopted this starting point for utilitarianism with his 1963 essay ‘Constitutional Liberty 
and the Concept of Justice.’ It plays no part in his two versions of ‘Justice as Fairness.’  The changing 
nature of Rawls’s conception of utilitarianism will receive more attention in Chapter 2. 
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reconciling utilitarianism with Justice as Reciprocity, since it is hard to see how those 10% 
could have any motive to comply with rules of justice in repayment for the advantages they 
received from the compliance of others – ‘repayment for what?’ they might ask.   
 
1.8.5  Although Rawls commonly conceived of utilitarianism as being derived from the 
utilitarian conception of society, he also contemplated its having its origin with the classical 
utilitarian idea of the ‘impartial spectator’.  In fact, he argued that the two starting points 
amounted to the same thing.  So, immediately continuing on from Passage 1g (T of J 
Rev)1, Rawls wrote 
 
The impartial spectator 
 
Passage 1h ( Tof J Rev) 
 
Once this is recognized, the place of the impartial spectator and the emphasis 
on sympathy in the history of utilitarian thought is readily understood. For it 
is by the conception of the impartial spectator and the use of sympathetic 
identification in guiding our imagination that the principle for one man is 
applied to society. It is this spectator who is conceived as carrying out the 
required organization of the desires of all persons into one coherent system 
of desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into one. 
Endowed with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination, the impartial 
spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and 
experiences the desires of others as if these desires were his own. In this way 
he ascertains the intensity of those desires and assigns them their appropriate 
weight in the one system of desire the satisfaction of which the ideal 
legislator then tries to maximize by adjusting the rules of the social system.2 
 
1.8.6  I am not persuaded that the device of the impartial spectator and what I am referring 
to as the utilitarian conception of society are as intimately connected as Rawls implies. But 
resolving this issue is not important for my argument in this thesis.  What is important to 
note is that Rawls appears to conceive of either of these as a foundation for what I shall 
refer to as the utilitarian theory of justice.  This is personified by the figure of the ideal 
legislator, who adjusts the rules of the social system so as to maximize utility.  The ‘ideal 
                                                 
1 p. 46 
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 24 
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legislator’ will play an important role in my arguments of Chapter 4.  The utilitarian theory 
of justice that he represents, according to Rawls 
 
Passage 1i (T of J Rev) 
 
receives perhaps its clearest and most accessible formulation in Sidgwick.  
The main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its 
major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of 
satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it.1  
 
1.8.7 This can usefully be viewed as Rawls’s canonical statement of the utilitarian 
theory of justice.  According to the utilitarian theory of justice then, acting justly would 
presumably be to act in accordance with the rules of institutions arranged to achieve the 
greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to society.    
 
1.8.8 The utilitarian theory of justice provides a useful intermediary device for the 
argument of my thesis; particularly for the argument of Chapter 4 when I consider Rawls’s 
argument that utilitarianism is unjust because it fails to take seriously the ‘separateness of 
persons’.  It is important, I believe, to distinguish at exactly what component of Justice as 
Benevolence that charge is levelled at.  The charge that the utilitarian conception of justice 
fails to take the separateness of persons seriously might turn out to be different to the 
charge that the utilitarian theory of justice fails to take the separateness of persons 
seriously.  In Chapter 4, I shall maintain that it is. 
  
1.8.9 In this section and the last I have fleshed out the details of Rawls’s views of the two 
conceptions of justice, Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity, which provided 
the focus of the passages in the Preface.  These accounts run from the level of construction 
to the principles that are supposed to govern the well-ordered society of either conception.  
In response to the question of what would motivate citizens in the well-ordered society 
governed by the two principles of justice to act justly, Rawls’s answer was ‘reciprocity’.  In 
response to the question of what would motivate citizens to act justly in the well-ordered 
society governed by the principle of utility.  Rawls’s answer was ‘sympathy’.   
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 20 
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1.8.10 So it is easy to see how, given Rawls’s understanding of classical utilitarianism as 
starting from either the utilitarian conception of justice or the impartial spectator and his 
own starting point of justice being a matter of reciprocity, it must have seemed highly 
unlikely that utilitarianism would be reconcilable with reciprocity.   
 
1.8.11 I end this section by providing a diagrammatic summary of Rawls’s conceptions as 
described so far in this Chapter with two significant additions: the first is bypass 1, which 
goes straight from the conception of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage 
to the two principles of justice.  This is an alternative route that Rawls’s first model of his 
theory might have taken as I explain in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 4 I suggest that bypass 2 
may lead from Justice as Reciprocity to the utilitarian conception of justice. 
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Fig 1(i) 
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9 The Problems 
 
1.9.1 In my Preface I described how when I first read Theory I couldn’t make sense of 
certain passages because they didn’t make sense, and that their lack of sense was due to 
their being the result of attempts to patch up arguments that Rawls had put forward in 
previous essays, by substituting new premises for old; the old premises still lying, largely 
neglected but still intact, in those earlier essays.  I also described how my method in this 
thesis would be to expose the problems by comparing the passages from Theory side by 
side with their historical antecedents.  In this section I provide a taste of that method by 
comparing a passage from Theory side by side with its antecedent from ‘Distributive 
Justice’ (1967) in order to expose some of the problems Rawls was never able to solve.  
The comparison of the two passages reveals that Rawls’s biggest problem was that he could 
never find a satisfactory alternative to defining mutual advantage in comparison to the state 
of nature outlined by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan.  I should state at this point that, 
following Wolff, I shall refer to Rawls’s theory as it was in ‘Distributive Justice’ as the 
‘second  model’ of his theory, and as it was in Theory, as the third model. 
 
1.9.2 In the opening few pages of Theory, Rawls put a brief case for the rejection of the 
principle of utility that he clearly intended to be intuitively appealing to the reader in 
advance of his more detailed argument.  This is repeated below 
 
Passage 1j (T of J Rev) The argument of Theory  
 
[A] It may be observed, however, that once the principles of justice are 
thought of as arising from an original agreement in a situation of equality, it 
is an open question whether the principle of utility would be acknowledged. 
[B] Offhand, it hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as 
equals, entitled to press their claims upon one another, would agree to a 
principle that may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake 
of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. [C] Since each desires to 
protect his interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no 
one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to 
bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. [D] In the absence of strong 
and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic 
structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages 
irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests. [E] 
Thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the idea of 
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reciprocity implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society. [my letters and 
italics]1 
 
1.9.3  When a writer introduces an argument with a rhetorical flourish to the effect that it 
should be obvious, as Rawls did in Sentence [B], that is often a signal that it will turn out to 
be anything but obvious. So it proves in this case, as I show below. 
 
1.9.4 To set the argument of Passage 1j (T of J Rev) in context, Rawls had already 
outlined his theory of Justice as Fairness so the reader first approaching this passage would 
be aware that the original agreement referred to in [A] was between parties situated behind 
a veil of ignorance that obscured their knowledge of the social positions or conceptions of 
the good of the real people they represented.2  So the first question that should strike the 
reader regarding the italicized claim in [B] is ‘why wouldn’t they agree to a principle that 
would requires lesser life prospects for some for the sake of a greater sum of advantages 
enjoyed by others?’  They don’t know whether they represent the ‘some’ who will turn out 
to have ‘lesser life prospects’ or the ‘others’ who enjoy the greater sum of advantages.  It 
will be easier to address this question and others arising from the passage after looking at 
the argument of the equivalent passage from Rawls’s earlier essay. 
 
Passage 1k (DJ 1967) The argument of ‘Distributive Justice’  
 
[1] Once justice is thought of as arising from an original agreement of this 
kind, it is evident that the principle of utility is problematical. [2] For why 
should rational individuals who have a system of ends they wish to advance 
agree to a violation of their liberty for the sake of a greater balance of 
satisfactions enjoyed by others? [3] It seems more plausible to suppose that, 
when situated in an original position of equal right, they would insist upon 
institutions which returned compensating advantages for any sacrifices 
required. [4] A rational man would not accept an institution merely because 
it maximized the sum of advantages irrespective of its effect on his own 
interests. [My italics and numbering of the sentences] 3 
 
1.9.4 It should be fairly obvious that this passage can be viewed as a historical antecedent 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.13  
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp.10 - 12 
3 Rawls DJ 1967 p.132 
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of Passage 1j (T of J Rev).  Its claim in Sentence [1] that the principle of utility is 
‘problematical’ is similar to the first clause of Sentence [B]’s claim that the 
acknowledgement of the principle of utility is ‘hardly likely’.  And the justification of [1]’s 
claim that the principle of utility is problematical in the italicized part of [2] could be read 
as occupying the same position in the argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967) as the italicized 
second clause of [B] in Passage 1j (T of J Rev).1  The main conclusion of the two passages 
is essentially the same.  The implicit conclusion of [3] in Passage 1k (DJ 1967) is that the 
parties in the original position would reject the principle of utility in favour of other 
principles.  The implicit conclusion of [E] in Passage 1j (T of J Rev) is that the parties in 
the original position would reject the principle of utility in favour of other principles.2 
 
1.9.5 But now it can be seen that the two passages, while supporting the same conclusion, 
offer quite different premises in support of the main conclusion.  The argument of Theory 
concludes that the parties in the original position would reject the principle of utility 
because they wouldn’t accept a principle that that may require lesser life prospects for 
some for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others.  The argument of 
‘Distributive Justice’ concludes that the parties in the original position would reject the 
principle of utility because they wouldn’t accept a principle that would violate their liberty 
without giving them compensating advantages in return. 
 
1.9.6 My interpretation of the argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967) calls for some more 
justification.  Rawls is suggesting that it is highly unlikely that the parties in the original 
position would choose the principle of utility, and part of the support for that conclusion is 
that rational individuals who were concerned with their own ends would not agree to a 
violation of their liberty for the sake of a greater balance of satisfactions enjoyed by others.  
Now, one might be inclined to read Rawls as asserting here that the parties in the original 
position would not agree to a violation of their liberty for any reason, not just for the sake 
                                                 
1 p. 52 
2 This conclusion is not quite so clear in the passage from Theory as it is in the passage from 
‘Distributive Justice’.  This is because Sentence [3] from DJ 1967 gives the parties decision as the 
reason for the rejection of the principle of utility in the same sentence, which Sentence [E] from T 
of J Rev doesn’t.  But sentence [E] is obviously intended to follow as a conclusion from the rest of 
the passage, all of which concerns the decision of the parties in the original position.  
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of a greater balance of satisfactions enjoyed by others.  This reading might construe Rawls 
to be asserting that people were already in possession of inviolable rights that the principle 
of utility would be liable to violate.1 
  
1.9.7 But the following line, [3], doesn’t fit with such an interpretation.  [3] doesn’t say 
that the parties in the original position would not agree to have their liberty violated for any 
reason.  Instead, it appears to be asserting that the parties in the original position would 
agree to a violation of their liberty, if they received compensating advantages for that 
violation of their liberty.  The parties' agreed-to ‘violation of their liberty’ is what Rawls is 
naturally read to mean by [3]’s ‘the sacrifices required’.  This second interpretation would 
bring Rawls in line with the traditional social contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau, who all held the social contract to require people to surrender some, if not all, of 
their natural liberty.2 
  
1.9.8 The second interpretation of Rawls’s argument which, henceforth, I shall assume to 
be correct, carries with it two important implications.  The first implication is that the 
principle of utility would not compensate the parties for their loss of liberty, and the second 
is that Rawls’s principles of justice would, by contrast, provide such compensation.  The 
                                                 
1 In fact, as I describe in Chapter 4, Rawls did briefly contemplate an original position in which the 
parties involved were already in possession of their rights which the principle of utility would be 
liable to violate.  That was in his essay ‘Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice’ (1963) 
and I refer to the state Rawls’s theory was in at that time as model 1.5.  That is because it lies 
halfway between what Wolff in Understanding Rawls describes as Rawls’s first model of ‘Justice 
as Fairness’ and his second model of ‘Distributive Justice’. (Wolff 1977) 
2 Locke certainly held that the social contract required people to give up their liberty to punish 
transgressors of the law of nature, while retaining their liberty to acquire and dispose of private 
property, so should be interpreted as a social contract theorist who required people to surrender 
some, but not all, of their natural liberty. (See Locke 2003 Two Treatises of Government  
Chapters 8&9)  Rousseau held that the social contract required people to give up all of their 
‘natural liberty’ in exchange for ‘civil liberty’, so should be regarded as viewing the social 
contract as requiring compete surrender of their natural liberty. (See Rousseau 2002 The Social 
Contract Book 1 Chapter 6).  Hobbes is more complicated and ambiguous.  He claimed that it 
would be rational for people to promise away all their natural liberty, but then could be viewed 
as holding that they retained some of their natural liberty nonetheless, as he held it to be rational 
for rebels to fight for survival against a ruler intent on their death (See Hobbes 1996 Leviathan 
Part 2 Chapter 21). Hobbes’ position is particularly pertinent to my thesis as I shall argue in 
Chapter 4 that the underlying logic of justice as reciprocity should be committed to a similar 
position, that those who are not afforded a sufficient prospect of a life worth living through 
social co-operation, have no obligation to cooperate with society.  
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second of these is implied by [3]’s implication that the parties would have the option of 
insisting on institutions which did return compensating advantages for their loss of liberty. 
 
1.9.9 We can put aside the question of what ‘the liberty of the original position’, as I shall 
refer to the liberty invoked in Passage 1k (DJ 1967)1, would amount to for now, in order to 
question whether Rawls’s conclusion of sentence [2] is as obvious as he implies it is. 
 
1.9.10 And it turns out not to be, for reasons related to the design of the original position.  
This design was essentially the same in ‘Distributive Justice’ as it was in Theory.  As Rawls 
described it then 
 
Passage 1l: The original position in ‘Distributive Justice’ (DJ 1967) 
 
the contract doctrine assumes that the rational individuals who belong to 
society must choose together, in one joint act, what is to count among them 
as just and unjust.  They are to decide among themselves once and for all 
what is to be their conception of justice.  This decision is thought of as being 
made in a suitably defined initial situation one of the significant features of 
which is that no one knows his position in society, nor even his place in the 
distribution of natural talents and abilities.  The principles of justice to which 
all are forever bound are chosen in the absence of this sort of specific 
information.  A veil of ignorance prevents anyone from being advantaged or 
disadvantaged by the contingencies of social class and fortune; and hence the 
bargaining problems which arise in everyday life from the possession of this 
knowledge do not affect the choice of principles.2 
  
1.9.11 As I interpret Passage 1k (DJ 1967) the argument is that it is unlikely that the 
parties would choose the principle of utility not because all of them would fail to be 
compensated adequately for their loss of liberty but because some of them would.  This 
reading interprets Passage 1k (DJ 1967) as assuming that there is a fixed sum of people, 
and that that ‘the principle of utility’ is the principle of average utility, which is reasonable 
given Rawls’s later justification of these assumptions dealing with the same scenario in 
Theory.  Given these assumptions, the losses to those people who end up worse off than 
they would be in a situation of equal liberty translate into gains for others who do better 
                                                 
1 p. 53 
2Rawls DJ 1967 p. 132  
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than they would in a situation of equal liberty. But, as Rawls says, one of the ‘significant 
features’ of the original position is that ‘no one knows his position in society’.  In that case, 
if we assume that the parties really don’t know what position they would occupy in society, 
those who would fail to be adequately compensated for their loss of liberty - call them ‘the 
losers’ - by the principle of utility would not know themselves to be such. They might 
instead turn out to be one of those others who might do better under the principle of utility 
than under Rawls’s principles of justice – call them ‘the winners’.   
 
1.9.12 In the light of their lack of knowledge of whether they would turn out to be a winner 
or a loser, a rational individual might choose the principle of utility since this is the 
principle that could be expected to work out best for them.  They would be prepared to run 
the risk of turning out to be amongst those who do not receive adequate compensation for 
their loss of liberty (i.e. a loser) for the prospect of greater gains to those who do (i.e. a 
winner). Whether or not that would actually be the rational choice is debatable, but I don’t 
need to enter that debate in order to point out that the implication of Rawls’s argument, that 
it would be unlikely that people in the original position would choose the principle of utility 
because it would fail to compensate some of them for violation of their liberty, is highly 
questionable. 
 
1.9.13 How should the fact that that it may be rational for the parties in the original 
position to choose the principle of utility affect the rest of the claims of this passage?  Apart 
from the point already made, that they might choose the principle of utility over the two 
principles of justice, there are three further remarks to be made.  Let us assume, for the sake 
of argument, that persons in the original position would indeed choose the principle of 
utility. The first remark to be made, then, is that it would be inaccurate to describe the 
parties in the original position as rational individuals who are agreeing to a violation of 
their liberty for the sake of a greater balance of satisfactions enjoyed by others as [2] does.  
It would be more accurate to describe them as agreeing to run the risk of losing their liberty 
for the expectation of greater gains to themselves.  The second remark is that the claim of 
[3] would be similarly misleading.  The parties would be prepared to run the risk of 
institutions which did not return compensating advantages for their sacrifice of liberty.  The 
third remark concerns the accuracy of sentence [4].  The implication is that all the principle 
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of utility would do is maximize the sum of advantages, and the parties in the original 
position’s interests would be better served elsewhere, either by the liberty of the original 
position or alternative principles of justice.  But if the parties in the original position chose 
the principle of utility because they felt the gamble was rationally justified they should not 
be described as doing so irrespective of its effect on their interests.  Rather, they should be 
described as accepting utilitarian institutions, in the hope that doing so would further the 
pursuit of their own interests. 
 
1.9.14 So it is by no means clear that the parties in the original position of ‘Distributive 
Justice’ would reject the principle of utility.  But it is worth seeing what can be salvaged 
from the argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967)1 and Passage 1l (DJ 1967)2, and whether what 
can be salvaged would be enough to condemn the principle of utility from the perspective 
of Justice as Reciprocity.  The purpose of this salvaging operation is firstly; to provide a 
coherent argument which condemns the principle of utility from the perspective of Justice 
as Reciprocity that can be used as point of contrast for the incoherent arguments of Theory, 
examined below (§§1.9.44 –1.9.52), and secondly; to expose two problems for Rawls’s 
theory of Justice as Reciprocity that I maintain he was unable to resolve.  
 
1.9.15  I shall introduce this salvaging operation by observing that the difficulty Rawls’s 
argument had in establishing its conclusion was that it was arguably rational for people in 
the original position to choose a principle that might fail to compensate some cooperating 
members of society for their loss of liberty.  But this difficulty seems to point to a problem 
with the design of the original position for its intended purpose of coming up with the 
principles best suited for the conception of Justice as Reciprocity. It might be argued that 
Justice as Reciprocity should surely require that every individual cooperating member of 
society receive adequate compensation for their loss of liberty.  This line of argument 
points to an obvious flaw in the design of the original position; it is the veil of ignorance 
which appears to be flawed. 
 
1.9.16 To appreciate how the veil of ignorance might undermine the point of the original 
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position, it is helpful to recall what the ultimate purpose of the original position is.  This is 
to construct principles suited for the conception of society as a cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage. As Passage 1l (DJ 1967) above reports, Rawls’s stated aim for the veil 
of ignorance was to prevent ‘the bargaining problems which arise in everyday life from the 
possession of this knowledge [of one’s position in society and place in the distribution of 
natural talents and abilities]’ from affecting the choice of principles.  This aim easily fits 
with Justice as Reciprocity.  If people know too much about each other no agreement could 
be reached, and a cooperative venture for mutual advantage might seem impossible to 
achieve.  But the veil of ignorance appears to overshoot its aim by preventing those who 
wouldn’t receive adequate compensation for their loss of liberty under particular principles 
from knowing this and being able to veto principles in light of that knowledge. 
 
1.9.17 Thomas Nagel neatly pointed to the fundamental problem with Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance, back in 1971 in The Possibility of Altruism.  Although his concern was with the 
viability of the hypothetical contract for the purpose of constructing a reasonable theory of 
altruism rather than of Justice as Reciprocity, the problem he pointed out also has 
implications the viability of Justice as Fairness as an appropriate device for constructing 
principles of reciprocity.  Nagel observed  
 
Passage 1m (P of A): Nagel's criticism of the original position 
 
it will be natural for the person [i.e. party in the original position] choosing 
to think of the various lives, one of which he is already settled with, as 
possibilities;  it is possible that he is a slave, but then again it is possible that 
he is a master.  And he may be able to tolerate as an outcome of the 
interpersonal weighting system a small percentage of heavy losers.  Such 
tolerance seems to deny the interests of these people due weight, since there 
really are individuals in these roles, and their lives are not possibilities, but 
actualities: the only lives they have.1 
 
1.9.18 Nagel’s argument can be adapted to the context of Justice as Reciprocity as follows.  
As Nagel says, the device of choice from behind a veil of ignorance is liable to treat actual 
people as possibilities. The party in the original position might take a gamble on becoming 
                                                 
1 Nagel 1970 p.140 
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a slave or a master, but the result of his gamble would be to impose slavery on a real 
person.  And that real person, the slave, might not receive compensating advantages for 
their loss of liberty. 
 
1.9.19 As mentioned above (§1.9.15) it might seem a reasonable requirement of Justice as 
Reciprocity that all cooperating members of society receive compensation for their sacrifice 
of liberty, and to the extent that the veil of ignorance interferes with the original position’s 
ability to ensure that requirement is met, it is a hindrance rather than a help. 
 
The more promising reconstruction of Rawls’s argument of ‘Distributive Justice’. 
 
1.9.20  In view of all the subsequent revisions of his theory, and the revision of this 
particular passage which Rawls was evidently unhappy with, it is reasonable to speculate 
that Rawls may not have fully appreciated the hindering aspect of the veil of ignorance 
when he wrote Passage 1k (DJ 1967)1, and that he had assumed that principles that failed 
to compensate all for their loss of liberty could not fetch agreement amongst the parties in 
the original position.2  So let us suppose that Rawls had somehow found a way to 
circumnavigate the problem under consideration, and devise an original position with a veil 
of ignorance that prevented ‘the winners’ (those who would receive compensating 
advantages for their loss of liberty) from knowing which principles would work out more to 
their advantage, given their particular circumstances, while ‘the losers’ (those who would 
                                                 
1 p. 53 
2 There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to support this speculation. I have already indicated my 
agreement with Wolff’s view that ‘[t]he labyrinthine complexities of A Theory of Justice are the 
consequences of at least three stages in the development of Rawls’s thought, in each of which he 
complicated his theory to meet objections others had raised to earlier versions, or which he himself 
perceived.’  ‘Distributive Justice’ is what Wolff takes to be the defining essay of Rawls’s second 
model (Wolff 1977 p.5) where Rawls has just introduced the veil of ignorance.  It follows from a 
model I have identified as model 1.5 (to be examined in detail in Chapter 4) in ‘Constitutional 
Liberty and the Concept of Justice’ (1963) where Rawls conceives of the people in the original 
position as being already in possession of their basic liberties, and having knowledge of their 
identities, requiring genuine unanimous agreement.  Rawls, in my view, had not managed to 
properly ‘move on’ from his previous model.  A third commentator, beside myself and Wolff, who 
has commentated on the inconsistency of Rawls’s work is H.LA. Hart who, in ‘Rawls on Liberty 
and its Priority’ (1973 p. 541), remarks on ‘difficulties in this interpretation [of certain claims in 
Theory] which suggest that Rawls has not eliminated altogether the earlier general doctrine of 
liberty.’  The doctrine referred to by Hart is the doctrine of Rawls’s first model which receives 
examination in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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not receive compensating advantages for their loss of liberty) knew themselves to be such 
and were able to reject any principles that would lead them to lose.  We can then salvage a 
more promising line of argument against the principle of utility from the perspective of 
Justice as Reciprocity.  According to this new line of argument, the principle of utility 
would be rejected by the parties in the original position because it failed to ensure that each 
and every cooperating member of society received adequate compensation for their loss of 
liberty. 
 
1.9.21 The argument, thus reconstructed, is better placed to uphold the main conclusion of 
Passage 1k (DJ 1967)1, that the parties in the original position would reject the principle of 
utility.  An implicit claim of [2], that by agreeing to the principle of utility the losers would 
be agreeing to a sacrifice of their liberty for the sake of others could be upheld.  They 
would be better off if all retained the liberty of the original position, so agreeing to the 
principle of utility would require that they sacrifice their liberty for the sake of the benefits 
that their loss of liberty would provide to ‘others’, namely, the winners.  So the second 
implicit claim of [2], that the parties in the original position would not agree to the principle 
of utility because the losers would not agree to lose their liberty if they received no 
compensating advantages in return also seems plausible. The claim of [3] could also be 
upheld. Rational individuals who were concerned to advance their ends, and not to provide 
benefits to others, would insist on institutions (such as those governed by the two principles 
of justice) that would provide compensating advantages to themselves for their loss of 
liberty.   
1.9.22 So in summary: the ‘more promising’ reconstruction of Rawls’s argument of the 
last two paragraphs (§§1.9.20 - 1.9.21), which supposes that  the ‘losers’ could and would 
veto principles under which they would lose, would appear to be both more suited to the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity and better able to sustain the claims that the principle 
of utility is incompatible with the conception of Justice as Reciprocity than the 
interpretation of Rawls argument examined earlier (§§1.9.4 –1.9.13) in which the losers’ 
knowledge that they were losers was hidden from them by the veil of ignorance. 
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1.9.23  However, there are two serious problems with Rawls’s argument as thus 
reconstructed, one of which he was evidently aware of at the time, the second of which he 
evidently became aware of later.   
 
 
 
The first problem 
 
1.9.24 The first problem, of which Rawls was certainly aware, is that taking the baseline of 
‘the liberty of the original position’ as the baseline from which the ‘compensating 
advantages’ provided by principles of distributive justice might be measured, might not 
condemn as ‘unjust’, institutions that we intuitively feel deserve that designation.  So, in a 
highly revealing passage from ‘Distributive Justice’, that will receive more detailed 
examination in Chapter 3, Rawls wrote 
 
Passage 1n (DJ 1967):  Rawls on Hume’s definition of mutual advantage 
 
But all Hume seems to mean by this [the possibility of defining ‘advantage’ 
in comparison to some historically relevant benchmark] is that everyone is 
better off in comparison with the situation of men in the state of nature, 
understood either as some primitive condition or as the circumstances which 
would obtain at any time if the existing institutions of justice were to break 
down.  While this sense of everyone’s being made better off is perhaps clear 
enough, Hume’s interpretation is surely unsatisfactory.  For even if all men 
including slaves are made better off by a system of slavery than they would 
be in the state of nature, it is not true that slavery makes everyone (even a 
slave) better off, at least not in a sense that makes the arrangement just.  The 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation are unjustly distributed even if 
everyone does gain in comparison with the state of nature; this historical or 
hypothetical benchmark is simply irrelevant to the question of justice.  In 
fact, any past state of society other than a recent one seems irrelevant 
offhand, and this suggests that we should look for an interpretation 
independent of historical comparisons altogether.  Our problem is to identify 
the correct hypothetical comparisons defined by currently feasible changes.1 
 
                                                 
1 Rawls DJ 1967  p. 135  
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1.9.25 The point for now is that, depending on how the ‘liberty of the original position’ is 
to be defined, it might allow slaves to qualify as being ‘better off’ under a system of slavery 
than in a state in which all enjoyed the liberty of the original position and that, according to 
Rawls, would not do since slavery is unjust.1  So the first problem with taking the baseline 
of a state of nature to be the baseline by which to measure mutual advantage is that it might 
allow slavery to qualify as just. 
 
1.9.26 This point can be confirmed by my delineating a Hobbesian definition of natural 
liberty and the state of nature that it would seem to define in more detail.  This will also 
serve the purpose of casting light on the other problem raised by the reconstructed 
argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967)2. 
 
1.9.27  Hobbes defined the ‘Right of Nature’ in Leviathan as ‘the Liberty each man hath, 
to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to 
say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, 
and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.’3 This definition confuses 
the issue a bit from the perspective of my attempt to construct a definition of natural liberty 
suitable for the conception of Justice as Reciprocity, as it might be taken to imply that 
people didn’t have the natural right to do anything to advance ends they might have that 
aren’t simply the preservation of their life.  In light of this, I shall modify Hobbes’s actual 
definition to come up with a ‘Hobbesian’ definition of natural right that simply allows one 
to use one’s power to do anything to advance any purpose whatsoever.  Just how broadly 
Hobbes intended this right to do ‘any thing’ to be understood, becomes apparent shortly 
after he offered this definition when he goes on to generalize the implications of this right 
for his State of Nature, which, as he had explained earlier in Leviathan, is a war of all 
against all. 
 
Passage 1o (Lev) 
 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 3 I argue that Rawls’s first argument for his difference principle should be understood 
as an attempt to get round this problem. 
2 p. 53 
3 Hobbes 1996  p.91  
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And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the previous 
Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which 
case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can 
make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against 
his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to 
every thing: even to one anothers body. 1 
 
1.9.28 For my modified Hobbesian definition we should ignore the clause that might seem 
to limit the use of one’s natural right to preserve one’s life against one’s enemies and focus 
on the fact that it includes the freedom to use one another's body which, by anyone’s 
standard, is a very permissive interpretation of natural liberty.  It is also in stark contrast to 
the natural liberty that John Locke supposed we were once entitled to, whereby 
 
Passage 1p (Two Treatises) 
 
a state of liberty is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an 
uncontrolleable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not 
liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but 
where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.  The state of 
nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, 
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions:2   
 
1.9.29 In one way, the original position described in Passage 1k (DJ 1967)3 and Passage 
1l (DJ 1967)4 is more reminiscent of Locke’s state of nature than Hobbes’s, as Rawls 
implies in Passage 1k (DJ 1967), that the parties would be able to advance their ends, at 
least to some extent, if they rejected any contract in favour of retaining the liberty of the 
original position.  But in another way it is more reminiscent of Hobbes’s social contract as 
Locke, in Passage 1p (Two Treatises), maintains that people in the state of nature have 
‘possessions’, in other words ‘property’, which is protected by the law of nature.  For 
Rawls, as for Hobbes, there is no protection of property prior to the social contract.  This 
thesis shall maintain that Rawls’s original position is rather more like Hobbes’s state of 
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2 Locke 2003 p.102  
3 p. 53 
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nature than Rawls would like, as there is no rationale within his theory for any restraints on 
natural liberty prior to the social contract. 
 
1.9.30 Hobbes’s state of nature was, however, in two important ways very different to 
Rawls’s original position.  First, as already remarked above (§1.9.27), Hobbes supposed 
people to have no other end than their self-preservation.  Rawls, by contrast, is open to their 
having a variety of ends in Passage 1k (DJ 1967)1.  Secondly, Hobbes took it to be simply 
a matter of fact that people in a state of nature would be roughly equal in power so no one 
individual could expect to dominate another.  Rawls supposed ‘free and independent 
persons in an original position of equality’ in order to ‘reflect the integrity and equal 
sovereignty of the rational persons who are the contractees’.2 The results of Rawls’s 
hypothetical contract are intended to be applied to people who as a matter of fact might 
well not be free, independent, equal or even rational. There is an important moral premise 
underlying Justice as Fairness (at least on my, and many other interpreters of Rawls); the 
contract treats people as free and equal because this is how they ought to be treated.  There 
is no such moral premise underlying Hobbes’s social contract theory; indeed, Hobbes 
maintains that notions of morality have no place in a state of nature.3 
 
1.9.31 But important though these differences may be between Hobbes’ and Rawls’s social 
contract theories are, they need not prescribe different definitions of natural liberty.  There 
is nothing in the Hobbesian definition of liberty I have given so far that contradicts the aims 
of Justice as Fairness.  Assuming that the parties in the original position would all have 
liberty to do whatever they wanted in pursuit of their various conceptions of the good is, at 
least arguably, to reflect the integrity and equal sovereignty of the rational persons who are 
the contractees, regardless of the fact that Hobbes did not produce his definition of the right 
of nature with Justice as Fairness in mind.  In fact, it is the definition of equal natural 
liberty that Rawls later appears to be committed to in Theory 
 
Passage 1q (T of J Rev): no-agreement point as baseline 
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3 Hobbes 1996 p. 90 
66 
 
 
To be sure, from the standpoint of the original position, the principles of 
justice are collectively rational: everyone may expect to improve his 
situation if all comply with these principles, at least in comparison with what 
his prospects would be in the absence of any agreement.  General egoism 
represents this no agreement point.1 
 
1.9.32 This no agreement point of general egoism is Theory’s equivalent of what I have 
referred to as ‘the liberty of the original position’ of ‘Distributive Justice’.    
 
1.9.33 What would a state of nature of general egoism look like?  It would be a shame to 
waste the opportunity to describe it in the words of the political philosopher who did most 
to warn the world to avoid such a possibility, so I won’t.  As Thomas Hobbes put it in 
Leviathan 
 
Passage 1r (Lev):  Hobbes’s state of nature 
 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention 
shall furnish them withall.  In such condition, there is no place for Industry; 
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the 
Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by 
Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing 
such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no 
account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, 
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish and short.2 
 
Second problem 
 
1.9.34 The preceding paragraphs should make it easier to describe the second of the 
problems that the reconstruction of Rawls’s argument of ‘Distributive Justice’ would have 
faced.  As Hobbes pointed out, a state of general egoism would be pretty dire, dire enough 
to make it probable that the principle of utility would improve everyone’s prospects by 
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comparison.  In which case, the ‘more promising’ argument considered earlier ((§§1.9.20 - 
1.9.21) that the parties in the original position would reject the principle of utility because it 
failed to compensate all for their loss of the liberty of the original position would not hold 
water. 
 
1.9.35 This problem Rawls certainly appeared to be aware of by the time of writing 
Theory, for there he is explicitly committed to the position that the principle of utility 
would improve the prospects of all in comparison with the benchmark of the state of nature.  
So he wrote 
 
Passage 1s (T of J Rev): all conceptions of justice superior to general egoism 
 
…it is obvious that by choosing one of the other conceptions the persons in 
the original position can do much better for themselves. Once they ask which 
principles all should agree to, no form of egoism is a serious candidate for 
consideration in any case.1 
 
1.9.36 The context of this passage is that the parties in the original position (as it was in 
Theory) are comparing the alternative conceptions of justice available to them.  Those 
alternatives include, amongst others, general egoism, the classical principle of utility, the 
principle of average utility and Rawls’s two principles of justice.2  So Rawls’s statement 
that ‘it is obvious that by choosing one of the other conceptions the persons in the original 
position can do much better for themselves,’ should be taken to imply that by choosing 
either classical utilitarianism or the principle of average utility the parties could do better 
than under the conception of general egoism.   
 
1.9.37 Therefore, by the same logic as Rawls held that, ‘from the standpoint of the original 
position, the principles of justice are collectively rational’3 because everyone may expect to 
improve his situation if all comply with these principles, at least in comparison with what 
his prospects would be in the absence of any agreement’, so consistency should have 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 117  
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 117 
3 Already cited in Passage 1q (T of J Rev) above. 
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obliged him to hold that it would have been collectively rational from the standpoint of the 
original position for the parties to choose the principle of classical utility or the  principle of 
average utility. This is because either of those conceptions of justice offered them a better 
alternative than the liberty of the original position. 
 
1.9.38 The position Rawls appears to be committed to in Theory, then, is in stark contrast 
to the claim of the reconstructed argument from ‘Distributive Justice’ which was that 
rational persons in the original position would reject utilitarianism because it failed to 
compensate them for their sacrifice of the liberty of the original position. 
 
1.9.39 Here I recap the second problem posed for the reconstructed argument of 
‘Distributive Justice’.  That argument looked promising because (as suggested in §1.9.15) it 
seems, at least at first sight, to be a reasonable requirement that principles of distributive 
justice should at least compensate all cooperating members of society for their loss of 
natural liberty.  And, the reconstructed argument of ‘Distributive Justice’ disqualified the 
principle of utility from the competition on the grounds that it didn’t compensate all 
cooperating members of society for their loss of natural liberty.  But, according to Rawls’s 
commitments of Theory, either utilitarian conception of justice would compensate all 
cooperating members of society for their loss of natural liberty.  So they should not, after 
all, be disqualified as contenders for the principles of justice most suited to the conception 
of Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
1.9.40 I turn now to re-examine the revision of the argument from ‘Distributive Justice’ 
that Rawls puts early in Theory.  I shall argue that if the reconstructed argument of 
‘Distributive Justice’ had serious problems, it was still far more coherent than anything that 
can be put together from the revised argument of Theory.  For the reader’s convenience, I 
repeat Passage 1j (T of J Rev) from the beginning of this section below 
 
Passage 1j (T of J Rev): The argument of Theory 
 
[A] It may be observed, however, that once the principles of justice are thought of 
as arising from an original agreement in a situation of equality, it is an open 
question whether the principle of utility would be acknowledged. [B] Offhand, it 
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hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equals, entitled to press 
their claims upon one another, would agree to a principle that may require lesser 
life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed 
by others. [C] Since each desires to protect his interests, his capacity to advance his 
conception of the good, no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for 
himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. [D] In the 
absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept 
a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages 
irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests. [E] Thus 
it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the idea of reciprocity 
implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society.’ [my letters and italics]1 
 
First interpretation of the argument of Theory 
 
1.9.41 The most significant difference to the equivalent argument of ‘Distributive Justice’, 
already remarked upon above (§1.9.5), is the italicized part of line B, where Rawls has 
substituted the principle of utility’s property that it ‘may require lesser life prospects for 
some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others’ for the charge 
of ‘Distributive Justice’, that it may require ‘a violation of their liberty for the sake of a 
greater balance of satisfactions enjoyed by others’.  The idea that principles appropriate to 
the conception of Justice as Reciprocity must avoid requiring lesser life prospects for some 
simply for the sake of a greater balance of satisfaction enjoyed by others is less reasonable 
than the idea that such principles should compensate all for their loss of natural liberty.  I 
show this below. 
 
1.9.42 An equivalent argument can be applied to the first interpretation of the argument 
from Theory as was applied to the first interpretation of the argument of ‘Distributive 
Justice’ in paragraphs (§§1.9.4 – 1.9.13).  The parties in the original position would not 
know whether they would be the ones who would have lesser life prospects for some 
simply for the sake of others, as that information would be hidden from them by the veil of 
ignorance.  Analogous reasoning applies here as to the reasoning of that argument of 
‘Distributive Justice’ but according to the assumptions of Theory, the parties run the risk of 
being ‘losers’ who have to endure lower life prospects for the sake of others instead of 
being losers who are not adequately compensated for their loss of natural liberty.  Since the 
                                                 
1Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.13  
70 
 
reasoning is analogous to sections (§1.9.4 – §1.9.13), I do not need to go into it in such 
detail here.  It is, however, worth remarking that Rawls has, in Theory, clarified the choice 
facing the parties as one between the two principles of justice and the principle of average 
utility, so the parties should have more confidence that their expected prospects would be 
greater under the principle of utility than under the two principles of justice. 
 
1.9.43 So the assertion of sentence [B] that ‘[o]ffhand, it hardly seems likely that persons 
who view themselves as equals, entitled to press their claims upon one another, would 
agree to a principle that may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a 
greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others’ provides, to my mind, a fine illustration of 
the point I raised in the Preface of Rawls concealing weak argument behind strong rhetoric.  
This ‘offhand’ argument comes very early in Theory, and anticipates a more complex 
argument to come in support of its conclusion, which may yet prove able to support it.  But 
Rawls had already provided a brief description of his original position and veil of 
ignorance, and in the light of that description, it seems quite likely, ‘offhand’, that the 
parties would agree to a principle, such as the principle of average utility, which may 
require lesser life prospects for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by ‘others’.  
This would be more likely to be the case given that, since they would be agreeing to the 
principle of average utility, those ‘others’ may turn out to be themselves. 
 
Reconstruction of Rawls’s argument of Theory 
 
1.9.44 The next question to ask is whether Rawls’s ‘offhand’ argument of Theory would be 
any more promising if it were reconstructed along similar lines to the ‘more promising’ 
reconstruction of his argument of ‘Distributive Justice’?   
 
1.9.45 And the simple answer is: ‘No’.  A similar reconstruction of Rawls’s argument is, in 
fact, far less promising from the point of view of Justice as Reciprocity than the 
reconstructed argument of ‘Distributive Justice’.  What made the reconstructed argument of 
‘Distributive Justice’ promising, was, I claimed (in §1.9.20) the fact that it would be 
rational for someone who knew he would be a ‘loser’ in society to veto any principle that 
made him worse off than retaining ‘the liberty of the original position’.  But no analogous 
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line of argument would make it clearly rational for a loser, even one who knew he would be 
such, to veto a principle that may require him to have lesser life prospects imply for the 
sake of the greater advantages of others, as the following paragraphs (§§1.9.46 - 1.9.50) 
explain.   
 
1.9.46 In fact, there are two analogous lines of argument to consider, caused by the 
substitution of the italicized part of [B] for its equivalent in Passage 1k (DJ 1967), [2]. The 
effect of this substitution is to cast confusion over the questions of exactly who are those 
entities who may be required by the principle of utility to have ‘lesser life prospects’ for the 
sake of the greater advantages of others, and lesser prospects than what? Is it the parties in 
the original position who may be required to have lesser life prospects than if they retained 
the liberty of the state of nature?  Or is it the losers in the well-ordered society who may be 
required to have greater life prospects for the sake of advantages to the winners in the well-
ordered society?1   
 
1.9.47 Let us take the first of these possibilities first.  Suppose we read the claim as 
asserting that the parties in the original position, if they chose the principle of utility, would 
require the losers in the well-ordered society to have less than they would in a state of 
general egoism for the sake of the winners.  This is not only an unnatural reading of the 
claim, but is contradicted by Passage 1s (T of J Rev)2, which, as just remarked (§1.9.36), 
asserts that the principle of utility would mean that all, including the worst off in society, 
would enjoy greater life prospects than in a state of general egoism.  An insinuation that 
some would veto the principle of utility because it required them to have lesser life 
prospects than in a state of general egoism would simply be false. 
 
1.9.48 It would be more natural to interpret the claim as being confined to the citizens of a 
well-ordered society, and this is how it has been sometimes interpreted.3 This raises its own 
difficulties.  As Thomas Nagel and Alan Gibbard have pointed out, a similar charge could 
                                                 
1 Robert Nozick (1974 p. 196) makes a similar point regarding the ambiguity of another passage of 
Theory orig over whether it is referring to the parties in the original position or the citizens of a well-
ordered society. 
2 p. 67. 
3 For example, see Scanlon ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ (Scanlon 1982 p.123 fn.18). 
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be pressed against the two principles of justice in comparison with the principle of utility.1  
The two principles of justice would require lesser life prospects for those who would do 
better under the principle of utility for the sake of greater advantages to those who would 
do better under the two principles of justice.  For this reason the objection has generally 
been interpreted as an objection to sacrifices of the worse off for the better off, and in the 
revised edition of A Theory of Justice, Rawls appears to have clarified that the objection 
should be so interpreted.2 
 
1.9.49 So it seems reasonable, henceforth, to interpret Passage 1j (T of J Rev)3 as 
objecting to sacrifices of the less advantaged for the sake of the more advantaged.   On this 
interpretation, the reconstructed argument claims that losers would veto the principle of 
utility if it may require them to have lesser life prospects for the sake of the greater 
advantages of others once they ‘arrive’ in the well-ordered society.  But such a veto would 
only make sense if they could expect to hold out for something better.  It would be foolish 
of them to exercise the veto if that would scupper the deal, and leave them where they 
started.  It would be more rational for them to choose to endure making sacrifices for the 
winners in a society that still offered them better prospects than in a state of general 
egoism. 
  
1.9.50 The key claim of Sentence [B] Passage 1j (T of J Rev), then, that it seems unlikely 
that parties would agree to the principle of utility, even on the reconstructed argument 
where those who would turn out to be losers knew as much, looks unsustainable whichever 
way Passage 1j (T of J Rev) is read.   
 
1.9.51 The remaining claims of Passage 1j (T of J Rev) are also highly questionable.  
Rather than go through all of them, I shall just compare [D]’s claim that ‘a rational man 
would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of 
advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests’ and 
                                                 
1 See Nagel ‘Rawls and Justice’ (Nagel 1973 p.13) and Gibbard Reconciling our Aims (Gibbard 2008 
pp.40 -41) 
2 See Chapter 3, Section 2 of this thesis. 
3 p. 68 
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compare it with its correlative from Passage 1k (DJ). That correlative was sentence [4]’s 
‘A rational man would not accept an institution merely because it maximized the sum of 
advantages irrespective of its effect on his own interests.’  So it is very similar. It made 
sense, however, in the context of ‘Distributive Justice’ to assert that a rational man would 
not accept an institution ordered by the principle of utility when his interests may be better 
served by the liberty of the original position, merely to maximize the sum of advantages. It 
makes much less sense, in the context of Theory, to assert that ‘a rational man would not 
accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages 
irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests.’  If the fallback 
position in the event of non-agreement was a state of general egoism, a man who chose the 
principle of utility in preference to a state of general egoism would not be accepting a basic 
structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its 
permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests.  He would be better described as 
accepting a basic structure that maximized the algebraic sum of advantages because doing 
so would likely secure him some basic rights and enable him to effectively pursue his 
interests. 
 
1.9.52 There may well be some other ways of interpreting the charges against 
utilitarianism contained within these passages that I haven’t considered.  But I doubt very 
much that they would prove more coherent.  For the truth is, I think, that the Passage 1j 
(TJ Rev) from Theory can be explained as an attempt to plaster over the cracks in the 
argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967) of ‘Distributive Justice’.  But the need to fix that 
argument was forced by a substantive change in Rawls’s position. An underlying 
assumption of the argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967) was that the principle of utility would 
fail to compensate all cooperating members of society for their loss of the liberty of the 
original position. But by the time of Theory, Rawls was committed to the position that the 
utilitarian conceptions of justice would improve the position of all cooperating parties in 
comparison to the equivalent liberty of the original position, which was a state of general 
egoism.  New cracks in the plaster duly appeared, and the only filler available to Rawls was 
to claim that the principle of utility might, in contrast to the two principles of justice, 
require the less advantaged to make sacrifices for a greater sum of benefits to the more 
advantaged.  From the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity this does not, at initial 
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inspection, look like such a damaging charge as that the principle of utility would fail to 
provide all with compensation for their loss of natural liberty. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
1.10.1 The comparison of Passage 1j (T of J Rev) from Theory with its historical 
antecedent Passage 1k (DJ 1967) from ‘Distributive Justice’ has, I hope, exposed two 
major, and related problems for Rawls’s theory of Justice as Reciprocity.  The first problem 
is that Justice as Reciprocity might prove to be reconcilable with utilitarianism after all.  
The second is that, just because Justice as Reciprocity might be reconcilable with 
utilitarianism, it might fail to support the three tenets of deontological liberalism.1 
 
1.10.2 I suggested above (§§1.6.1 - 1.6.7) that the great appeal of Rawls’s theory of justice 
was that it offered the promise of underwriting ‘common sense’ intuitions about justice, 
that correspond to the three tenets of deontological liberalism, with a plausible account of 
their moral foundation in the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  Rawls envisaged this 
could be done through the route shown on the left hand side of Fig. 1(i).  Justice as 
Reciprocity would entail Justice as Fairness, which would in turn entail the two principles 
of justice, which would in turn uphold the three tenets of deontological liberalism. 
 
1.10.3 But when Rawls first came up with his ‘idea’ for his theory of justice 2 he was 
committed to assumptions that would make that route work.3  By the time of Theory his 
assumptions had changed, and the route could quite conceivably lead to acceptance of the 
principle of utility, in either its average or classical version.  This contention can be 
confirmed by observing that a modified Justice as Fairness could support the principle of 
                                                 
1 I explained utilitarianism’s inability to support the three tenets of deontological liberalism above 
(§§1.2.1 – 1.2.3) 
2 Wolff 1977 p.16 describes Rawls’s as ‘one of the loveliest ideas in the history of social and 
political theory’, though he interprets Rawls’s idea somewhat differently to myself.  
3 Though, as I shall argue in Chapter 2, the stage of Justice as Fairness was actually an unnecessary 
diversion when a direct route from Justice as Reciprocity to the two principles was viable. 
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utility, with a tinkered veil of ignorance which gave those who would be likely to be the 
worst off group in society the opportunity to reject the principle of utility in favour of ‘the 
liberty of the original position’. 
 
1.10.4 For imagine you were faced with a choice today between accepting the rule of a 
potential Leviathan1, who happened to be a classical utilitarian, or the ‘liberty of the 
original position’ which I suggested above (§§1.9.26 - 1.9.28) could be coherently 
interpreted on roughly Hobbesian lines as the right to do anything in pursuit of whatever 
aims one happens to have.  You know that you will be in the worst off group in society.  
You also know that a classical utilitarian Leviathan is quite prepared to countenance doing 
extremely nasty things to members of the worst off group in society for the sake of greater 
advantages to other groups in society.   For example, the classical utilitarian Leviathan 
would be prepared to institute a system of slavery so abject that the slaves would consider 
themselves better off dead, if to do so would promote the greatest happiness.  Such an 
abject system of slavery would make your life more unpleasant than it would be if you 
retained the ‘liberty of the original position’.  On top of that, she would insist that all 
slaves, including yourself, had an obligation to obey all the duties of their station, even 
though doing so would afford them no prospect of a life worth living.  And you know that 
you would be one of those slaves.  Finally, she would not be tolerant of alternative 
ideologies or lifestyles.  She would insist that classical utilitarianism was the one true way 
and that all the citizens in in her society should follow it. 
 
1.10.5 However, you also know that, for reasons such as diminishing marginal utility, 
outlined in §1.5.2 above, the Leviathan would be far more likely to arrange institutions in a 
similar way to a Leviathan who accepted Rawls’s two principles of justice.  The Leviathan 
has, after all, read John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and believes that the rights to safeguard the 
individual from the state should be taken very seriously indeed, even if they are not 
inviolable.  Having read On Liberty, she also believes that it is more practically sensible to 
leave people to find their own path to the one true way of Classical Utilitarianism than to 
force it on them.   
                                                 
1The ‘Leviathan’ of Hobbes’s title refers to a ruler or government.  
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1.10.6  You happen not only to be one of those who are going to be a member of the worst 
–off group in society, but a member of the quasi-religious sect of ‘Prioritarians’.  
Prioritarianism holds that everyone should aim at making the worst-off group in society as 
well-off as possible. A Leviathan who was committed to Rawls’s two principles of justice 
would, then, be more to your personal advantage and to your ideological taste.  He would 
be more to your personal advantage because you would be better off under his jurisdiction 
and he would be more to your ideological taste because he would be committed to making 
the worst-off group in society as well off as possible.  Unfortunately, a Leviathan who is 
committed to Rawls’s principles of justice is not available. 
 
1.10.7 In this modified original position it would, I maintain, be rational for everyone, 
including those who knew they would be in the worst off group in society (and including 
Prioritarians) to agree to a contract pledging obedience to the classical utilitarian Leviathan.  
Then, if we adopted this modified original position as ‘the appropriate initial status quo’ of 
Rawls’s definition of Justice as Fairness given in Passage 1f (T of J Rev)1, Justice as 
Reciprocity would have proceeded, via Justice as Fairness, to have instituted classical 
utilitarianism.2 
 
1.10.8 In this case, Justice as Reciprocity would not only have failed to repudiate 
utilitarianism, but it would also have failed to deliver on the promise to underwrite the three 
tenets of deontological liberalism (§1.1.1 & §§1.6.1 – 1.6.7).  It would have failed to 
underwrite them firstly, because no-one would have any right not to act so as to maximize 
utility, secondly; because everyone would have the right to do anything to do anything to 
anyone else for the sake of the maximization of utility and thirdly; because no one would 
have the right to choose any alternative conception of the good than to be a classical 
utilitarian. 
 
1.10.9 This, I think, is a fair summary of the problem faced by Rawls which, I shall argue 
in the forthcoming chapters, he never surmounted.   
                                                 
1 p. 45 
2This route is represented by the wiggly line in Fig. 1(i) 
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Chapter 2.  The First Model of Justice as Fairness 
    
2.0.1 The concluding remarks of Chapter 1 remarked that when Rawls first came up with 
his idea of Justice as Reciprocity he was committed to assumptions that would make the 
route from Justice as Reciprocity to his two principles of justice work (§1.10.3).  This 
would have had the added bonus of fulfilling the promise of Justice as Reciprocity to 
support the three tenets of deontological liberalism. The point of examining Rawls’s first 
model of Justice as Fairness in this chapter in close detail is to demonstrate the advantages 
of Rawls’s first model in that regard.  This will set the scene for the rest of this thesis which 
argues that once Rawls abandoned the assumptions of the first model he was unable to find 
an alternative route that worked.  
 
2.0.2 Rawls’s first model did not only have the advantage of establishing the route from 
Justice as Reciprocity, it would also have established the two principles of justice as the 
only conception of justice capable of meeting the requirements of Justice as Reciprocity, set 
out in Chapter 1 (§§1.4.1 - 1.4.2).  This is because they would have been the only principles 
capable of meeting the mutual advantage condition.  And by meeting the mutual 
advantage condition they would meet the fairness condition.  It is another important aim 
of this chapter to show that, on Rawls’s first model, meeting the mutual advantage 
condition was a necessary and sufficient condition of meeting the fairness condition. 
 
2.0.3 The repercussion of the success of Rawls’s argument of his first model would have 
been to erect insurmountable blockages on both the direct route from Justice as Reciprocity 
to the utilitarian conceptions of justice, and the route proceeding via Justice as Fairness.  
The utilitarian conceptions of justice would have been unable to meet the mutual advantage 
condition, and by failing to meet the mutual advantage condition they would be equally 
incapable of meeting the fairness condition. 
 
2.0.4 Rawls’s first model would also have had the advantage of being able to sustain all 
three of the tenets of deontological liberalism 
 
2.0.5 But, as I show in this chapter, the repercussions of the failure of Rawls’s first model 
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removed at least part of the blockages on the routes from Justice as Reciprocity to the 
utilitarian conceptions of justice.  At the end of the chapter I will show that the utilitarian 
conceptions would have been able to meet the mutual advantage condition, given Rawls’s 
abandonment of many of the assumptions that underpinned the first model, and the revised 
assumptions of Theory.  The major revision which would enable the utilitarian conceptions 
of justice to meet the mutual advantage condition, was Rawls’s shift to defining mutual 
advantage in comparison to the benchmark of a Hobbesian state of nature.1  The end of this 
chapter will leave the utilitarian conceptions able to meet the constraint requirement and 
mutual advantage condition of Justice as Reciprocity with a question still hanging over 
their ability to meet the fairness condition.  It will also call into question the ability of 
Justice as Reciprocity to uphold the three tenets of deontological liberalism. 
 
2.0.6 Rawls first put forward his two principles of justice in his 1957 paper ‘Justice as 
Fairness’, which was to be presented at a Symposium later the same year, and was 
published in the Journal of Philosophy.  A longer essay of the same name was published the 
following year, and it is the fuller version which has generally been treated as Rawls’s first 
statement of his theory of Justice as Fairness.2 I shall refer to both essays, which do not 
contain any important theoretical differences, but will pay rather more attention to the 
earlier essay than most other commentators have seen fit to do.  This is primarily because it 
was in the first version of ‘Justice as Fairness’ (henceforth to be referred to as ‘Justice as 
Fairness (1)’) that Rawls explicitly referred to his theory as one of ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ 
which he did not do in the second version (henceforth to be referred to as ‘Justice as 
Fairness (2)’) 
 
2.0.7 Robert Paul Wolff remarks of what he variously describes as ‘the first form of the 
model’ or ‘the first model’ as presented in those two essays: ‘In its first form, Rawls’s 
model is simple, clear, elegant, and - as we shall see - subject to devastating objections.  
Despite its shortcomings, however, the first form of the model is, I will argue, the real 
                                                 
1 As discussed at length in my Chapter 1 (§§1.9.23 – 1.9.40) 
2 For example, Robert Paul Wolff focuses exclusively on the 1958 essay in his discussion of ‘the 
first form of Rawls’s model’ and Samuel Freeman made the editorial decision to omit the initial 
version in Rawls’s Collected Papers (1999)   
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foundation on which all the rest of Rawls’s theory is constructed.’1  
 
2.0.8 Wolff’s remark concisely summarizes my view of Rawls’s first model.  I also 
believe that the interpretation Wolff gives of Rawls’s two principles as they were in 
Rawls’s first model is correct, as is his account of the first form of Justice as Fairness.  So 
here I shall not add much to Wolff’s exegesis of Rawls’s theory as it stood then, apart from 
drawing attention to aspects particularly relevant to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity 
and Rawls’s critique of utilitarianism. 
 
In Section 1, I describe Rawls’s principles of justice as they should be understood in the 
first model, and draw particular attention to the first model’s argument against 
‘aggregation’ – weighing advantages to some against disadvantages to others – that 
utilitarianism is unavoidably committed to.  Many philosophers have objected to utilitarian 
aggregation, as it is the aggregative feature of utilitarianism that makes it unable to 
accommodate the first two tenets of deontological liberalism.  I go into this argument 
against the purported injustice of utilitarianism in more detail in the section on ‘the 
separateness of persons’ objection to utilitarianism in Chapter 4, but that later argument 
will only make sense against the backdrop of the argument against aggregation that Rawls 
would have been able to put had his first model proved viable.  The argument of Sections 1 
to 4 will proceed on the assumption that Rawls was committed to what I call ‘the simple 
assumption of the first model’.  
 
 Section 2 gives an account of Rawls’s theory of Justice as Fairness, as it stood then.  This 
section will, as the first section does, largely follow Wolff’s account from Understanding 
Rawls, though I shall put forward an important argument of my own to support the idea that 
in the event of a clash, Justice as Fairness (that is, the stipulation that those principles 
which would be chosen in the appropriately defined original position are those that should 
be considered ‘just’) should give way to the requirement that all people who have a duty to 
cooperate in the well-ordered society should be advantaged with respect to a position of 
equal liberty.  This argument will help pave the way for a further argument against Justice 
                                                 
1Wolff 1977 p.25 
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as Fairness that I put in Chapter 3.   
 
In Section 3, I shall argue that Hart’s ‘principle of fair play’ – or the ‘duty of fair play’ as 
Rawls referred to it then - played a far more important role in Rawls’s first form of the 
model than it subsequently did in Theory.  Indeed, it stipulated conditions that only the two 
principles of justice could hope to meet.  By meeting them, the two principles of justice 
would be the only principles that could possibly be suitable for the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity.  Neatly enough, the principle of fair play maps exactly on to Gibbard’s 
defining features of reciprocity that I set out in Chapter 1 (§§1.4.1 -1.4.2).  Since the duty 
of fair play was, on Rawls’s first model, only compatible with the two principles of justice 
it had the effect of excluding the utilitarian conceptions of justice from consideration.  
Importantly, from the point of view of this thesis, neither the wiggly line nor the ‘bypass 2’ 
route shown in Fig. 1(i) would have been remotely viable.   
 
In Section 4, I examine Rawls’s first use of the term ‘reciprocity’ in ‘Justice as Fairness 
(1)’, and his conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  I also examine Rawls’s early conception 
of Justice as Benevolence and its relationship to utilitarianism, and show how the idea that 
the two would advocate the same principles of justice appeared to be precarious.   
 
Section 5 considers the possibility that Rawls was not committed to the simple assumption 
of the first model that I attributed to him in Section 1.  It examines an argument of Brian 
Barry’s that purports to show that Rawls’s difference principle is the most egalitarian, or 
impartial, compromise on straight equality in the face of the problem posed by there being 
more than one distribution that is Pareto preferred to equality.  I suggest that Barry’s 
argument fails, but also that the success or failure of an argument establishing the 
difference principle as the egalitarian alternative to equality would have made little 
difference to the first model’s argument that the aggregation that utilitarianism is 
unavoidably committed to was unjust.   
 
In Section 6’s concluding remarks I consider the potential implications of Rawls’s revision 
of the assumptions of his first model for his enduring contention that the two principles of 
justice are grounded in the conception of reciprocity whilst utilitarianism is grounded in 
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benevolence, and never the twain shall meet.  I also consider the effect of the failure of 
Rawls’s first model on the ‘promise’, described in Chapter 1 to support the three tenets of 
deontological liberalism with the conception of Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
1 The two principles of justice 
 
2.1.1 There are two radical differences between the first model and the model of Theory 
that are especially important from the point of view of my argument.  The first difference is 
as follows.  In Theory, the two principles of justice are concerned with different things: the 
first is concerned with the basic liberties and the second is concerned with economic 
distribution.  In the first model, by contrast, the two principles were continuous with each 
other and both concerned with both liberty and economic distribution.  The second 
difference is that ‘liberty’ was measured in a very different way to how it would later be 
measured in Theory; it was to be measured in terms of the economic advantages that 
different assignments of rights would bestow on the holder of those rights.  Rawls did not 
explain these points very clearly in either ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1) or ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
(2), so some analysis of the texts of those essays is needed here to show that the two 
principles in the first model should indeed be interpreted in the way I have just suggested. 
 
2.1.2 In ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2), Rawls wrote 
 
Passage 2a (J as F 2) 
 
The conception of justice which I want to develop may be stated in the form 
of two principles as follows:  first, each person participating in a practice, or 
affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible 
with a like liberty for all; and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it is 
reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage, and 
provided the positions to which they attach, or from which they may be 
gained, are open to all.  These principles express justice as a complex of 
three ideas: liberty, equality, and reward for services contributing to the 
common good. 1  
 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1958 p.165-166  
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2.1.3 Rawls did not explain his notion of practice in any detail, simply remarking in a 
footnote that 
 
Passage 2b (J as F 2) 
 
I use the word “practice” throughout as a sort of technical term meaning any 
form of activity specified in a system of rules which defines offices, roles, 
moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its 
structure.  As examples one may think of games and rituals, trials and 
parliaments, markets and systems of property.1 
 
2.1.4 The two passages just cited describe how the first principle requires an equal liberty 
(as the first principle of justice in Theory would still do) and the second allowed 
inequalities that were to everyone’s advantage provided there was equal opportunity to 
achieve the advantageous positions (as the second principle of justice in Theory would still 
do).  But the description of the principles given so far does not show that they are both 
supposed to be concerned with liberty.  Nor do the passages indicate how ‘liberty’ should 
be understood or measured.  The passage which provides evidence that Rawls then 
regarded both principles to refer to liberty, understood as an assignment of rights to people 
in different positions, and for any inequality in liberty to be measured in gains in material 
or other quantities, is  
 
Passage 2c (J as F 2) 
 
The second principle defines what sort of inequalities are permissible; it 
specifies how the presumption laid down by the first principle may be put 
aside.  Now by inequalities it is best to understand not any differences 
between offices and positions, but differences in the benefits and burdens 
attached to them either directly or indirectly, such as prestige and wealth, or 
liability to taxation and compulsory services.  Players in a game do not 
protest against there being different positions, such as batter, pitcher, catcher 
and the like, nor to there being various privileges and powers as specified by 
the rules: nor do the citizens of a country object to there being the different 
offices of government such as president, senator, governor, judge, and so on, 
each with their special rights and duties…they may object to the distribution 
of power and wealth which results from the various ways in which men avail 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1958 fn.2 p. 164 
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themselves of the opportunities allowed by it (e.g., the concentration of 
wealth which may develop in a free price system allowing large 
entrepreneurial or speculative gains).1 
 
2.1.5 So the idea is that just as players in different positions in a game of baseball have to 
abide by different rules governing how they play the game (e.g. a batter is not allowed to 
catch a ball, an outfielder is) so citizens participating in the practices of society may have 
different rights assigned to them determining what they are permitted or not permitted to 
do.  The second principle of justice allows different assignments of rights to the occupants 
of different roles in the practices of society providing everyone benefits with respect to 
what they would have under the same assignment of rights.  The inequalities allowed by the 
second principle of justice, then, refer to different assignments of rights – or ‘liberty’ – and 
the value of the different assignment of rights is to be measured in terms of material or 
psychological gains.  I cannot improve on Wolff’s summary of the ‘central idea’ of Rawls’s 
principles, which he puts thus: 
 
Passage 2d (Wolff 1977) 
   
The central idea behind Rawls’s principles seems clear enough:  the output 
or earnings of a practice is to be distributed equally, unless some pattern of 
unequal distribution can…be made to work for everyone’s benefit, and 
provided that everyone has a shot at the better-paid roles.2  
 
2.1.6 This interpretation of Rawls’s principles as both applying to liberty, understood in 
terms of assignments of rights, with the advantages of various assignments of rights being 
measured essentially in economic terms calls for some justification.  Once again I follow 
Wolff.  Wolff acknowledges the fact that Rawls’s formulation of his principles as 
concerned with ‘liberty’ is ‘puzzling’ when they appear to be more concerned with 
economic distribution, but supports his reading of Rawls’s principles with two 
considerations.  The first is textual.  In reply to an anticipated objection that Rawls should 
instead be read as applying his first principle to the issue of political liberty, and the second 
to economic distribution, as he was to go on to apply them in Theory, Wolff points out that 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1958 p.167  
2 Wolff 1977 p.38 
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Passage 2e (Wolff 1977) 
 
Rawls does not say that the second principle specifies the conditions under 
which political liberty may be set aside for economic advantage.  He does 
not, in other words, present the second principle as grounds for overriding 
the first.  Rather, he presents the second principle as stating the grounds on 
which the presumption (of equal distribution) can be set aside.  What is at 
stake, quite clearly, is the question when unequal distribution of payoffs may 
justly be substituted for equal distribution of payoffs, not the quite different 
question when a certain pattern of payoffs of one sort of good (wealth, etc) 
may be invoked as justification for deviating from an equal distribution of a 
different sort of good (namely, liberty).1  
 
2.1.7  Wolff’s reasoning here appears to me to be sound.  His point is that Rawls did not 
write something along the lines of, “Everybody should have the greatest equal liberty 
compatible with a similar equal liberty for all, unless equal liberty interferes with economic 
advantage, in which case liberty can be sacrificed for the sake of the pursuit of economic 
advantage.”  Instead of which he wrote that the presumption of equality could be waived in 
favour of inequality, presumably applied to the same thing.  Wolff’s reading can be 
supported by the observation that Passage 2c (J as F 2)2 envisages the inequalities that 
may be permitted by the second principle being attached to ‘different offices’ with ‘special 
rights and duties’.  So the idea seems to be that the second principle of justice will allow 
some people to have advantages in comparison to others by virtue of the ‘special rights’ 
they have, and that the possession of ‘special rights’ is equivalent to having ‘extra liberty’.   
 
2.1.8 The second consideration offered by Wolff in favour of his interpreting the second 
principle of justice as being applied to liberty is that such an interpretation 
 
Passage 2f (Wolff 1977) 
 
makes Rawls’s “theorem” seem at least initially plausible.  The proof of the 
theorem will simply involve an invocation of the conception of Pareto 
                                                 
1 Wolff 1977 p. 39 
2 p. 82 
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optimality, with the understanding that the quasi-ordering of alternative 
distributions is to be made with respect to the original, or baseline situation 
of equal distribution.  Such a line of reasoning in support of the two 
principles will make sense only if the first principle is construed as a prima 
facie rule of equal distribution and the second principle is construed as an 
excuse for deviations from distributive equality.1   
 
2.1.9 The passage above provides a useful bridge from the question of how Rawls’s 
principles of justice in the first model should be interpreted to the question of what the 
implications of the first model would be for the permissibility of any attempts to aggregate 
advantages, in the way that the classical principle of utility would be apt to do.  I believe 
that the Rawls of the first model as represented in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1) and (2) should be 
read as committed to the simple assumption of the first model, which would exclude 
aggregation, the ‘weighing of advantages to some against disadvantages to others’, however 
that ambiguous phrase might be interpreted, and the first ground I shall offer for that belief 
is similar to the consideration offered by Wolff in Passage 2f (Wolff 1977).2  As Wolff 
pointed out, Rawls appears to ‘simply’ invoke the conception of Pareto-optimality in 
support of his principles.  He does not, in other words, consider the important question of 
which distribution the two principles would select if there were two or more Pareto-optimal 
distributions none of which were Pareto-preferred to any other.  This suggests to me that he 
assumed that there would be at most, only one way in which a practice satisfying Rawls’s 
first principle of justice could be altered and meet the requirements of his second principle 
of justice.  To put the point another way: there could be only one Pareto-optimal 
distribution that is Pareto-preferred to equality. 
 
2.1.10 The points of the previous paragraph, and the technical terms involved (i.e. ‘Pareto-
preferred’, ‘Pareto-optimal’, ‘aggregation’ and ‘the simple assumption of the first model’), 
will make more sense in the light of the discussions I am about to give of first, a putative 
counter-example to the difference principle and secondly, an important passage from 
‘Justice as Fairness’ (2).   
 
2.1.11 The counter-example is based on one given by John Broome in an appendix to 
                                                 
1 Wolff 1977 p.40 
2 I provide more grounds for this belief below. 
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Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons, adapted to be better suited to Rawls’s first model.1  It 
will be subject to several variations over the next few chapters to reflect the changing 
assumptions of Rawls’s models and different problems to be illustrated.  Let us suppose, 
then, that there exists a country in 2016, ‘Freedonia’ with a population divided equally 
between agricultural and non-agricultural workers.  Suppose that without price supports for 
agricultural product the agricultural workers would be the worst off group in Freedonia – 
price supports would make them better off.  However, price supports would have the effect 
of worsening the economic position of everyone else, but not enough so as to make them as 
badly off as the agricultural workers would be without price supports.  The situation is 
illustrated in the figure below.  The numbers in the table can be taken to represent ‘net 
benefits’ so as to be consistent with the ‘benefits’ and ‘burdens’ referred to in Passage 2c 
(J as F 2)2 
 
Fig 2 (i)3 
Distribution Non-agricultural workers Agricultural workers 
 1 115 140 
 2 120 110 
 3 100 100 
 
2.1.12 The difference principle, as justified by the use of the maximin principle in Theory, 
would select Distribution 1 as that is the distribution where the ‘worst off group’ is as well 
off as possible.  But what would the first model’s second principle of justice recommend?  
The second principle of justice, as described in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1&2) and as outlined 
in the last few sections, would seem to be compatible with both Distributions 1 & 2 as they 
are both unequal distributions that are advantageous to everyone in comparison to the equal 
                                                 
1 Joshua Cohen uses the example of price support for agricultural workers in his essay ‘Democratic 
Equality’ (Cohen 1989 p. 739).  This suits Rawls’s first model as Rawls specified ‘markets’ as an 
example of a practice in Passage 2b (J as F 2) p. 82.  Broome’s example described was aimed at 
Rawls’s third model of Theory, which applied the principles of justice to the basic structure of 
society.  So Broome’s example imagined different constitutions India and Britain might have in 
1800 (Parfit pp. 491-492). 
2 p. 82. 
3 All the examples in this chapter assume that Freedonia has a fixed population and the 
recommendations of the classical principle of utility and the principle of average utility would 
coincide.  So it is convenient just to talk of ‘utilitarianism’ and ‘the principle of utility’. 
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Distribution 1. 
 
2.1.13 The question as to which of the two unequal distributions the second principle of 
justice would select has arisen because my example has supposed that there are two 
distributions that are Pareto-preferred to equality.  A distribution, x, is weakly Pareto-
preferred to a distribution, y, if at least one person prefers x to y and no-one prefers y to x.  
It is strongly Pareto-preferred to equality if everyone prefers x to y.  As Wolff explains, and 
as shown in Passage 2g (J as F 2) below1, the principle of Pareto preference that Rawls 
invokes is that of strong Pareto preference rather than weak Pareto preference.2 Both 
Distributions 1&2 are Pareto-optimal.  A distribution is Pareto-optimal if it is impossible to 
make anyone better off without making someone else worse off.  If Distribution 1 were 
chosen rather than Distribution 2, the agricultural workers would be better off but everyone 
else would be worse off.  The converse would be true if Distribution 2 were chosen rather 
than Distribution 1. 
 
2.1.14 Now, if Rawls were committed to the simple assumption of the first model, this 
question would not arise.  This assumption would have the effect of limiting the feasible set 
to either Distributions 1&3 or Distributions 2&3.  Suppose it were limited to 1&3.  Then 
we would have 
 
Fig 2 (ii) 
Distribution Non – agricultural workers Agricultural workers 
 1 115 140 
 3 100 100 
 
2.1.15 The second principle of justice would unequivocally be in favour of Distribution 1, 
as that distribution would be preferred by all to 3, and would be the only distribution that 
was preferred by all to 3. 
                                                 
1 p. 88 
2 Wolff argues convincingly that Rawls first form of the model should have only committed him to 
weak Pareto-preference.  See Wolff (1977) pp 40-41. 
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2.1.16 So my first ground for ascribing the simple assumption of the first model to Rawls 
is that it would avoid any dilemma as to how to apply the second principle of justice in the 
case of there being more than one Pareto-optimal unequal distribution.  If Rawls was aware 
of the problem, he certainly never addressed it in either ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1) or (2). 
 
2.1.17 My second ground for ascribing the simple assumption of the first model to Rawls 
is that it would avoid a dilemma as to how to interpret the following passage which 
contains Rawls’s first objection to utilitarian aggregation. 
 
Passage 2g (J as F 2) 
 
[1] It should be noted that the second principle holds that an inequality is 
allowed only if there is reason to believe that the practice with the 
inequality, or resulting in it, will work for the advantage of every party 
engaging in it. [2] Here it is important to stress that every party must gain 
from the inequality. [3] Since the principle applies to practices, it implies 
that the representative man in every office or position defined by a practice, 
when he views it as a going concern, must find it reasonable to prefer his 
condition and prospects with the inequality to what they would be under the 
practice without it. [4] The principle excludes, therefore, the justification of 
inequalities on the grounds that the disadvantages of those in one position 
are outweighed by the greater advantages of those in another position. [5] 
This rather simple restriction is the main modification I wish to make in the 
utilitarian principle as usually understood.  [6] When coupled with the 
notion of a practice, it is a restriction of consequence, and one which some 
utilitarians, e.g., Hume and Mill, have used in their discussions of justice 
without realizing apparently its significance, or at least without calling 
attention to it.  Why it is a significant modification of principle, changing 
one’s conception of justice entirely, the whole of my argument will show.1 
[My line numbering, Rawls’s italics] 
 
 
2.1.17 Passage 2g (J as F 2) starts out, in Sentence [1], by interpreting the second 
principle of justice as requiring that practices with inequalities are allowed only if they 
work for the advantage of everyone engaged in them. Sentence [2] just reiterates the same 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1958 pp 67- 68 
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point.  Because Rawls has asserted that it is only if a practice meets this requirement that 
the equality requirement of the first principle can be waived, he presumably means 
practices to at least be to everyone’s advantage in comparison to the same practice under 
equality.  I shall call that requirement (a). ‘Every’ is stressed in each of the first three 
sentences, providing confirmation of Wolff’s claim that Rawls meant to invoke strong, 
rather than weak, Pareto preference over equality as a requirement of his second principle 
of justice.  Requirement (a) is, I think, unambiguous.     
 
2.1.18 Sentences [3] and [4] are ambiguous, and it is their ambiguity that leads to the 
differing possible interpretations of this passage.  When, in Sentence [3], Rawls stipulated 
that every representative man ‘must find it reasonable to prefer his condition and prospects 
with the inequality to what they would be without it’ – I shall call this requirement (b) - 
did he mean i) that they must prefer their condition and prospects to their condition and 
prospects under any other possible configuration of the practice that met requirement (a) 
including all unequal ones that are Pareto-preferred to equality, or did he just mean ii) that 
they must prefer their condition and prospects with the inequality to their condition and 
prospects under equality?  The ambiguity of Sentence [3] carries over into Sentence [4].  
Sentence [4] excludes any inequalities that might potentially be justified on the grounds 
that the greater advantages of some outweigh the lesser disadvantages of others.  This is the 
first variant of Rawls’s extremely influential claim that distributive justice excludes 
aggregation. I shall refer to ‘the exclusion of aggregation’ expressed by Sentence [4] 
requirement (c).1  But did Rawls intend ‘disadvantages’ and ‘advantages’ to be i) 
measured by reference to any other possible configuration of the practice that would be 
Pareto-preferred to equality, or ii) just to the practice under equality?2   
 
2.1.19 This problem of interpretation can be clarified with reference to Fig 2 (i) and Fig 2 
(ii).  First, let us suppose that Rawls did not make the simple assumption of the first model, 
so the feasible set might be that of Fig 2 (i). 
 
2.1.20 A sensible way to resolve the problem of how to decide between distributions 1 & 2 
                                                 
1 I shall refer back to the ‘exclusion of aggregation’ in Chapter 4. 
2 The two interpretations shall henceforth be referred to as interpretations (i) and( ii). 
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in Fig 2 (i) might appear to be to see where the greater sum of advantages lay and pick 
Distribution 1, if there were a sufficient number of agricultural workers for that choice to 
maximize the sum of advantages or Distribution 2, if that choice would maximize the sum 
of advantages. To aggregate, in other words.  But would choosing on such grounds be a 
violation of requirements (b) and (c)?  The answer is that it would be, on interpretation (i) 
of those requirements, but wouldn’t be on interpretation (ii) of those requirements.   
 
2.1.21 This dilemma of interpretation would not arise, however, if Rawls was committed 
to the simple assumption of the first model.  In Fig 2 (ii) there is only one unequal 
distribution that is Pareto-preferred to equality, Distribution 3, and that distribution is 
would satisfy requirements (b) and (c) on both interpretations (i) and (ii) of those 
requirements.  That provides my second ground for supposing that Rawls was committed to 
the simple assumption of the first model.  It would contain an unequivocal objection to any 
aggregation, however advantage and disadvantage might be understood.  And just as Rawls 
did not consider the question of how to resolve the problem of how to apply the two 
principles of justice in case there were more than one unequal distribution that was Pareto-
preferred to equality, so he did not consider the question of how to interpret requirements 
(b) and (c ) in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2). 
 
2.1.22 A third ground for ascribing the simple assumption of the first model to the Rawls is 
that he later did address the problem posed by the possibility there being more than one 
unequal distribution that is Pareto-preferred to equality in his 1967 essay ‘Distributive 
Justice’, as if it had occurred to him for the first time.  It is not mentioned in the three 
essays in between.  Wolff takes ‘Distributive Justice’ to be the defining essay of the second 
form of the model.1  The innovations introduced in that essay, in particular the concepts of 
chain connection and close-knitness, can, I think, be understood as motivated largely by the 
desire to surmount the problem arising from the possibility of there being more than one 
unequal distribution that is Pareto-preferred to equality.2 
 
2.1.23 Three more reasons for supposing that Rawls was committed to the simple 
                                                 
1 Wolff 1977 p. 5   
2 This point will receive further explanation in Chapter 3  
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assumption of the first model are first, the advantage it would bestow to Rawls’s ambition 
to uphold the two principles of justice as the principles of justice that were particularly 
suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity, secondly, the advantage it afforded to 
Rawls’s ambition to refute utilitarianism and thirdly, the neatness of fit it would provide to 
the different elements of his theory at the time.  The rest of this section will consider the 
first two of these advantages.  The third should reveal itself over the analysis of the 
different elements of Rawls’s first model in Sections 2 to 4.  The aim of demonstrating this 
neatness of fit justifies my proceeding on the assumption that Rawls was committed to the 
simple assumption of the first model before going on to question this in Section 5. 
 
2.1.24 The advantage the simple assumption of the first model would bestow to Rawls’s 
ambition to uphold the two principles of justice as the principles of justice that were 
particularly suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity should now be easy to 
understand.  In Chapter 1, I suggested that a necessary condition for principles of 
distributive justice to be suited to that conception was that they meet the mutual 
advantage condition, whatever that may turn out to involve.  The benchmark by which to 
measure mutual advantage could be taken to be ‘equal liberty’.  The two principles of 
justice would then emerge as uniquely suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  
The first principle of justice would ensure that all cooperating members of society benefited 
with respect to what they would have in a distribution that gave them any less than the 
greatest possible equal liberty.1  The second principle of justice would then ensure that any 
unequal distribution that was to the advantage of all cooperating parties would be selected.  
Given the simple assumption of the first model there would be no need for any other 
criteria to decide which mutually advantageous distribution should be selected.  So the two 
principles of justice would appear to be the principles that best satisfied the mutual 
advantage condition.  Any distribution that didn’t satisfy them would be to everyone’s 
disadvantage in comparison with the unique distribution that did satisfy them. 
 
2.1.25 The simple assumption of the first model would also have had the effect of making 
                                                 
1 Recall that ‘equal liberty’ in the first model is to be understood in terms of assignment of rights 
that bestow equal advantages on people. Presumably Rawls envisaged there being a potential 
assignment of rights that bestowed equal advantages on all, but less than the maximum advantage 
compatible with equality. 
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a very powerful case that any aggregation of the kind that utilitarianism, in any of its forms, 
is committed to, would be unjust according to the lights of Justice as Reciprocity.  To 
appreciate this, we first need to note that the simple assumption of the first model only 
asserts that all unequal distributions that allow the greater advantages to some to outweigh 
disadvantages to others and are also to everyone’s advantage in comparison to equality are 
practically unfeasible; it does not rule out the possibility of ‘aggregating’ distributions (as I 
can call distributions that allow advantages to some to outweigh disadvantages to others) 
altogether. The simple assumption of the first model would still admit the practical 
feasibility of aggregating distributions which were not to everyone’s advantage in 
comparison to equality.  In support of reading Passage 2g (J as F 2) as allowing the 
practical feasibility of aggregating distributions which are not to everyone’s advantage in 
comparison with equality, I can point out that not only does the passage do nothing to 
imply that such distributions are unfeasible, but that it would contradict Sentence [6]’s 
assertion that the ‘restriction’ expressed in Passage 2g (J as F 2)1 is ‘a restriction of 
consequence.’2  It would be a very inconsequential restriction that only forbade 
distributions which were practically unfeasible, in any case. 
 
2.1.26 If aggregating distributions which are not to everyone’s advantage in comparison to 
equality are allowed into the feasible set, but aggregating distributions which are to 
everybody’s advantage in comparison to equality are excluded, then the feasible set might 
be something similar to that represented in the figure below 
 
Fig 2 (iii) 
Distribution Non-agricultural workers Agricultural workers 
 1 115 140 
 3 100 100 
 4 170 90 
 
                                                 
1 p. 88. 
2 Rawls describes it as ‘a’ restriction though, as the argument of these few sections shows, whether 
it expresses just one restriction is questionable.  The fact that he suggested it did provides another 
ground for supposing that he was committed to the simple assumption of the first model. 
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2.1.27 For the purpose of my argument the exact figures in Distribution 4 do not matter.  
What does matter, is that Distribution 4 represents a feasible aggregating distribution, and 
any feasible aggregating distribution would have the effect of placing some people below 
the equal distribution, 3, just as Distribution 4 does.  There would, then, be a very powerful 
line of argument in favour of requirement (c) from the point of view of Justice as 
Reciprocity:  any aggregating distribution – that is, any distribution that justifies 
inequalities on the grounds that the disadvantages of those in one position are outweighed 
by the greater advantages of those in another position, such as Distribution 4 on either 
interpretation (i) or (ii) of advantage or disadvantage – would violate the mutual 
advantage condition by not being to everyone’s advantage in comparison to the relevant 
situation of equal liberty. 
 
2.1.28  So the simple assumption of the first model would have rendered the question of 
how to interpret Passage 2g (J as F 2) unimportant from a practical point of view.  On 
either interpretations (i) or (ii) of ‘advantage’ and ‘disadvantage’, justifying inequalities on 
the grounds that the ‘disadvantages’ of those in one position are outweighed by the ‘greater 
advantages’ of those in another position would violate the mutual advantage condition.  
So ‘aggregation’ would violate the mutual advantage condition however ‘aggregation’ 
might be interpreted.  
 
2 Justice as fairness in the first form of the model 
 
2.2.1 In this section I argue first, that Justice as Fairness in the first model contained a 
much stronger line of argument against the principle of utility and for the two principles of 
justice than his subsequent model would and secondly, that this line of argument seems to 
obviate the need for Justice as Fairness to play a role in Rawls’s theory of Justice as 
Reciprocity altogether. 
 
2.2.2 As there were important difference between Rawls’s principles of the first model 
and those of Theory, so too, there were some very important differences between Rawls’s 
theory of Justice as Fairness in his first model and in Theory.  
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2.2.3 In the equivalent of Theory’s original position the decision making parties are, as 
they would later be in Theory, conceived of as ‘mutually self-interested.’1 However, they 
are not, as they would later be in Theory, to be imagined as making their choices from 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, but instead are fully aware of their position, and of how the 
practices of the ‘hypothetical society’2 they are members of affect them.  The practices of 
the hypothetical society are not generally assumed to be ‘just’, i.e. compliant with the 
principles of justice, though some may happen to be.  As Rawls described the decision 
problem facing the parties 
 
Passage 2h (J as F 2) 
 
Since these persons are conceived as engaging in their common practices, 
which are already established, there is no question of our supposing them to 
come together to deliberate as to how they will set these practices up for the 
first time.  Yet we can imagine that from time to time they discuss with one 
another whether any of them has a legitimate complaint against their 
established institutions.3  
 
2.2.4 The first model’s equivalent of Theory’s ‘veil of ignorance’ is Rawls’s supposition 
that 
 
Passage 2i (J as F 2) 
 
[t]hey [the parties in the first original position] each understand further that 
the principles proposed and acknowledged on this occasion are binding on 
future occasions. Thus each will be wary of proposing a principle which 
would give him a peculiar advantage, in his present circumstances, 
supposing it to be accepted.  Each person knows that he will be bound by it 
in future circumstances the peculiarities of which cannot be known, and 
which might well be such that the principle is then to his disadvantage.  The 
idea is that everyone should be required to make in advance a firm 
commitment, which others also may reasonably be expected to make, and 
that no one be given the opportunity to tailor the canons of a legitimate 
complaint to fit his own special condition, and then discard them when they 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1958 p.168 
2 Rawls 1957 p.656 
3 Rawls 1958 p 171 
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no longer suit his purpose.1  
 
2.2.5 The first model, then, relied on the supposition that the parties’ ignorance of their 
future circumstances, coupled with the requirement that the principles chosen must bind 
them in such circumstances, would be strong enough to produce principles that could be 
unanimously agreed to by people aware of their present circumstances.  On initial 
inspection, it doesn’t appear to be strong enough for that task. The principal source of 
difficulty is, as Wolff puts it, ‘the impossibility of achieving unanimity among a group of 
players who, in a manner of speaking, know too much about themselves and their fellow-
players.’2 This difficulty provides at least part of the explanation for why Rawls introduces 
the veil of ignorance in subsequent models.  
 
2.2.6 For the sake of my argument, let us suppose that they would choose the two 
principles of justice and consider what implications that choice would have for Rawls’s 
theory of reciprocity as it was in the first model.  First we need to be clear about what 
Rawls meant by ‘justice as fairness’ in his first model. 
 
2.2.7 In ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1), Rawls wrote 
 
Passage 2j (J as F 1) 
 
These remarks [regarding the rationality of choosing the two principles in 
the hypothetical society] are not, of course, offered as a proof that persons so 
circumstanced would settle upon the two principles, but only to show that 
the principles of justice could have such a background; [1] and so can be 
viewed as those principles which mutually self-interested and rational 
persons, when similarly situated and required to make in advance a firm 
commitment could acknowledge as restrictions governing the assignment of 
rights and duties in their common practices, and thereby accept as limiting 
their rights against one another.   
 3.  That the principles of justice can be regarded in this way is an 
important fact about them.  It brings out the idea that fundamental to justice 
is the concept of fairness which relates to right dealing between persons who 
are cooperating with or competing against one another, as when one speaks 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1958 pp 171-172 
2 Wolff 1977 p 51 
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of fair games, fair competition, and fair bargains.  The question of fairness 
arises when free persons, who have no authority over one another, are 
engaging in a joint activity and amongst themselves settling or 
acknowledging the rules which define it and which determine the respective 
shares in its benefits and burdens. A practice will strike the parties as fair if 
none feels that, by participating in it, he, or any of the others, is taken 
advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which he does not regard as 
legitimate.  [2] A practice is just, then, when it satisfies the principles which 
those who participate in it could propose to one another for mutual 
acceptance under the aforementioned circumstances.  Persons engaged in a 
just, or fair, practice can face one another honestly, and support their 
respective positions, should they appear questionable, by reference to 
principles which it is reasonable to expect each other to accept.  [3] It is this 
notion of the possibility of mutual acknowledgement which makes the 
concept of fairness fundamental to justice.  Only if such acknowledgement is 
possible, can there be true community between persons in their common 
practices; otherwise their relations will appear to them as founded to some 
extent on force and violence.1  [My italics and numbering of the sentences] 
 
2.2.8 The three italicized sentences encapsulate Rawls’s theory of Justice as Fairness as it 
was in his first essay of the same name.2 The definition Rawls gives of Justice as Fairness 
in Theory is essentially the same, apart from the removal of the reference to practices.3 But 
the reasons for the parties choosing the two principles are very different to those they 
would become in Theory.  In ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1&2) the parties choose the principles 
because they are the only principles that ensure that all would do as well, or better, than 
they would under an equal economic distribution, which was also a distribution of equal 
liberty.  So in the first form of the model, Justice as Fairness held that it was both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the parties’ choice of principles, that the principles 
guaranteed that all would be at least as well off as they would be in a situation of equal 
liberty. 
 
2.2.9 Now this raises a puzzling question regarding Rawls’s first form of the model, 
which is why did he feel any need to support the two principle of justice with the 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p.657 
2 The wording in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2) is exactly the same apart from the insertion of ‘or fair’ 
after ‘is just’ in the equivalent of the second italicized sentence. Rawls 1958 p.178   
3 It reads ‘[t]he original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the 
fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.  This explains the propriety of the name “justice as 
fairness”: it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is 
fair.’ 
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contractualist argument of ‘Justice as Fairness’?  I can only put forward a speculative 
answer to that question, but in so doing I can also put forward the argument I promised 
earlier to the effect that Justice as Fairness should give way to the requirement that all 
people do at least as well as they would in the relevant situation of equal liberty in the event 
of a clash between meeting that requirement, and meeting the contractualist requirement of 
Justice as Fairness. 
 
2.2.10 At the heart of Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity there lies, I believe, the 
idea that cooperating parties in a venture for mutual advantage should be treated as if they 
were free and equal.  He said this in so many words in the selection from Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement that I cited as Passage P3.   To repeat these: the historical 
conception of society that Rawls embraces as the primary alternative to utilitarianism is 
‘the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free 
and equal’.  The conception of justice that I have attributed to Rawls, Justice as 
Reciprocity, holds that rules, or institutions, are ‘just’ insofar as they are appropriate to that 
conception of society.  In this case, Justice as Reciprocity, should, given the assumptions of 
Rawls’s first model, be able to mandate the two principles of justice directly without any 
need for the ‘middle man’ of Justice as Fairness.  Justice as Reciprocity would seem, at 
least on the face of it, to require that all cooperating members of society do at least as well 
as they would in the relevant situation of equal liberty.   According to the assumptions of 
the first model, as I have been at pains to emphasize in these last two sections, the 
principles of justice would meet this requirement, and they are the only principles, that 
could meet this requirement.  In terms of Fig. 1(i) in Chapter 1, Justice as Reciprocity could 
proceed via the Justice as Fairness bypass 1 straight to the two principles of justice.  This 
implication of Rawls’s first model explains why I did not feel the need to enter into the 
argument of Justice as Fairness, that the parties would choose the principles in the original 
position, in too much detail. If Justice as Fairness did not select the two principles of justice 
then it would appear to be unfit for the purpose of constructing principles of Justice as 
Reciprocity.  I return to this line of argument in Chapter 3, where I deploy it to dismiss 
Rawls’s theory of Justice as Fairness as it was in Theory. 
 
2.2.11 My speculation as to why Rawls felt the need to deploy the contractualist argument 
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of Justice as Fairness is that contractualism is, as Rawls repeatedly emphasizes, the great 
historical alternative to utilitarianism, and one that seems closely allied to Rawls’s 
conception of society.   
 
2.2.12 It is worth remarking here that Rawls’s use of a hypothetical contract seems to me 
to defeat at least one of the main purposes behind the invocation of a contract in traditional 
social contract theory.  Contractualist theorists such as Locke and Hobbes depended heavily 
on the idea that the social contract was binding because breaking it would be breaking an 
actual contract, and breach of contract was unjust.  Rawls explicitly repudiates the idea that 
justice is akin to an actual contractual obligation throughout the various developments of 
his theory.1 
 
3 The duty of fair play 
 
2.3.1 What was to become the principle of fairness in Theory made its debut as the duty 
of fair play in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1). It plays a comparatively minor role in Theory, where 
Rawls holds it to obligate only persons who have voluntarily accepted offices in a well-
ordered just society, and not citizens generally.  Indeed, Rawls remarks in Theory that 
‘[t]here is, I believe, no political obligation, strictly speaking, for citizens generally.’2 But I 
believe the duty of fair play was central to Rawls’s first model and was intended to apply to 
                                                 
1 Ronald Dworkin questioned the point of Rawls’s hypothetical contract in his essay, ‘Justice and 
Rights’ (1978 p. 151), remarking that ‘[a] hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an 
actual contract; it is no contract at all.’  Dworkin (who was commenting on Rawls’s third model of 
Theory) went on to suggest that the device of choice in the original position from behind a veil of 
ignorance would be more usefully understood as a device for testing which principles would best 
fulfilled the obligation of political institutions to treat the individuals they govern equally.  
However, in ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical.’ (p. 236), Rawls rejects Dworkin’s 
suggestion on the grounds that it is too ‘narrow’ an interpretation of justice as fairness.  One of the 
reasons Rawls gives for regarding Dworkin’s interpretation as too narrow is that justice as fairness 
is rooted in the ‘fundamental and intuitive idea of society as a fair system of cooperation.’  But if 
that is the fundamental idea, if the two principles of justice are the only principles of justice that 
could fulfil the mutual advantage condition, then the need for justice as fairness is questionable.   
Rawls was, of course, defending the third model’s version of justice as fairness which is very 
different to the first.  However, in Chapter 3, I go on to argue that the third model of justice as 
fairness is unsuited to the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation precisely 
because it doesn’t guarantee principles that would meet the mutual advantage condition of Justice as 
Reciprocity. 
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 98 
99 
 
all citizens.  It sets out the motive to be just, and, I shall maintain, exactly corresponds to 
Gibbard’s defining features of Justice as Reciprocity: that is, those who had a duty to act in 
accordance with the duty of play, as it should be interpreted in Rawls’s first model are 
those who would have a duty of reciprocity according to Gibbard’s definition of Justice as 
Reciprocity. (§§1.4.1 -1.4.2).   I shall also show that only Rawls’s two principles of justice 
could meet the duty of fair play in Rawls’s first model; the classical principle of utility 
could not do so. 
 
2.3.2 I should explain the significance of this result for the conclusion of my thesis as a 
whole.   When I first started this thesis I nursed the ambition to show that the principle of 
classical utility was, contra Rawls, the principle that was uniquely suited to Justice as 
Reciprocity and that the motive for acting in accordance with the principle of classical 
utility would be the duty of fair play, i.e. a duty of reciprocity, rather than any putative duty 
of benevolence.  I have curtailed that ambition to the more modest one of showing that the 
classical principle of utility is reconcilable with the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  
The reason for this curtailment is that I have not solved the problem, and do not believe that 
anyone else has either, of what the fairness condition might entail.1 
 
2.3.3 The Rawls of the first model thought he had solved the problem and believed that 
the fairness condition effectively amounted to the same thing as the mutual advantage 
condition.  He did not make this belief particularly clear but it can be discerned by a close 
reading of what he wrote, which I provide below.  This might seem surprising, as the 
fairness condition and the mutual advantage condition are conceptually distinct 
requirements and were presented as such in Chapter 1; the reason they were not practically 
distinct, I shall explain, was due to Rawls’s theory of Justice as Fairness. 
 
2.3.4 But Rawls had not solved the problem, and the repercussion of this failure was to 
leave open the question of what the fairness condition might entail, which in turn left open 
the question of whether the duty of fair play could as equally well apply to a society that is 
well-ordered by the principle of classical utility as to one that is well-ordered by the two 
                                                 
1 I confess to still nursing the same ambition, though it is beyond the remit of this thesis to fulfil it. 
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principles of justice.  In Chapter 4 I argue that other things indeed being equal, the ideal 
legislator should feel free to choose the classical principle of utility if that is where he or 
she felt that choice would do the most good. Which is also to say that, although Justice as 
Reciprocity and Justice as Benevolence are indeed two distinct conceptions of justice, their 
practical recommendations in terms of a governing principle of distributive justice could 
coincide. 
 
2.3.5 Rawls introduces the duty of fair play in the course of providing his account of why 
people should be bound by a practice that meets the principles of justice, in a passage just 
following Passage 2j (J as F 1) 
 
Passage 2k (J as F 1) 
 
[1]Now if the participants in a practice accept its rules as fair, and so have no 
complaint to lodge against it, there arises a prima facie duty (and a 
corresponding prima facie right) of the parties to each other to act in 
accordance with the practice when it falls upon them to comply. [2] When 
any number of persons engage in a practice, or conduct a joint undertaking, 
according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted 
to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar acquiescence on 
the part of those who have benefited by their submission. [3] These 
conditions will, of course, obtain if a practice is correctly acknowledged to 
be fair, for in this case, all who participate in it will benefit from it. [my 
italics and numbering of the sentences]1   
 
2.3.6 This statement of the duty of fair play, if taken out of context, might appear to be 
compatible with a very wide range of principles of distribution.  If all that is required for a 
practice to qualify as fair is, as sentence [1] implies, that its practitioners accept it as fair, 
then the ‘fairness’ of any practice would seem to be purely subjective, dependent on the 
opinions of the practitioners. If all accepted the two principles of justice as fair, then the 
two principles of justice would be fair.  But if all accepted the principle of utility as fair 
then the principle of utility would be fair.   
 
2.3.7 But in the context of the account of Rawls’s two principles of justice and Justice as 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p.665  
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Fairness as they were in ‘Justice as Fairness’, just given, the passage should be read as 
restricting the duty of fair play to only those practices that are in accordance with Rawls’s 
principles of justice.  This reading is justified by paying close attention to sentences [2] and 
[3].  The ‘conditions’ of sentence [3] are those conditions a practice needs to meet in order 
for people to have a prima facie duty to act in accordance with that practice in their 
capacity as beneficiaries of that practice, and a prima facie right to expect a similar 
acquiescence from other beneficiaries of that practice in their capacity as ‘contributors’ to 
the benefits of the practice. The participants in the practice qualify as ‘contributors’, due to 
the fact that their restriction of their liberty has, Rawls presumes, increased the size of the 
benefits available to all participants in the practice. 
 
2.3.8 Now sentence [3] might at first appear to be strange.  It asserts that if a practice is 
correctly acknowledged to be fair then those who participate in it will benefit from it.  That 
is, it asserts that if the antecedent of the conditional (that participants in a practice correctly 
regard the practice as fair) obtains, then the consequent (that everyone benefits from the 
practice) obtains as well.  The reason this assertion might seem odd is that the idea of an 
inference from someone’s accepting a practice as fair to someone’s benefiting from it is 
highly questionable.  To use an example that Rawls would have approved of at the time of 
writing ‘Justice as Fairness’: an indoctrinated slave might perceive the practice of slavery 
to be fair, but a slave surely does not benefit from his slavery.1  However, we should pay 
particular attention to Rawls’s qualification that the practice has to be ‘correctly’ 
acknowledged as fair, and also to his theory of Justice as Fairness.  Rawls has argued that 
rational persons would only choose the two principles of justice to govern their practices, 
and this should be read as what he means by ‘correctly’ in this passage.  So we can infer 
that those practices that are correctly acknowledged as fair would benefit the participants in 
the practice.  This is because, as shown in the preceding section (§2.2.8), the parties in the 
first original position would choose the two principles of justice precisely because they did 
                                                 
1 I write ‘at the time’ advisedly.  I shall presently quote a passage from ‘Justice as Fairness’ which 
demonstrates that Rawls’s first model did not construe the practice of slavery to be beneficial to the 
slaves.  And as already shown, in Passage 1n (DJ 1967) (p. 63), he took the same position in the 
significantly revised model of ‘Distributive Justice’ (1967).  But, as evidenced by Passages 1r and 
1t (Theory Rev) by the time of Theory, he was committed to a definition of advantage with respect 
to the baseline of a Hobbesian state of nature, according to which a system of slavery might prove 
to be to everyone’s advantage.  
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offer an improvement on the relevant situation of equal liberty.1  
 
2.3.9 It should be noted that it would also be the case that all those practices that 
benefited all those who participated in them would also be fair.  This is guaranteed by the 
simple assumption of the first model that there could be at most only one distribution which 
was to everyone’s advantage in comparison with the same practice under equality, together 
with the assumption that the parties in the first original position would choose principles to 
govern their practices that guaranteed that everyone fared at least as well as under the same 
practice under equal liberty.  So if the antecedent of the conditional (that everyone benefits 
from the practice) obtained, then the consequent (that participants in a practice correctly 
regard the practice as fair) would follow.   
 
2.3.10 The relationship between ‘fairness’ and ‘benefit’, then, in the first model was one of 
equivalence.  A practice or venture would be fair if, and only if, it would also be beneficial 
to its participants.  This is also to say that a practice or venture would be beneficial to its 
participants if, and only if, it were fair.  This completes my demonstration that the two 
conceptually distinct requirements of Justice as Reciprocity did not lead to practically 
distinct requirements given the assumptions of the first model. 
 
2.3.11 This relationship between ‘benefit’ and ‘fairness’ in the first model carried with it 
two important implications for my overall argument. First, the duty of fair play would only 
bind people to practices or ventures that were governed by the two principles of justice.  
And secondly, the two principles of justice would be the only conception of justice that 
would fit what I referred to in Chapter 1 as Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  
This took Justice as Reciprocity to be defined by three features: firstly, justice would 
require constraint on the part of those who are required to act justly. Secondly, the fairness 
condition, which stipulates that a necessary condition that must be met for any individual 
                                                 
1 It might seem that the two principles shouldn’t be interpreted as offering an improvement on the 
relevant situation of equal liberty as if the second principle hasn’t come into play, the first principle 
just provides participants with equal liberty.  But it should be noted that the first principle refers to 
‘the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all’.  The relevant situation of equal 
liberty in comparison to which the combined principles offer an improvement can, then, be 
interpreted as a less extensive liberty than that provided by the first principle of justice. 
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participating in a cooperative venture to have a duty of reciprocity, is that the rules 
governing the cooperative venture are fair.  And thirdly, the mutual advantage condition 
which stipulates that a second condition that must be met for any individual participating in 
a cooperative venture is that the venture affords them some prospect of ‘advantage’.  The 
utilitarian conception of justice, whereby practices of joint ventures are governed by the 
principle of utility, would, according to Rawls’s first model, meet neither the fairness 
condition nor the advantage condition.  So no one could be bound by the duty of fair play to 
utilitarian practices.  I return to reconsider what the relationship of the utilitarian 
conceptions of justice would be to Justice as Reciprocity under the assumptions of Theory 
at the end of this Chapter.   
 
4 Justice as Reciprocity v Justice as Benevolence in Rawls’s first model 
 
2.4.1 Rawls first used the term ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ in his essay ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
(1).  In this section I analyse what he meant by the term and contrast it with his conception 
of Justice as Benevolence, as it was in the first model.  Having described the ideas, I can 
then demonstrate how, given the assumptions of Rawls’s first model, the expectation that 
the two competing conceptions of justice would yield similar policy prescriptions looked at 
least tenuous.  This will enable me to show, in the Concluding Remarks of the next section, 
how, given the revised assumptions of Theory the expectation that they would yield similar 
policy prescriptions didn’t seem nearly so tenuous.  
 
2.4.2 In ‘Justice as Fairness’(1), Rawls provides a summary of the first model of his 
theory which he then connects directly to what he calls  ‘conditions of reciprocity and 
community’. The paragraph containing this summary and the paragraph following it, 
defining the condition of reciprocity, are very useful.  They illustrate just how closely 
connected the different elements of Rawls’s theory, Justice as Fairness, the two principles 
of justice and the duty of fair play, were in the first model.1 I repeat those paragraphs below  
 
Passage 21 (J as F 1) 
                                                 
1 This is the ‘neatness of fit’ referred to earlier (§2.1.23) 
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[1] The conception at which we have arrived, then, is that the principles of 
justice may be thought of as arising once the constraints of having a morality 
are imposed upon rational and mutually self-interested parties who are 
related and situated in a special way. [2] A practice is just if it is in 
accordance with the principles which all who participate in it might 
reasonably be expected to propose or to acknowledge before one another 
when they are similarly circumstanced and required to make a firm 
commitment in advance; and thus when it meets standards which the parties 
could accept as fair should occasion arise for them to debate its merits. [3] 
Once persons knowingly engage in a practice which they acknowledge to be 
fair and accept the benefits of doing so, they are bound by the duty of fair 
play which implies a limitation on self-interest in particular cases. 
 [4] Now if a claim fails to meet this conception of justice there is no 
moral value in granting it, since it violates the conditions of reciprocity and 
community amongst persons: he who presses it, not being willing to 
acknowledge it when pressed by another, has no grounds for complaint when 
it is denied; whereas him against whom it is pressed can complain. [5] As it 
cannot mutually be acknowledged, it is a resort to coercion: granting the 
claim is only possible if one party can compel what the other will not admit.  
[6] Thus in deciding on the justice of a practice it is not enough to ascertain 
that it answers to wants and interests in the fullest and most effective 
manner. [7] For if any of these be such that they conflict with justice, they 
should not be counted; their satisfaction is no reason for having a practice. 
[8] It makes no sense to concede claims the denial of which can be objected 
to.  [9] It would be irrelevant to say, even if true, that it resulted in the 
greatest satisfaction of desire.1  
 
2.4.3 The usefulness of this passage lies in its exposure firstly; of just which claims 
people would have the right to press, with others having an obligation to grant and 
secondly; which claims they wouldn’t have the right to press and others would have no 
duty to grant, according to Justice as Reciprocity in Rawls’s first model.  ‘The principles of 
justice’ referred to in sentence [1] are, of course, Rawls’s two principles of justice.  
Sentence [2] defines those practices as ‘just’ as those practices which could be 
acknowledged by those in ‘the original position’. This also, it is reasonable to suppose, is 
the same conception of justice at work in sentences [7] and [8]. Only Rawls’s principles of 
justice could be acknowledged in the ‘original position’ and, on my interpretation given 
above (§§2.1.11 - 2.1.21), they would be acknowledged because they are the only 
principles that would ensure that everyone did as well, or better, than under equality.  
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p.660 
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Sentence [3], in line with my interpretation of the duty of fair play given above, (§§2.3.1 - 
2.3.7) can be read as asserting that since only those practices that are in accordance with the 
two principles of justice could qualify as fair, only those practices could bind people by the 
duty of fair play.   
 
2.4.4 In anticipation of the case that I shall put in the next section for the principle of 
classical utility’s compatibility with Justice as Reciprocity I shall point out here that at the 
root of Rawls’s conception of justice is the assumption that only the two principles of 
justice would ensure they would all do as well or better than in the relevant situation of 
equal liberty.  This is why they are chosen in the first original position, making them ‘fair’.  
And the duty of fair play, as shown in Section 3, only obligates people to principles which 
are fair. 
 
2.4.5 The next question to be addressed is what Rawls meant by ‘the conditions of 
reciprocity’ in sentence [4]. This turns out to be a comparatively simple question to answer.  
Two pages before Passage 21 (J as F 1) Rawls wrote 
 
Passage 2m (J as F 1) 
 
It is this notion of the possibility of mutual acknowledgment which makes 
the concept of fairness fundamental to justice. Only if such acknowledgment 
is possible, can there be true community between persons in their common 
practices; otherwise their relations will appear to them as founded to some 
extent on force and violence.1 
 
2.4.6 Rawls nowhere distinguishes between conditions of community and reciprocity, so 
it is reasonable to construe them as being the same.  In that case, conditions of reciprocity 
as those conditions which would be met by claims that conform to principles that could be 
mutually acknowledged in the first original position.  The condition of reciprocity, then, 
appears to be met by the same practices as would meet Justice as Fairness.  Rawls’s point in 
invoking the term ‘reciprocity’ appears to be to emphasize the consensual nature of persons 
acting in accordance with these principles as opposed to those which violate those 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p. 668. 
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conditions which are founded on force’, ‘violence’ or ‘coercion’, to use the terms evoked in 
Passage 21 (J as F 1) and Passage 2m (J as F 1). 
 
2.4.7 This interpretation of Rawls’s use of the term ‘reciprocity’ in Rawls’s first model is 
supported by the definition of a principle of reciprocity Rawls put in a later essay, ‘Justice 
as Reciprocity’ (1971), which was essentially a rewrite of ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2) for an 
edited collection.1  I put this definition here, but will refer back to it in Chapter 3 as a 
possible candidate for a mysterious principle of reciprocity that Rawls refers to in Theory. 
  
Passage 2n (J as R 1971): the principle of reciprocity 
 
The principle of reciprocity requires of a practice that it satisfy those 
principles which the persons who participate in it could reasonably propose 
for mutual acceptance under the circumstances and conditions of the 
hypothetical contract. Persons engaged in a practice meeting this principle 
can then face one another openly and support their respective positions, 
should they appear questionable, by reference to principles which it is 
reasonable to expect each to accept. A practice will strike the parties as 
conforming to the notion of reciprocity if none feels that, by participating in 
it, he or any of the others are taken advantage of or forced to give in to 
claims which they do not accept as legitimate.2 
 
2.4.8 My interpretation of Rawls’s ‘conditions of reciprocity’ as being met by the same 
condition as Justice as Fairness can be confirmed by considering that if ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
were substituted for ‘the principle of reciprocity’ in Passage 2n (J as R 1971) it would still 
make perfect sense.  In this passage, as in the previous two, the term appears to be evoked 
to emphasize the willing nature of reciprocal behaviour, as opposed to being ‘taken 
advantage of’ or ‘forced’. 
 
2.4.9 In fact, Rawls substituted ‘justice as fairness’ for ‘justice as reciprocity’ himself.  
Passage 2o (J as F 1) below contains Rawls’s first use of the phrase ‘justice as 
reciprocity’; there is an equivalent passage in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2) which is essentially 
                                                 
1 Originally published in Samuel Gorovitz, ed., Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill: With Simple 
Essays, pp. 242–268. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971. 
2 Rawls 1971 p.208 
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the same except for the substitution of ‘justice as fairness’ for ‘justice as reciprocity’.1 
 
2.4.10 Turning now to consider which claims would violate the condition of reciprocity; 
these are those which might be pressed which aren’t in accordance with principles that 
could be mutually acknowledged.  We have already seen that Rawls regarded them as being 
founded on ‘force’, ‘violence’ or ‘coercion.’  But the fact that they are not in accordance 
with principles that are mutually acknowledged does not mean that they could not be given 
some other principled justification, however.  It is obvious that Rawls has the principle of 
utility in mind when he writes of claims that would violate the condition of reciprocity ‘it 
would be irrelevant to say…that it resulted in the greatest satisfaction of desire.’2   
 
2.4.11 So in summary:  Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity in the first model put 
the emphasis on the fact that principles that conform to the conception must be mutually 
acknowledged, and that is how his use of the term ‘reciprocity’ should be understood.3  
However, the three main elements of his theory in the first model were so inextricably 
intertwined that any principles that satisfied Justice as Reciprocity would be the only 
principles that would satisfy the other elements of his theory: the only principles that could 
be mutually acknowledged would also be the only principles that could meet the 
requirement of the duty of fair play.  Similarly, the only principles that advantage all with 
respect to the relevant position of equality would be the only principles that could be 
selected by Justice as Fairness.  Furthermore, the two principles of justice would be the 
only principles that would meet the conditions of any of these elements of Rawls’s 
conception of justice in the first model.  And, as I already demonstrated in Section 3 on ‘the 
duty of fair play’ (§2.3.8), the two principles of justice would be the only conception of 
justice capable of meeting the requirements of Gibbard’s definition of Justice as 
Reciprocity set out in Chapter 1 (§§1.4.1 - 1.4.2). 
 
2.4.12 So I turn now to Rawls’s conception of Justice as Benevolence as it was in the first 
                                                 
1 See footnote 43 below 
2 in the words of Passage 21 (J as F 1)’s Sentence [9] 
3 I haven’t analysed Rawls’s use of the actual term ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ in ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
(1).  This occurs in Passage 2o (J as F 1) below and is entirely in conformity with the conception 
outlined here. 
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model.  He starts by defining it in opposition to his conception of Justice as Reciprocity in 
the paragraph immediately following Passage 21 (J as F 1).  In fact, this paragraph is the 
one cited as P3 in my Preface, which I repeat here for convenience 
 
Passage P3 (J as F 1957) 
 
This conception of justice (i.e. the conception of justice as reciprocity) 
differs from that of the stricter form of utilitarianism (Bentham and 
Sidgwick), and its counterpart in welfare economics, which assimilates 
justice to benevolence and the latter in turn to the most efficient design of 
institutions to promote the general welfare.1 
 
2.4.13 The point to be noted, as was already noted in my Preface, is that Rawls’s pictures 
of the rival conceptions of society were remarkably similar in his first essay ‘Justice as 
Fairness’ in 1957 to what they would be in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 
 
2.4.14 Rawls considers that Justice as Benevolence might recommend the two principles of 
justice as a practical means to maximizing utility, but points out that, if so, the two ideas 
behind the rival conceptions of justice would still be very different. 
 
Passage 2o (J as F 1) 
 
But even if such restrictions [i.e. the assumption that all members of society 
have similar utility functions and the assumption of the law of diminishing 
marginal utility] are built into the utility function, and have, in practice, 
much the same result as the application of the principles of justice (and 
appear, perhaps, to be ways of expressing these principles in the language of 
mathematics and psychology), the fundamental idea is very different from 
the conception of justice as reciprocity.2 Justice is interpreted as the 
contingent result of a higher order administrative decision whose form is 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p.660 
2 The equivalent of this phrase and surrounding text in J as F (2) is ‘(and appear, perhaps, to be 
ways of expressing these principles in the language of mathematics and psychology), the 
fundamental idea is very different from the conception of justice as fairness.2 For one thing, that the 
principles of justice should be accepted is interpreted as the contingent result of a higher order 
administrative decision.  The form of this decision is regarded as being similar to that of an 
entrepreneur…’ (Rawls 1958, p.185) A comparison of the two selections should justify my claim 
above that they are ‘essentially the same’ (§2.4.8). 
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similar to that of an entrepreneur deciding how much to produce of this or 
that commodity in view of its marginal revenue, or to that of someone 
distributing goods to needy persons according to the relative urgency of their 
wants. [my underlining]1 
 
2.4.15 Next, Rawls introduces the figure of the ideal legislator for the first time 
 
Passage 2p (J as F 1) 
 
The individuals receiving the benefits are not thought of as related in any 
way: they represent so many different directions in which limited resources 
may be allocated.  Preferences and interests are taken as given; and their 
satisfaction has value irrespective of the relations between persons which 
they represent and the claims which parties are prepared to make on one 
another. This value is properly taken into account by the (ideal) legislator 
who is conceived as adjusting the rules of the system from the center so as to 
maximize the present capitalized value of the social utility function.2 
 
2.4.16 This is enough textual evidence from ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1), to support a couple of 
important points about Rawls’s conception of Justice as Benevolence in his first model, and 
to contrast it with his conception of Justice as Benevolence in Theory. 
  
2.4.17 The first point to note, which is very important to the overall argument of this 
thesis, is that Justice as Benevolence was conceived of as starting at a lower level of 
construction to how it would be conceived in Theory.  There was no mention of the 
impartial observer, or the utilitarian conception of society, nor would there be for several 
essays to come.3  In terms of Fig. 1(i) Justice as Benevolence started at the lower level of 
construction, referred to as ‘the utilitarian theory of justice.’  The reason this is important is 
that utilitarianism can very easily be conceived of starting at this lower level, in which case 
strong lines of arguments directed against the higher level of construction may prove to be 
misleading distractions.  I shall argue that ‘the separateness of persons’ objection to ‘the 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p. 661  
2 Rawls 1957 p.662 
3 The utilitarian conception of society would make its first appearance in ‘Constitutional Liberty and 
the Concept of Justice’ (1963).  The impartial spectator wouldn’t make his debut until ‘Distributive 
Justice: Some Addenda’ (1968) 
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utilitarian conception of society’1 is a misleading distraction in Chapter 4. 
 
2.4.18 The second point to note is that although Rawls conceded that the two conceptions 
of justice may converge on the same practical result of recommending the two principles of 
justice, their convergence would be precarious.  Passage 2o (J as F 1) described the 
‘practical result’ of utilitarianism recommending the principles of justice as ‘the contingent 
result of a higher order administrative decision’.2  Rawls’s point here is that utilitarianism 
would only support the two principles of justice if ‘the ideal legislator’, or other higher 
order utilitarian administrative device, estimated that doing so would maximize utility.  If 
the ideal legislator estimated the two principles of justice wouldn’t maximize utility, he or 
she wouldn’t prescribe them.  This would be in contrast to the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity which would prescribe them on the grounds that they would be the only 
principles that could be mutually acknowledged regardless of whether they maximized 
utility. 
 
2.4.19 The two conceptions of justice, then, seem quite likely to lead to different policy 
prescriptions.  Even if the utilitarian ideal legislator would select the two principles of 
justice as rules of thumb, he would not require them to be as strictly observed as would the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  As I remarked in Chapter 1, even as strong a 
champion of individual liberty as John Stuart Mill allowed that his liberty principle should 
give way to considerations of expediency on occasions where the calculus of utility called 
on it to do so (§1.5.5). 
 
5 What if Rawls were not committed to the ‘simple assumption of the first 
                                                 
1 By which I mean Rawls’s higher level of account of how utilitarianism might best be motivated, 
referred to in footnote 46 above. 
2 Rawls later questions utilitarianism’s reliance on the empirical assumptions of similar utility 
functions and diminishing marginal utility to deliver the same practical results as Justice as 
Reciprocity, claiming that ‘the various restrictions on the utility function needed to get this result 
are borrowed from the conception of justice as fairness. The notion that individuals have similar 
utility functions, for example, is really the first principle of justice under the guise of a 
psychological law. It is assumed not in the manner of an empirical hypothesis concerning actual 
desires and interests, but from sensing what must be laid down if justice is not to be violated.’ 
(Rawls 1957 p.662) This strikes me as a display of excessive enthusiasm for the two principles of 
justice on Rawls’s part.  The notion that individuals have similar utility functions seems a 
reasonable empirical hypothesis. 
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model’? 
 
2.5.1 Thus far I have proceeded on the supposition that Rawls was committed to the 
simple assumption of the first model, because it is my belief that he was.  But a powerful 
argument against this supposition is that it suggests that he was a bit naïve: surely he should 
have been alert to the possibility of there being more than one unequal distribution that is 
Pareto-preferred to equality?  I have seen no evidence to suggest that Rawls was alert to 
that possibility at the time, and provided some grounds for supposing that he wasn’t.  Other 
commentators, however, have helpfully attempted to ‘fill in the gaps’ in Rawls’s work and 
argue that the difference principle is the most ‘egalitarian’ compromise on actual equality.  
Thoroughness recommends the consideration of at least one of these alternatives; after all, 
there may be an argument that would have served Rawls’s purposes equally well, whether 
he considered it or not. 
 
2.5.2 So I here consider an argument offered by Brian Barry in Justice as Impartiality,1 
where Barry’s reference to Broome’s example suggests that he considered his new 
justification would work for examples such as Broome’s.  I argue below that it doesn’t. 
 
2.5.3  The purpose of Barry’s argument of Justice as Impartiality was to side with Rawls in 
defence of the difference principle against utilitarianism.  He ends up concluding that 
‘utilitarianism… fails as a theory of justice because it is liable to place unfair burdens on 
some people’ and ‘the inequalities in well-being that it [i.e. utilitarianism] can give rise to 
cannot be justified to those who are at the losing end of them.’2I can set aside the larger 
questions of whether utilitarianism is unfair, or can be justified to those at its losing end, to 
focus on the question in hand, which is whether Distribution 2 in Fig 2 (i) is unfair or can 
be justified to those at its losing end.  This is the question in hand because the aim is to 
establish whether the difference principle is the most egalitarian interpretation of Rawls’s 
second principle of justice in his first model.  We are operating on the assumption that the 
requirement of Rawls’s first principle of justice, that guarantees the greatest liberty 
compatible for all, has been met (it is represented by Distribution 3).  So the more unequal 
                                                 
1 Barry makes reference to Broome’s example in Barry 1995 p. 66  
2 Barry 1995 p. 66 
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assumptions (that would endow people with less than 100) are not in the picture. 
 
2.5.4 The easiest way for me to show that Distribution 2 could be justified to those who 
lose out under is by response to Barry’s implicit argument that it couldn’t, repeated in 
Passage 2r below 
 
Passage 2r  
 
What then can we say to the actual worst-off people in a society where the 
difference principle is instantiated?  We cannot say that they could not be 
made better off.  But we can say that the currently worst-off people could be 
made better off only if some other people were made worse off than the 
currently worst-off people are now.  The minimum level, in other words, 
would have to become lower.  This necessarily follows from the stipulation 
that it is currently as high as it can be.  Now, there is nothing to stop the 
members of the worst-off group saying ‘Fine: make us better off at the 
expense of these others.’  But this cannot be a moral demand.  For the only 
moral basis for their being as well off as they are now is that the worst off 
people (whatever their identities) should be as well off as possible.1 
 
2.5.5 For this argument to succeed in the face of Fig 2 (i) Barry would have to 
claim that the non-agricultural workers demand to make them better off than the 
agricultural workers could not be a moral demand.  But there does seem to be a 
moral demand available to them, they could try saying “We’re not just being 
greedy; it’s fairer – there is less inequality in Distribution 2 than in Distribution 1; 
that seems intuitively obvious.”  And if aggregative considerations favoured 
Distribution 2, they could also say, “Plus there’s more of us; more good will be 
done this way.”2 
 
2.5.6 Would Barry have a viable counter-argument to these moral justifications for the 
agricultural workers demands?  The one implicit in the final sentence of Passage 2r is that 
‘the only moral basis’ for people to have any more than they might otherwise have is ‘that 
the worst off people… should be as well off as possible’.  If it is true that the only possible 
                                                 
1 Barry 1995 p.66 
2 These two lines of argument were suggested to me by Jonathan Wolff. 
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moral basis for anyone having any more than they might otherwise have is ‘that the worst 
off people… should be as well off as possible’ then it would be correct that the 
justifications the non-agricultural workers offer for their demand would not be ‘moral’ 
ones.  But this purported counter-argument is clearly question begging: it does not establish 
the claim that there can be no other moral basis for people to have more than they might 
otherwise have; it simply assumes it. 
 
2.5.7 Alternatively, someone might try to argue against allowing aggregative 
considerations into resolving the question of how the second principle of justice should be 
applied by some other ‘egalitarian’ criterion that would favour Distribution 2 on the 
grounds that it was fairer.  Then Distribution 2 might be selected even in the case that there 
were many more agricultural workers than non-agricultural workers. 
 
2.5.8 But at the end of the day, however the question of how best to interpret the second 
principle of justice in the face of the possibility of more than one unequal distribution that 
is Pareto-preferred to equality in the first model should be resolved, its resolution would 
make little difference to either Rawls’s case for the two principles of justice being the 
principles most appropriate to Justice as Reciprocity on the one hand, or his case that 
utilitarianism is incompatible with Justice as Reciprocity on the other.   
 
2.5.9 The reason that it would make little difference to his case that the two principles of 
justice were most suited to Justice as Reciprocity is that they would still be the only two 
principles that would meet the mutual advantage condition.  This position in the first 
model, we can recall, is the assignment of equal rights that would provide people with the 
maximum level of net benefit compatible with the same level of net benefit for all.  If, as 
Rawls maintained, Justice as Fairness lay at the heart of Justice as Reciprocity and the 
parties in the original position would choose the only principles that met the mutual 
advantage condition, they would choose the two principles of justice regardless of the 
subsidiary question of how to interpret the demands of the second principle of justice.  And 
they would decisively reject utilitarianism for the reason that it would be liable to place 
some of them below the level of net benefit they would enjoy under the first principle of 
justice. 
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2.5.10 The point of §2.5.9 can be illustrated by adapting the example behind Fig 2 (i).  
Suppose, for the sake of example, that Rufus T Firefly, the leader of Freedonia, had 
unlimited powers and chose to institute such a system of serfdom on the grounds that doing 
so would maximize utility because the agricultural workers would be more productive if 
tied to the land, only being allowed to travel outside the confines of the manor on high days 
and holidays. Rufus T Firefly in this example can be conceived as the ‘ideal legislator’ who 
is ‘adjusting the rules of the system from the center so as to maximize the present 
capitalized value of the social utility function.’1 
 
Fig 2 (v) 
 
Distribution Non-agricultural workers Agricultural workers 
 1 115 140 
 2 120 110 
 3 100 100 
 4 150 (freemen and lords of 
the manor) 
90 (serfs) 
 
2.5.11 If there were enough non-agricultural workers then the principle of utility would 
select Distribution 4.  But the agricultural workers would reject a principle that would be 
liable to give them less than they could be assured with the guarantee of equal liberty 
offered by the first principle alone.  However, although they would presumably favour the 
interpretation of the second principle of justice that maximized the prospects of the worst 
off (resulting in Distribution 1) if it were unavailable, for some reason, they would still 
choose the two principles of justice because they would still be better off under the 
combination of the two principles than the first principle of justice alone.              
 
2.5.12 So now it is possible to take full stock of the consequences of Rawls being, or not 
                                                 
1To quote Passage 2p (J as F 1) 
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being, committed to the simple assumption of the first model.  If he was so committed, then 
the two principles of justice would exclude any aggregation, whether it be understood 
according to interpretation (i) of Sentence 4 of Passage 2g (J as F 2)1 or interpretation (ii).  
If he wasn’t so committed, then there might be an argument that upheld the difference 
principle as the most egalitarian interpretation of the second principle of justice.  In which 
case, the two principles of justice would again exclude any aggregation, understood under 
either interpretation.  Alternatively, there might be another ‘egalitarian’ argument that 
would select one of the Pareto optimal unequal distributions on non-aggregative grounds as 
the best interpretation of the second principle of justice.  Such an argument would also 
exclude aggregation on either interpretation.  Finally, the second principle of justice might 
be interpreted as allowing for limited aggregation to resolve the question of which Pareto-
optimal unequal distribution to select.  In which case, the principle would exclude 
aggregation according to interpretation (ii) of the exclusion but not according to 
interpretation (i).  The important point to note, however, is that in all these cases the 
unlimited aggregation that the principle of utility would allow would be excluded by the 
second principle of justice. 
               
 
Concluding remarks 
 
2.6.1 Here I take stock of the consequences of Rawls’s abandonment of the assumptions 
of his first model and subsequent endorsement of a state of general egoism as the baseline 
from which mutual advantage should be measured.  The way I shall do this is with 
reference to an applied example that Rawls conveniently supplied in ‘Justice as Fairness’ 
(1): that utilitarianism might recommend a system of slavery.  He suggests this possibility 
in the following two passages, the first from ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1) and the second from 
‘Justice as Fairness’ (2) 
 
Passage 2s (J as F 1) 
 
                                                 
1 p. 88 
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[1] It [the utilitarian conception of justice] can lead one to argue against 
slavery on the grounds that the advantages to the slaveholder do not counter 
balance the disadvantages to the slave and to society at large burdened by a 
comparatively inefficient system of labor.  [2] The conception of justice as 
fairness, when applied to the offices of slaveholder and slave, would forbid 
counting the advantages of the slaveholder at all. [3] These offices could not 
be founded on principles which could be mutually acknowledged, so the 
question whether the slaveholder’s gains are great enough to counterbalance 
the losses to the slave and society cannot arise in the first place.1  
 
Passage 2t (J as F 2)  
 
[1] Utilitarianism cannot account for the fact that slavery is always unjust, 
nor for the fact that it would be recognized as irrelevant in defeating the 
accusation of injustice for one person to say to another, engaged with him in 
a common practice and debating its merits, that nevertheless it allowed of the 
greatest satisfaction of desire. [2] The charge of injustice cannot be rebutted 
in this way. [3] If justice were derivative from a higher order executive 
efficiency, this would not be so. 2 [my italics and sentence numbering] 
 
2.6.2 The essence of the argument contained between these passages is that the utilitarian 
conception of justice may or may not condemn slavery as unjust – the matter of whether it 
did so or not would depend on the contingent question of whether the advantages to the 
slaveholder would outweigh the disadvantages to the slave.  However, suggests Rawls in 
Sentences [2] and [3] of Passage 2s (J as F 1), Justice as Fairness would not hesitate in 
condemning slavery as unjust; slavery would be unjust because it would not be in 
accordance with principles that could be mutually acknowledged by the slaveholder and the 
slave. 
 
2.6.3 Rawls’s argument of these passages, incidentally, provides a fine example of a 
claim that would violate the conditions of reciprocity put forward in Passage 21 (J as F 1).  
That passage asserted that it would be irrelevant to say of a claim that was not put forward 
in accordance with principles that could be mutually acknowledged ‘that it resulted in the 
greatest satisfaction of desire.’  Such a claim would still violate the conditions of 
reciprocity and community. Passage 2t (J as F 2) Sentence [1] describes a potential 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957 p.661 
2 Rawls 1957 p.188  
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justification of slavery on the grounds that it allowed ‘the greatest satisfaction of desire’ as 
‘irrelevant’ indicating that this is just the sort of claim that Rawls had in mind as being in 
violation of conditions of reciprocity and community. 
 
2.6.4 But the crucial point to appreciate, when considering Rawls’s argument, is that 
Justice as Fairness’s unequivocal condemnation of slavery as unjust ultimately depends on 
the assumption that slavery would disadvantage the slave with respect to the relevant 
situation of equal liberty.  This is why, to use the terms of Passage 2s (J as F 1), the offices 
of slaveholder and slave ‘could not be founded on principles which could be mutually 
acknowledged’; the only principles which could be mutually acknowledged would be 
principles that ensured that all did at least as well or better than in the relevant situation of 
equal liberty. 
 
2.6.5 However, Rawls had changed his model by the time of Theory where, as explained 
in Chapter 1, he assumed a state of general egoism as the relevant situation of equal liberty 
(§§1.9.32 – 1.9.40).  With the state of general egoism as the 1.9.32 position it is by no 
means clear that both slave and slaveholder would not be prepared to mutually 
acknowledge principles which permitted the existence of their respective offices.  As I 
suggested in Chapter 1 (§§1.10.1 – 1.10.6), it might be rational for someone who knew that 
they certainly occupy the office of slave if expediency required such offices to exist, to still 
prefer a classical utilitarian Leviathan over the alternative of a state of general egoism.  So 
Justice as Fairness might allow the classical principle of utility to be mutually 
acknowledged by the slave and slaveholder, given the revised assumptions of Theory.   
 
2.6.6   If it turned out to be the case that the parties in the revised original position of 
Theory would choose the principle of utility, then there might turn out to be no divergence 
between the recommendations of Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity.  This 
point can be put with reference to Rawls’s claims in Passage 2t (J as F 2). The argument 
of that passage can be analysed as:  
 
1. If justice were derivative from a higher order executive efficiency it could not 
account for the fact that slavery is always unjust. 
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2. Slavery is always unjust 
 
Therefore 
3. Justice is not derivative from a higher order of efficiency. 
 
2.6.7 But premise 2 depends on another claim that Rawls wrote a few lines prior to 
Passage 2t (J as F 2) that ‘[a]s that office [i.e. the office of slaveholder] is not in 
accordance with principles that could be mutually acknowledged, the gains accruing to the 
slaveholder, supposing them to exist, cannot be accounted as in any way mitigating the 
injustice of slavery.’1 Premise 2’s claim that slavery is unjust, then, depends on Rawls’s 
argument that the office of slaveholder and slave would not be in accordance with 
principles that could be mutually acknowledged.   As I maintained above (§2.6.5), the 
assertion that the offices in question would not be mutually acknowledged is questionable, 
given the baseline of general egoism that Rawls is committed to in Theory. 
 
2.6.8 If the classical principle of utility turned out to be the choice of the parties in the 
original position of Theory, then Premise 2 of the argument would be false according to the 
lights of Justice as Fairness, and the conclusion, 3, would not follow.  This would open up 
the possibility that justice might both be derivative from a higher order of efficiency and 
derivative from Justice as Fairness.  Then, if Justice as Fairness turned out to be the 
appropriate device for constructing principles appropriate to Justice as Reciprocity (as I 
shall argue it isn’t in the next chapter), Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity 
might converge on the same policy recommendations.   
 
2.6.9 The possibility that Justice as Reciprocity and Justice as Benevolence might 
converge on the same policy recommendations threatens the ability of Justice as 
Reciprocity to underwrite the three tenets of deontological liberalism.  This can be easily 
demonstrated.  In Chapter 1 I explained how Rawls conceived that Justice as Benevolence 
could lead to the classical principle of utility.  And I showed how classical act-
                                                 
1Rawls 1958 p.188.  The sentence from ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2) effectively makes that same 
assertion as is equivalent to Passage 2q (J as F 1)’s Sentence [3].   
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utilitarianism was unable to support any of the three tenets of deontological liberalism, 
because of its commitment to unlimited aggregation.  So if Justice as Reciprocity also led 
to classical act-utilitarianism, it would be also be unable to underwrite the three tenets of 
deontological liberalism. 
 
2.6.10 I should here elaborate on how the tenets of deontological liberalism should be 
understood for the purpose of this thesis, and that is as pertaining to real people, in the real 
world, at the present time.  Our ‘common sense convictions concerning the priority of 
justice’ is that we ‘have an inviolability founded on justice…which even the welfare of 
every one else cannot override,’1 not that people should have an inviolability founded on 
justice in an ideal world.  That, at any rate, is the intuition regarding the core tenet of justice 
that I uphold in Chapter 4.2 
 
2.6.11 The great advantage of the first model in this regard is that it would have fulfilled 
the promise Justice as Reciprocity offered of supporting the three tenets of deontological 
liberalism conceived in this way.  As described above, the model assumes people who are 
already engaged in practices (§§2.2.3 – 2.2.4) judging ‘whether any of them has a 
legitimate complaint against their established institutions’.  Suppose, then, that Rufus T 
Firefly had established serfdom five years ago.  The serfs in Distribution 4 of Fig 2 (v) 
could legitimately complain that Firefly’s decision had deprived them of their liberty-right 
and claim-right to go away at weekends, as serfdom did not meet the mutual advantage 
condition of Justice as Reciprocity, and they would only have agreed to principles that 
would meet the mutual advantage condition.  They have these rights as Justice as Fairness 
supposes that people have the rights to whatever would be accorded to them by principles 
they would choose in the original position.   
 
 
2.6.11 The explanation of how the first model would uphold the third tenet of 
deontological liberalism is slightly more complicated.  In the Rawlsian scheme of things, 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 (pp. 24 – 27) 
2 For this reason, I have imagined the citizens of Freedonia to be real contemporaries of 
ours. 
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different views on how best to be altruistic or benevolent constitute different conceptions of 
the good.  Utilitarianism is regarded by Rawls as a reasonable comprehensive doctrine1; its 
conception of the good could be the statement of Peter Singer’s quoted in Chapter 1 which 
held ‘that an act is right only if it does at least as much to increase happiness and reduce 
misery, for all those affected by it, as any possible alternative act.’2 
 
2.6.12 Now, the first model was, I believe, neutral between conceptions of the good.  This 
assertion might seem surprising in light of Section 5’s examination of whether egalitarian 
values could be used to choose among the various distributions that are Pareto-superior to 
an equal distribution of the advantages of social cooperation.  But it should be noted that 
the context of that examination was internal to the question of how to interpret the second 
principle of justice.  And the second principle of justice was chosen on morally neutral 
grounds: as explained at length, the two principles of justice were chosen as the only 
principles that could meet the condition of mutual advantage. 
 
2.6.13 This point can be illustrated with reference to Fig 2 (i).  Suppose that it just so 
happens that the non-agricultural workers are utilitarians and the agricultural workers are 
prioritarians.  Rufus T Firefly happens to be a utilitarian himself in his personal life, but 
knows that his responsibility is to implement Justice as Reciprocity and that Justice as 
Reciprocity leads to the two principles of justice.  Furthermore, he takes his responsibilities 
seriously.  He might be tempted to select Distribution 2.  Such a selection would further his 
personal aims in two ways: it would promote the greatest aggregate sum of advantages and 
it would provide more advantages to people who were themselves inclined to promote the 
greatest aggregate sum of advantages.  But he couldn’t in conscience do that.  His 
responsibilities as the person in charge of implementing Justice as Reciprocity oblige him 
to choose whichever distribution best fulfils the requirement of the second principle of 
justice, whether that turns out to be distribution 1 or 2. 
                                                 
1 See Rawls 1996 p.145 
2 Rawls describes the relationship between comprehensive moral doctrines and conceptions of the 
good in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. p. 19.  His view is that the elements of a conception of 
the good are ‘normally’ set within a comprehensive doctrine but presumably do not have to be.  A 
comprehensive moral doctrine that could provide the setting for the prioritarian conception of the 
good might be Brian Barry’s theory of Justice as Impartiality, as developed across Theories of 
Justice and Justice as Impartiality. 
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2.6.14 The last question to be addressed is whether the classical principle of utility could 
meet the requirements of Justice as Reciprocity under the revised assumptions of Theory.   
It would obviously meet the constraint requirement; any of the conceptions available to the 
parties in the original position would have to constrain their behaviour in accordance with 
the governing principles of society.  A slightly trickier question is whether it would meet 
the mutual advantage condition.  This condition, as I defined it in Chapter 1, depends on 
what the relevant situation of equal liberty is.   
 
2.6.15 The third condition that the classical principle of utility would have to meet is the 
fairness condition.  It is beyond the remit of this thesis to come to a firm conclusion over 
the question of whether the classical principle of utility could meet the fairness condition, 
though I shall suggest in Chapter 4, that it is at least not obviously unfair.   
 
2.6.16 In conclusion: the argument of this chapter has been that Rawls’s original idea that 
Justice as Benevolence and Justice as Reciprocity would inevitably prescribe different 
principles of justice in practice, depended on the first model of his theory’s assumption that 
only the two principles of justice would meet the mutual advantage condition and enable 
citizens to do as well, or better, than they would in the relevant situation of equal liberty.  
The shift in Rawls’s theory to the adoption of a benchmark of general egoism as the 
relevant situation of equal liberty, by which to measure mutual advantage, opened up the 
potential routes from Justice as Reciprocity to the utilitarian conceptions of justice.   
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Chapter 3.  One main ground for the two principles of 
justice – they’re not the principle of utility  
 
In this chapter I examine Rawls’s attempts to find an alternative argument, rooted in the 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity, to block the route from Justice as Reciprocity to the 
utilitarian conceptions of justice, once that route had been opened by Rawls’s revision of 
the assumptions underlying the first model of his essays ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1) & (2) to 
the assumptions of the third model of Theory. 
 
This chapter explores Rawls’s attempts to do that and argues that they were ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
 
1 Justice as Fairness 
 
3.1.1 Rawls’s most famous attempt to come up with an alternative argument, which was 
to revise Justice as Fairness, I shall swiftly put aside to concentrate on his other efforts.  
Ideally it should receive more consideration than I can give it here, but it has received much 
attention elsewhere and was pretty much abandoned by Rawls himself.  The major revision 
of Rawls’s theory of Justice of Fairness was to put considerably more weight on the use of 
the maximin principle to guide the choices of the parties in the original position than he did 
in the first model.  The maximin principle, as Rawls describes, ‘tells us to rank alternatives 
by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of 
which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others’1  Rawls’s argument that it would be 
rational for the parties in the original position to adopt this principle relied largely on two 
assumptions: firstly, that they were highly risk averse and secondly; that they cared ‘little, if 
anything, for what [they] might gain above the minimum stipend that [they] can, in fact, be 
sure of by following the maximin rule.’2  The first of these assumptions would lead the 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 133 
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 134.  Rawls gives a third reason for the deployment of the maximin rule 
which is that the parties in the original position have no way of estimating their probability of 
 
123 
 
parties in the original position to favour the two principles over the principle of utility for 
fear they might end up being losers and the second would lead them to the same ranking of 
preferences because they care little for the extra advantages the principle of utility would 
bring if they turned out to be winners. 
 
3.1.2 Rawls himself appeared to have accepted the criticism of reliance on the maximin 
principle, writing in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement that  
 
In contrast to what the exposition in Theory may suggest… the reasons for 
the difference principle do not rest (as K. J. Arrow and J. C. Harsanyi and 
others have not unreasonably thought) on a great aversion to uncertainty 
viewed as a psychological attitude (§§34-39).  That would be a very weak 
argument.  Rather, the appropriate reasons rest on such ideas as publicity and 
reciprocity.1 
 
3.1.3 It is those ideas of reciprocity that Rawls refers to that are the preoccupation of this 
Chapter; some of which are essentially the same in Theory as in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement. 
 
3.1.4 But before leaving Justice as Fairness behind I shall add one criticism of my own 
that builds on the criticism that I tentatively offered in Chapter 2.2  The hypothetical 
contract device of Justice as Fairness was devised with the purpose of constructing 
principles suitable for the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  The first model’s theory of 
Justice as Fairness had the parties in the original position choosing the two principles of 
justice because they were the only principles that would guarantee that all the cooperating 
parties would fare at least as well, or better, than under the first principle alone.  And on the 
assumptions of the first model they would choose those principles because they knew how 
principles would be likely to affect them, as they knew what position in society they 
occupied.  However, it can be questioned whether that knowledge of the parties would 
necessarily lead them to choose principles that guaranteed that they fare at least as well or 
                                                                                                                                                    
occupying any particular position in society.  This has received extensive criticism from 
commentators who understand decision theory better than I do, and I defer to their judgement. 
1 Rawls 2001 p. xvii 
2 See §2.2.10 
124 
 
better than under the first principle alone.  If there were other principles that were highly 
likely to make everyone, including the worst off members of society, than they would be 
under the first principle alone, but carried a very small risk that they would make the losers 
worse off than they would be under the first principle, mightn’t it be rational for the worst 
off people to choose those principles instead?  If it was, then the Justice as Fairness of the 
first model would undermine the purpose of Justice as Reciprocity by potentially foisting 
principles that didn’t treat people as free and equal on real people who hadn’t really chosen 
those principles but whom Justice as Reciprocity was supposed to treat as free and equal.  
Wouldn’t it be more in the spirit of Justice as Reciprocity to insist on the first principle of 
justice directly?1 
 
3.1.5 A much stronger criticism along these lines could be directed against the version of 
Justice as Fairness Rawls puts forward in Theory.  The veil of ignorance, that was missing 
from the first model but that plays a major role in Theory, prevents the parties in the 
original position from knowing how principles would be likely to affect them and the 
people they represent.  So the parties in Theory’s original position would be able to choose 
principles that were highly likely to have devastating effects on the real people they 
represent.  It is even open to them to choose principles that would make them worse off 
than they would be in the no-agreement state of general egoism. 
 
3.1.6  Rawls closes off that possibility in Theory by insisting that all the conceptions of 
justice, including the utilitarian ones, guarantee better prospects than a state of general 
egoism.2  This is implausible.  Robert Nozick has, rightly in my opinion, pointed out that 
‘the most pessimistically described Hobbesian state of nature’ would not be as bad as ‘the 
most pessimistically described future state’ if we include ‘future ones’.3  But even if Rawls 
were right, the fact that it would be open to the parties to inflict principles on real people 
that would potentially make them worse off than they would be in the relevant situation of 
equal liberty, if such states were possible, points to something wrong with Justice as 
Fairness.  It is not designed to ensure that the principles it selects meet the mutual 
                                                 
1 As Rawls temporarily did in model 1.5 to be examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
2 As explained in Chapter 1 (§§ 1.9.32 – 1.9.40) 
3 See Nozick 1974 p.5 
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advantage condition.  So it is not fit for the purpose of constructing principles suitable for 
the conception of Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
3.1.7 That nearly concludes my consideration of Justice as Fairness; though I will go on 
to consider how Rawls’s arguments against utilitarianism look as though they don’t need 
the support of Justice as Fairness below (§3.2.3).  I now turn to the more important charges 
against utilitarianism that are the focus of the remainder of this Chapter.  These are all 
located in Chapter 29 of Theory which is titled ‘Some main grounds for the two principles 
of justice’.  Given the content of Chapter 29 it might equally well have been titled ‘One 
main ground for the two principles of justice – they’re not the principle of utility’ since the 
chapter consists almost entirely of criticisms of the principle of utility.   
 
 
2 The key passage 
 
 
3.2.1  The context of Chapter 29 of Theory has Rawls weighing up the relative appeal to 
the parties in the original position of his two principles vis à vis the principle of average 
utility.  The claims under scrutiny all relate to the question of the principle of utility’s 
suitability, or otherwise, to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity and are embedded in 
the long Passage 3a (T of J Rev) repeated below.  This passage is, I believe, essential to 
understanding the failure of Rawls’s ambition to refute the viability of utilitarianism from 
the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity.  My method in arguing against the charges will be 
a repeat of the method I deployed in Chapter 1; by comparing the claims in the passage of 
Theory side by side with their historical antecedents from Rawls’s earlier essays I aim to 
expose their weakness. 
 
Passage 3a (T of J Rev) 
 
[1] A conception of justice is stable when the public recognition of its 
realization by the social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense 
of justice. [2] Now whether this happens depends, of course, on the laws of 
moral psychology and the availability of human motives. [3] I shall discuss 
these matters later on (§§75-76). [4] At the moment we may observe that the 
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principle of utility seems to require a greater identification with the interests 
of others than the two principles of justice. [5] Thus the latter will be a more 
stable conception to the extent that this identification is difficult to achieve. 
[6] When the two principles are satisfied, each person’s liberties are secured 
and there is a sense defined by the difference principle in which everyone is 
benefited by social cooperation. [7] Therefore we can explain the acceptance 
of the social system and the principles it satisfies by the psychological law 
that persons tend to love, cherish, and support whatever affirms their own 
good. 
[8] When the principle of utility is satisfied, however, there is no such 
assurance that everyone benefits. [9] Allegiance to the social system may 
demand that some, particularly the less favored, should forgo advantages for 
the sake of the greater good of the whole.  [10] Thus the scheme will not be 
stable unless those who make sacrifices strongly identify with interests 
broader than their own.  [11] But this is not easy to bring about. [12] The 
sacrifices in question are not those asked in times of social emergency when 
all or some must pitch in for the common good. [13] The principles of justice 
apply to the basic structure of the social system and to the determination of 
life prospects. [14] What the principle of utility asks is precisely a sacrifice 
of these prospects. [15] Even when we are less fortunate, we are to accept 
the greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason for lower expectations 
over the whole course of our life. [16] This is surely an extreme demand. 
[17] In fact, when society is conceived of as a system of cooperation 
designed to advance the good of its members, it seems quite incredible that 
some citizens should be expected, on the basis of political principles, to 
accept still lower prospects for the sake of others. [18] It is evident then why 
utilitarians should stress the role of sympathy in moral learning and the 
central place of benevolence among the moral virtues. [19] Their conception 
of justice is threatened with instability unless sympathy and benevolence can 
be widely cultivated.  [20] Looking at the question from the standpoint of the 
original position, the parties would reject the principle of utility and adopt 
the more realistic idea of designing the social order on a principle of 
reciprocal advantage.  [21] We need not suppose, of course, that in everyday 
life persons never make substantial sacrifices for one another, since moved 
by affection and ties of sentiment they often do. [22] But such actions are not 
demanded as a matter of justice by the basic structure of society.1 [my italics 
and numbering of the sentences] 
 
3.2.2 Rawls was unable to sustain any of the italicized claims, and I shall attempt to prove 
this by showing that they were originally predicated on assumptions that Rawls had 
‘officially’ abandoned by the time of writing Theory.  His abandonment of the assumptions 
underlying the italicized claims did not, however, prevent him from putting them forward 
in the original or revised editions of Theory, and of continuing to insist that the difference 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp.154-155  
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principle was a reciprocity principle, while the principle of utility was not, in Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement.   In fairness to Rawls, there is one definition he gives (amongst 
three he considers) of ‘reciprocity principle’, the conditions of which he could justly claim 
that the principle of utility could not meet.  That is ‘the standard of reciprocity’1 which 
excludes ‘that any one worse off than another should be asked to accept less so that the 
more advantaged can have more’.  But while it is true that the principle of utility is 
prepared to ask those worse off than others to have less so that the more advantaged can 
have more, the standard of reciprocity is not, I shall maintain, a viable principle of 
reciprocity. 
 
3.2.3 But before going into the question of whether the individual italicised claims can be 
sustained it is worth taking a broader view of the passage in the context of Rawls’s theory 
as a whole.  Doing so will help support the short argument I gave above (§§3.1.1 – 3.1.6) 
that Justice as Fairness is not fit for the purpose of constructing principles suitable for 
Justice as Reciprocity.  For many of the claims in the passage would seem to count against 
the principle of utility directly from the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity.   Take for 
example, the claim of sentence [8] that ‘[w]hen the principle of utility is satisfied, however, 
there is no such assurance that everyone benefits.’  In the context of Chapter 29, the parties 
are deliberating over which principles they would choose to govern society.  Justice as 
Fairness says that whatever principles they choose are principles fit for the conception of 
society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage; fit for Justice as Reciprocity.  There 
is something very fishy then about allowing principles that don’t provide an assurance that 
everyone benefits onto the menu in the first place.  Why couldn’t the menu just include 
items that did provide an assurance that everyone benefits?  A similar line of argument 
applies to the claim of sentence [20] that the parties would ‘adopt the more realistic idea of 
designing the social order on a principle of reciprocal advantage.’ A natural initial 
response to that line is to think, ‘Well of course the parties should adopt a principle of 
reciprocal advantage – that’s what they’re there for.’  This could easily be followed by a 
second, slightly more complex, thought, ‘Why do they have to be there at all?  Isn’t 
whatever makes the principle of reciprocal advantage a principle of reciprocal advantage 
                                                 
1 Examined below §3.1.32 - §3.1.33  
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enough to make it a principle of reciprocal advantage without the need for the parties to 
choose it in order to make it a principle of reciprocal advantage?’  The considerations that 
the principle of utility doesn’t provide an assurance that everyone benefits from social 
cooperation and isn’t a principle of reciprocity (whatever that involves) seems to be enough 
to disqualify it from the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity anyway.  To pile rejection by 
the parties in the original position on top of the poor principle of utility as well seems a bit 
like kicking the stuffing out of a corpse. 
 
3.2.4 The inclusion of those two claims, then, reinforces the doubts I have been 
concerned to raise about the need for Justice as Fairness in Rawls’s scheme of things.  
Now, with Justice as Fairness set to one side, we can consider what force the charges Rawls 
presses in Passage 3a (T of J Rev)1 against the principle of utility may have independently 
of the role they play in Justice as Fairness.  If they turn out to be viable, they would appear 
to pack considerable punch.  From the vantage point of Justice as Reciprocity the claim that 
the principle of utility isn’t a principle of reciprocity seems at least highly damaging.  And 
the claim that the principle of utility can provide no assurance that everyone benefits from 
social cooperation looks as if it has landed a knock-out blow.   
 
3.2.5 Other charges in Passage 3a (T of J Rev) against utilitarianism appeal from a 
broader perspective than that of Justice as Reciprocity.  The implication of sentences [10], 
[12], [14], [21] and [22] is that utilitarianism would demand, or impose, sacrifices of some 
people for the sake of others, in contrast to the two principles of justice which would 
somehow avoid demanding or imposing sacrifices.  Take, for example, sentence [14] 
‘[w]hat the principle of utility asks is precisely a sacrifice of these prospects?’ In the 
context of the passage, which is comparing the relative merits of the principle of utility and 
the two principles of justice, sentence [14] should be read as implying that the two 
principles of justice don’t ask for a sacrifice of life prospects. The charge that the principle 
of utility imposes avoidable sacrifices on people is likely to make people recoil from such a 
principle, whether or not they have bought into the idea of Justice as Reciprocity, or 
Rawls’s theory of Justice as Fairness. 
                                                 
1 pp. 125 – 126. 
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3.2.6 So the charges pressed in the passage under consideration would seem to count 
strongly against the principle of utility, independently of the part they play in Rawls’s 
argument that they would lead the parties in the original position to reject the principle of 
utility.1  But whatever force they have depends entirely on whether they are ultimately 
sustainable.  Rawls did not, I shall argue, have the means to sustain them but persisted to 
press them as though in the hope that he would one day come up with such means. 
 
3 There is ‘no assurance that everyone benefits’ from the principle of utility 
 
3.3.1 It is worth setting Rawls’s claim of sentence [8], that ‘[w]hen the principle of utility 
is satisfied…there is no such assurance that everyone benefits’ against the backdrop of a 
plausible picture of what would likely happen in the real world were a society to adopt the 
principle of average utility.  Passage 3a (T of J Rev) 2 evokes a picture of social exclusion 
for some groups, with some members of society doing badly enough to be considered as 
excluded from the advantages of social cooperation altogether.  It is true that the principle 
of average utility could, in principle, lead to some social groups having very low levels of 
welfare.  It could, to take the extreme possibility that Rawls repeatedly emphasises, even 
justify slavery.  But in my opinion it would be highly unlikely to do so, particularly in a 
society that constrained the principle of average utility by the requirement that a society 
was well-ordered, so its citizens consciously accepted the standard of the principle of 
utility.  By comparison to the United Kingdom in 2016, to take an example, I would expect 
the worst off groups to be considerably better off than they are now.  Many of the 
institutional arrangements that perpetuate inequalities, such as an education system that 
allows those with more money to buy advantages for their offspring, might go.  There 
might be greater investment in education and training, particularly for the least advantaged 
groups, leading to greater equality of opportunity and consequently greater equality of 
outcome.  The tax system would likely be more redistributive.  There may be some 
                                                 
1 In her excellent and instructive essay ‘Rawls and Utilitarianism’, which played an important role 
in the development of the ideas in this thesis, Holly Smith Goldman addresses what she referred to 
as Rawls’s ‘extra-contractarian’ arguments (Goldman 1980 p.346).  These include the claim that 
utilitarianism sacrifices some people for others. 
2 pp. 125 – 126. 
130 
 
inequalities due to the effectiveness of providing incentives, and these might result in the 
worst off doing less well than they would under the difference principle, but I would not 
expect the difference that would make to be huge.   
 
3.3.2 Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the principle of utility would have the 
benign effects that I suggest it might, with the worst off group in the UK being better off 
than they are now, but not as well off as they would be under the difference principle, and 
that the UK suddenly endorsed the principle of utility.  We can also suppose that the worst 
off group is the unemployed, and that they are better off than they are now.  Higher levels 
of welfare support are affordable because the unemployed are more motivated to find work 
in a more equal society.  If someone were to claim that the unemployed did not benefit 
from their cooperation with the system because they weren’t as well off as they might be, 
most people, I think, would meet that claim with incredulity.  Even many of those who 
believe that the situation of the worst-off is unjust because the better off shouldn’t need 
incentives might well be inclined to agree that they still benefit from social cooperation, but 
not, perhaps, enough.  The claim that social cooperation does not benefit them at all seems 
intuitively implausible. 
 
3.3.3 But, despite the intuitive plausibility of that claim, the historical explanation for 
Rawls’s assertion that the principle of utility can provide no assurance depends on his 
requiring that a society meet the ‘sense defined by the difference principle in which 
everyone is benefited by social cooperation’ referred to in sentence [6] in order to benefit 
its citizens.1  I shall go into this presently but first I shall consider whether defining the 
notion of benefitting through social cooperation with reference to a benchmark of general 
egoism would be enough to sustain the claim of sentence [7] that the principle of utility 
could provide no assurance that everyone benefits through social cooperation. 
 
3.3.4 It can’t.  At least it can’t in Rawls’s hands.  For as Passage 1s (T of J Rev)2 cited in 
Chapter 1 showed, Rawls was committed, in Theory, to the position that by ‘choosing one 
                                                 
1 By ‘historical explanation’ here, I mean an explanation in terms of the development of Rawls’s 
theory through the essays leading up to Theory. 
2 p. 67 
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of the other conceptions [including the utilitarian conceptions] the persons in the original 
position can do much better for themselves than under general egoism.   
 
3.3.5 Lest Passage 1s (T of J Rev) be regarded as just a one off slip on Rawls’s part, I can 
point out that he subsequently affirmed this position more clearly in his essay ‘The Basic 
Structure as Subject’.  In that essay Rawls was more explicit in taking the no-agreement 
point of general egoism to be his equivalent of the state of nature of traditional social 
contract theory. 
 
Passage 3b (BS as S) 
 
we can, if we like, in setting up the argument from the original position, 
introduce the state of nature in relation to the so-called non-agreement point.  
This point can be defined as general egoism and its consequences, and this 
can serve as the state of nature.  But these conditions do not identify a 
definite state.  All that is known in the original position is that each of the 
conceptions of justice available to the parties have consequences superior to 
general egoism.1 
 
3.3.6 With that potential definition of benefit out of the way I now turn to considering 
whether the sentence [6]’s ‘sense defined by the difference principle in which everyone is 
benefited by social cooperation’ can fare any better. This possibility subdivides into two 
further possibilities since Rawls offers two senses in which the difference principle may 
provide a sense in which inequalities are to the benefit of all.  Both need to be considered 
but both fail in the task. 
 
3.3.7 The two senses are distinguished from each other in the following passage 
 
Passage 3c (T of J Rev): Two senses of mutual benefit 
 
Next, we may consider a certain complication regarding the meaning of the 
difference principle.  It has been taken for granted that if the principle of 
justice is satisfied, everyone is benefited.  One obvious sense in which this is 
so is that each man’s position is improved with respect to the initial situation 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1996 p. 279 
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of equality…There may be, however, a further sense in which everyone is 
advantaged when the difference principle is satisfied, at least if we make 
certain assumptions. [my italics]1  
 
3.3.8 I shall handle these two senses in the opposite order to which they appear in 
Passage 3c (T of J Rev).  The assumptions behind the ‘further sense’ in question are the 
controversial assumptions of ‘close-knitness’ and ‘chain connection’, and it is impossible to 
appreciate how Rawls may have come to regard them as providing a sense in which social 
cooperation might be to everyone’s advantage without delving into the development of 
Rawls’s theory in the essays between his two ‘Justice as Fairness’ essays and Theory.  
Going through this history will also explain why Rawls was so determined to come up with 
‘a further sense’ in addition to the ‘obvious’ one.   
 
 3.3.9 Chapter 2 argued that in the first model of Justice as Fairness, the only conception 
of justice that could meet the mutual advantage condition was Rawls’s two principles of 
justice.  The ‘relevant situation of equal liberty’ by which mutual advantage was to be 
measured was given by the requirements of the first principle of justice.  Furthermore, I 
suggested, Rawls was committed to the simple assumption of the first model which would 
have made the second principle of justice easily acceptable to all.  All would prefer the one 
unequal distribution that was Pareto-preferred to the equal distribution, and there would be 
no dispute between which unequal distribution would be preferred to which other as there 
would be only one. 
 
3.3.10 The problem of defining a standard of comparison by which to measure mutual 
advantage became more acute when Rawls abandoned the assumptions of the first model.  
In Chapter 1, I promised to return to examine the implications of Passage 1n (DJ 1967)2 
from ‘Distributive Justice’ in more detail, and here is the place where I do so.  In Chapter 1, 
I suggested that there were two problems with substituting ‘the liberty of the original 
position’ for the equal liberty of the first principle of justice.  The first was that it might 
allow institutions such as slavery to qualify as ‘just’. The second was that it would allow 
utilitarianism to qualify as just according to the lights of Justice as Fairness.  
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 69  
2 p. 62 
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3.3.11 The ‘further sense’ that the difference principle provides which may define when 
any individual may be advantaged by social cooperation should, I shall argue, be 
understood as evolving largely as a response to the first two of these problems. To show 
this I need to first set out the context of Passage 1n (DJ 1967) from ‘Distributive 
Justice.’(1967)  
 
 
 
Rawls’s first argument for the difference principle 
 
3.3.12 The paragraph immediately preceding Passage 1n (DJ 1967) concludes with Rawls, 
having already defined his second principle of justice in the same words as in ‘Justice as 
Fairness’, observing that ‘it is not clear what is meant by saying that inequalities must be to 
the advantage of every representative man, and hence our first question.’1 Passage 1n (DJ 
1967) follows in the next paragraph which begins 
 
Passage 3d (DJ 1967) 
 
One possibility is to say that everyone is made better off in comparison with 
some historically relevant benchmark.  An interpretation of this kind is 
suggested by Hume.2 
 
3.3.13 So the context of Rawls’s reference to Hume’s benchmark of a state of nature in 
Passage 1n (DJ 1967) was, then, that Rawls was considering possible interpretations of his 
second principle of justice’s stipulation that ‘inequalities must be to the advantage of every 
representative man.’   
 
3.3.14 Rawls then goes on to point out that adopting the benchmark of either a 
‘hypothetical or historical’ state of nature might allow a system of slavery to qualify as 
being to the advantage of the slaves which leads him to dismiss such a benchmark as 
                                                 
1 Rawls DJ 1967 p.134 
2 Rawls DJ 1967 p.134 
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‘unsatisfactory.  For even if all men including slaves are made better off by a system of 
slavery than they would be in the state of nature, it is not true that slavery makes everyone 
(even a slave) better off, at least not in a sense which makes the arrangement just.1  
 
3.3.15 Because the benchmark of a state of nature does not provide a sense of ‘being made 
better off’ by an arrangement that would make that arrangement seem just, Rawls dismisses 
the ‘historical or hypothetical’ benchmark of a state of nature as ‘simply irrelevant to the 
question of justice.’  
 
3.3.16 ‘In fact’, he continues, ‘any past state of society other than a recent one seems 
irrelevant offhand, and this suggests that we should look for an interpretation independent 
of historical comparisons altogether.  Our problem is to identify the correct hypothetical 
comparison defined by currently feasible alternatives.’2 
 
3.3.17 So far, then, Rawls has considered the option of a hypothetical and historical state 
of nature as a possible interpretation of his second principle of justice’s stipulation that 
‘inequalities must be to the advantage of every representative man’ to dismiss it as simply 
irrelevant because such a definition might allow slavery to qualify as just.  And it is this 
that has led to the ‘problem’ of finding an alternative interpretation ‘in terms of currently 
feasible changes.’ 
 
3.3.18 The second alternative Rawls considers is applying ‘the well-known criterion of 
Pareto’ to institutions.3 This criterion he assumes would be chosen in the original position, 
but does not go far enough as an interpretation of the second principle of justice’s ‘benefit 
to all’ stipulation because of its indeterminacy.  As discussed in Chapter 2 there is a 
multiplicity of Pareto optimal distributions, all of which would be preferred by some 
representative men to others, and none of which would be preferred unanimously to all the 
                                                 
1 This argument appears to me to represent a determination on Rawls’s part to maintain the equation 
of ‘justice’ with ‘advantage’ that we saw was a key feature of the first model (§§2.1.1 - 2.1.7) 
despite the fact that he no longer subscribed to the assumptions that made the equation work in the 
first model. 
2 Rawls DJ 1967 p. 135 
3 Rawls DJ 1967 p. 135 
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others.1  
 
3.3.19 The third interpretation of the second principle of justice’s stipulation that 
inequalities must be to the benefit of every representative man Rawls considers is ‘the 
difference principle’, referred to as such for the first time,2 which he introduces thus 
 
 Passage 3e (DJ 1967): the first description of the difference principle 
 
There is, however, a third interpretation which is immediately suggested by 
the previous remarks, and this is to choose some social position by reference 
to which the pattern of expectations as a whole should is to be judged, and 
then to maximize with respect to the expectations of this representative 
man…Now, the one obvious candidate is the representative of those who are 
least favored by the system of institutional inequalities.  Thus we arrive at 
the following idea…We interpret the second principle of justice to hold that 
these differences are just if and only if the greater expectations of the more 
advantaged, when playing a part in the working of the whole social system, 
improve the expectations of the least advantaged.  The basic structure is just 
throughout when the advantages of the more fortunate promote the well-
being of the least fortunate, that is, when a decrease in their advantages 
would make the least fortunate even worse off than they are.3 
 
3.3.20 It is not entirely clear what Rawls is referring to as his ‘previous remarks’; it could 
be his reasons for his dismissal of the Pareto-criterion as insufficient or the benchmark of 
the state of nature as inadequate or a combination of the two.4 It does not matter much for 
my argument, as I am confident that whatever Rawls intended exactly by those words, it 
was a combination of the reasons for rejecting the first two potential interpretations of the 
benefit stipulation that motivated Rawls’s acceptance of the third: the difference principle. 
 
3.3.21 The difference principle solves the indeterminacy problem of the Pareto criterion by 
                                                 
1 See Rawls DJ 1967 pp. 135-137 
2 Rawls (DJ 1967 p. 138) writes that he refers to ‘the first part’ of his ‘second principle’ as ‘the difference 
principle.’ 
3 Rawls DJ 1967 p.138 my italics and numbering 
4 We can infer this because in the paragraph immediately preceding Passage 1n (p. 63) Rawls wrote, 
‘But it is not clear what is meant by saying that inequalities must be to the advantage of every 
representative man, and hence our first question.’ (Rawls DJ 1967 p.134) 
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picking from the multiplicity of Pareto optimal distributions the one that maximizes the 
expectations of the least advantaged representative man. 
 
3.3.22 But it also looks like it might offer a solution to the problem of the first 
interpretation posed by Rawls’s supposition that Hume’s interpretation of the benchmark of 
the state of nature might allow slavery to be justified.  In fact, there are two ways in which 
the difference principle seems to provide Rawls with a solution to this problem.  The first is 
relatively uncomplicated.  If the prospects of the least fortunate must be as great as they 
could be, then that would appear to rule out the possibility of slavery. A slave class would 
presumably be required to endure prospects lower than the prospects of the least fortunate 
would be, if the requirement that the prospects of the least fortunate were maximized was to 
be met. So this would get around the problem posed by taking the definition of the 
benchmark of a state of nature by resorting to another definition that hikes the position of 
the worst off to as high a level as possible – a level that would preclude the possibility of 
slavery. 
 
3.3.23 If Rawls had left his argument for the difference principle there, he would have 
addressed two of his problems: the indeterminacy of the Pareto criterion, and the problem 
that the benchmark of the state of nature might allow slavery to be justified.  But he 
wouldn’t quite have succeeded in doing what he set out to do, which was to find a way to 
address those problems that also stuck to the wording of his second principle of justice’s 
stipulation that ‘inequalities must be to the advantage of every representative man.’  This 
may explain why he then felt the need to ‘verify that this interpretation of the second 
principle of justice [i.e. the difference principle] gives a natural sense in which everyone 
may be said to be made better off.’  This second sense is much more complicated than the 
first but also more important to my argument as historically it leads to the claims in 
Passage 3a (T of J Rev).1  This way depends on two conditions obtaining in the basic 
structure of society, chain-connection and close-knitness, on top of the difference 
principle’s stipulation that the expectations of the least advantaged are maximized being 
met.  And the combined effect of these three conditions holding is that 
                                                 
1 pp. 125 – 126. 
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Passage 3f (DJ 1967) 
 
everyone does benefit from an inequality which satisfies the difference 
principle, and the second principle as we have formulated it reads correctly.  
For the representative man who is better off in any pair-wise comparison 
gains by being allowed to have his advantage, and the man who is worse off 
benefits from the contribution which all inequalities make to each position 
below.1   
 
3.3.24 This calls for some explanation. Chain connection obtains when an inequality that 
raises the expectations of a more advantaged social position, that has the effect of raising 
the expectations of the least advantaged, also raises the expectations of all the positions in 
between.  This goes some way towards making the implementation of the difference 
principle give a natural sense in which everyone may be said to be made better off by an 
inequality. But it does not go all the way.  For suppose the prospects of the worst off could 
be improved by offering an advantage to a middle position.  The requisite pair wise 
comparison would hold for the occupants of that middle position and all the positions 
below.  Those in the positions below could each be told that if the positions above them did 
not have an advantage over them they would be worse off, so the advantage of the position 
above is to the advantage of the position below.  But suppose it would be possible to 
increase the expectations at the top end of the scale without affecting the positions of those 
below?  This would not violate the difference principle’s stipulation that the worst off are 
as well off as possible.  Chain connection might still hold, as it might still be the case that 
increases in the expectations of more advantaged positions in the middle that raised the 
expectations of the lowest position also raised the expectations of those in between.  But it 
would not be the case that ‘the man who is worse off’ in any ‘pair-wise comparison’ has 
gained from inequalities allowed by the difference principle, since those who are worse off 
than those to whom the increased advantages at the top end of the scale have been allowed 
are no better off as a result.  So the condition of close-knitness is also needed.  The second 
condition of close-knitness holds if ‘it is impossible to raise (or lower) the expectation of 
any representative man without raising (or lowering) the expectations of every other 
                                                 
1 Rawls DJ 1967 p. 139 
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representative man.’1 This condition does not, it should be noted, exclude the possibility of 
increases in the expectations of more advantaged men which have the effect of lowering the 
position of the worst off class.  But such increases would violate the stipulation of the 
difference principle.  So it would be impossible to raise the advantages of a more 
advantaged position (without violating the difference principle) without also raising the 
expectations of every representative man.  The net effect of these three conditions is to 
ensure that the requisite relationship holds and that the worst off representative man in any 
pairwise comparison could console himself that the advantage of the position above him 
was, indeed, to his advantage in that if the more advantaged representative man had any 
less, the representative man would have less still. 
 
3.3.25 Grasping the mechanics of these two conditions is not particularly important here, 
but it is important to note two things.  Firstly, that this interpretation would seem to provide 
Rawls with a second way in which the difference principle would solve the problem posed 
by the alternative of defining the advantageousness of social cooperation by comparison 
with the benchmark of a state of nature.  The only advantages that would be allowed to any 
better off party would be those that were to the advantage of the positions of those below.  
But it seems extremely unlikely that the advantages of any positions that benefited from a 
system of slavery would be to the advantage of the slaves, the worst off group, in this way.  
So taking this ‘sense in which everybody may be said to be made better off’ rather than the 
alternative of using the benchmark of a state of nature might seem to offer Rawls another 
way out of the problem posed by the fact that a system of slavery might be to the slave’s 
advantage, according to the benchmark of a state of nature interpretation.   
 
3.3.26 The second point to note is that Rawls concedes that ‘[o]f course, chain-connection 
and close-knitness may not obtain’, in which case ‘[t]he stricter interpretation of the 
difference principle should be followed, and all inequalities should be arranged for the 
advantage of the most unfortunate even if some inequalities are not to the advantage of 
those in middle positions.’ He then goes on to remark ‘Should these positions fail, then, the 
                                                 
1 Rawls DJ 1967 p.139  
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second principle would have to be stated in another way.’1  The question this raises is: why 
was it so important to Rawls to stick to the original wording of his second principle? 
 
3.3.27  In answer to this question it is worth adding my thoughts to comments made by 
Robert Paul Wolff regarding ‘a rather odd characteristic of Rawls’s exposition.’ Wolff  
points out that when Rawls realizes that the two principles, as formulated in his first model 
wouldn’t work out as planned, his ‘obvious move is to give up his formula, and search 
instead for a different set of principles that meet the theoretical demands he wishes to place 
on them.’ 2 Instead of doing this, Rawls looks for some way to make his new principle, the 
difference principle, fit the original wording of his second principle of justice.  I would 
suggest that the explanation for this oddity lies largely in the original formula’s advantages 
from the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity.  The two advantages of the first model were 
as follows. Firstly, that it conflated the distinct ideas of ‘inequalities being to everyone’s 
advantage, and ‘social cooperation being to everyone’s advantage’.  And secondly, that it 
made ‘social cooperation (under the rules of a particular institution) being to everyone’s 
advantage’ a necessary and sufficient condition for the institution in question’s being just.  
This conflation becomes more explicit in the passages from ‘Distributive Justice: Some 
Addenda’ that I shall consider shortly.  And it lies, as my tracing of the history of the 
claims of Passage 3a (T of J Rev) will eventually show, behind the assertion of line [5] that 
the difference principle provides a sense ‘in which everyone is benefited by social 
cooperation’ and the implicit claim of line [7] that the principle of utility can provide ‘no 
such assurance that everyone benefits.’ 
 
3.3.28 Although Rawls presented his discussion of the three possible interpretations of the 
second principle of justice’s stipulation that inequalities are to the benefit of all as simply 
an attempt to ascertain its meaning, I have described it, and examined it, as his first 
argument for the difference principle.  I hope that my examination of it in the paragraphs 
above (§3.1.12 - §3.1.26) has justified this treatment.  Rawls first arrived at the difference 
                                                 
1 Rawls DJ 1967  pp. 139 -140 
2 Wolff 1977  pp. 57-58 
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principle, I have argued, in an attempt to come up with a new principle of mutual benefit 
that would, as his principles of justice aimed to do in the first model, allow us to reconcile 
our intuitions as to what institutions were just, with those that the principle defined as 
beneficial.   
 
3.3.29 It should be noted that, read this way, this argument for the difference principle is 
entirely independent of the arguments for the difference principle from Justice as Fairness 
as they would later be presented in Theory.  These are firstly, the argument that it would be 
appropriate for the parties in the original position to use the maximin rule, and secondly, 
the argument that underlies Passage 3a (T of J Rev), that the parties would reject the 
principle of utility in favour of the two principles of justice, due to the latter’s greater 
propensity for ensuring a stable society.  So a similar question arises in relation to this 
argument as arose in Chapter 2.  If the principles of justice can be motivated directly from 
considerations of Justice as Reciprocity, then why is there a need for Justice as Fairness? 
 
 
‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda.’ (1968) 
 
3.3.30  ‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda’, as the name suggests, builds on the analysis 
of the principles of justice that Rawls put in ‘Distributive Justice’.  The reason for my 
analysing it here is that it is in ‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda’ that Rawls first 
predicates some of the claims of Theory’s Passage 3a (T of J Rev)1 on the ‘further sense’ 
in which the difference principle meets the second principle of justice’s stipulation that 
‘inequalities must be to the advantage of every representative man.’  
 
3.3.31 These claims include: a) the claim of line [6] that the difference principle satisfies 
‘the psychological law that persons tend to love, cherish, and support whatever affirms their 
own good’; b) the claim of line [5] that the difference principle provides ‘a sense in which 
everyone may be said to be made better off’ and the related claim of line [7] that the 
principle of utility can ‘provide no such assurance that everyone benefits.’  It is also in 
                                                 
1 pp. 125 - 126 
141 
 
‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda’ that Rawls starts to refer to this sense as defining a 
condition of mutual benefit or reciprocity, which he continues to do in Theory.  And he 
does so in a passage, the first part of which, is repeated almost word for word in Theory. I 
have separated the passage from ‘Distributive Justice: Some Addenda’ into two, in order to 
clearly distinguish between the two different criterions of reciprocity it contains,  
 
Passage 3g (DJ:SA): the standard of reciprocity 
 
A further consideration in support of the difference principle is that it 
satisfies a reasonable standard of reciprocity.  Indeed, it constitutes a 
principle of mutual benefit, for, when it is met, each representative man can 
accept the basic structure as designed to advance his interests.  The social 
order can be justified to everyone and in particular to those who are least 
favoured. [4] By contrast with the principle of utility, it is excluded that any 
one worse off than another should be asked to accept less so that the more 
advantaged can have more.  This condition seems an essential part of the 
notion of reciprocity and the difference principle fulfils it where 
utilitarianism does not.1  
  
Continuing with 
 
Passage 3h (DJ:SA): the condition of mutual benefit 
 
It is necessary, however, to consider how the condition of mutual benefit is 
satisfied.  Consider any two representative men A and B, and let B be the 
one who is worse off.  Actually, since we are most interested in the 
comparison with the least favoured man, let’s assume that B is this 
individual.  Now clearly B can accept A’s being better off since A’s 
advantages have been gained in ways that improve B’s prospects.  If A were 
not permitted to win his better position, B would be even worse off than he 
is.2 [my italics] 
 
3.3.32 One of Rawls’s tendencies as a writer, pronounced enough to be described as a trait, 
is to present seemingly similar, but significantly different, claims as though they were one 
and the same.  The passages just quoted provide a good example of this.  The ‘condition of 
mutual benefit’ described in Passage 3h (DJ:SA) depends on the conditions of chain 
                                                 
1 Rawls DJ:SA 1968 p.169  
2 Rawls DJ:SA 1968 p.169  
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connection and close-knitness holding, while the ‘standard of reciprocity’ described by the 
italicised sentence in Passage 3g (DJ:SA) doesn’t, and I shall refer to them by those titles 
from now on in order to distinguish them.  If the condition of mutual benefit holds then 
so will the standard of reciprocity, but the converse is not true.  Recall the example of 
§3.1.25 where chain connection held but close-knitness didn’t and it was possible to raise 
the prospects of better off groups without affecting the prospects of the worse off ones, and 
impossible to raise the prospects of the worse off groups.  Then the condition of mutual 
benefit of Passage 3h (DJ:SA) would not be fulfilled while the standard of reciprocity of 
Passage 3h (DJ:SA) might be.  A possible explanation for this is that Rawls was confident 
at this stage that these conditions would hold.1 
 
3.3.33 The standard of reciprocity and the condition of mutual benefit differ only 
marginally from the similar conditions put forward in ‘Distributive Justice’ in the italicized 
passage at the end of Passage 3e (DJ 1967)2, and the second sense that the difference 
principle gives ‘in which everyone may be said to be made better off.’ But in ‘Distributive 
Justice’ Rawls was seemingly just concerned to provide a correct interpretation of the 
second principle of justice’s stipulation that inequalities are to the advantage of every 
representative man.  Here he has upped his game against utilitarianism with his remark that 
the standard of reciprocity is ‘an essential part of the notion of reciprocity and the 
difference principle fulfils it where utilitarianism does not.’   
                                                 
1 Someone might be tempted at this point to read Rawls as defining the principle of mutual benefit 
as holding just when the advantages of more favoured individuals are to the advantage of the least 
advantaged individual rather than between any two representative men, in which case the 
assumptions of chain connection and close-knitness need not hold.  Two factors count against this 
reading.  Firstly, he clearly states that the condition of mutual benefit should apply between any two 
representative men, he is just taking the least representative man as an example;,and secondly, his 
reconstruction of Passage 3g in the original edition of Theory includes a caveat about chain 
connection.  There he wrote ‘A further point is that the difference principle expresses a conception 
of reciprocity.  It is a principle of mutual benefit.  We have seen that, at least when chain 
connection holds, each representative man can accept the basic structure as designed to advance his 
interests.’ (Rawls 1971 p. 102 my italics). This passage was substantially altered in the revised 
edition of Theory, so it no longer contained either the caveat or the comparison between 
representative men A and B.  This revision may have been prompted by extensive criticism of the 
relevant passage in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia. On a related issue, concerned with 
whether Rawls should be read as accepting the principle that ‘inequality is unjust, unless it benefits 
the worst-off group,’ see Derek Parfit’s Equality or Priority page 119 and footnote 59. 
2 p. 135 
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3.3.34 Rawls now goes on to make a series of claims about the relative suitability or 
unsuitability of the difference principle and the principle of utility to society conceived of 
as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage that are direct corollaries of the ones in 
Passage 3a (T of J Rev), writing 
 
Passage 3i (DJ:SA 1968) ‘affirming our good’ 
 
 [1] The difference principle should be acceptable, then, both to the 
more advantaged and to the less advantaged man.  [2] The principle of 
mutual benefit applies to each increment of gain for the more favoured 
individual, a unit increase, so to speak, that improves the situation of this 
individual being allowed provided that it contributes to the prospects of the 
least fortunate.1 [3] The principle of reciprocity applies each step of the way, 
the increments for the better situated continuing until the mutual benefit 
ceases. [4] It is evident that, in general, the principle of utility does not 
satisfy the principle of reciprocity; there is no definite sense in which 
everyone necessarily benefits from the inequalities that are authorized by the 
utilitarian conception.  [5] It seems irrelevant to say that everyone is better 
off than he would be in a state of nature, or if social cooperation were to 
break down altogether, or even that all are better off in comparison with 
some historical benchmark. [6] We want to be able to say that as the social 
system now works, the inequalities it allows contribute to the welfare of 
each.  
[7] Now the fact that the two principles of justice embody this 
reciprocity principle is important for the stability of this conception. [8] A 
conception of justice is stable if, given the laws of human psychology and 
moral learning, the institutions which satisfy it tend to generate their own 
support, at least when this fact is publicly recognized. [9] Stability means 
that just arrangements bring about in those taking part in them the 
corresponding sense of justice, that is, a desire to apply and act on the 
appropriate principles of justice. [10] Assuming as a basic psychological 
principle that we tend to cherish what affirms our good and to reject what 
does us harm, all those living in a basic structure satisfying the two 
principles of justice will have an attachment to their institutions regardless of 
their position.  [11] This is the case since all representative men benefit from 
the scheme. [12] In a utilitarian society, however, this is not guaranteed; and 
therefore to the extent that this psychological principle holds the principle of 
utility is likely to be a less stable conception.2  
 
                                                 
1 The same point, I think, applies here as in the footnote above. 
2 Rawls DJ:SA 1968 p. 170-171 my italics and numbering of the sentences. 
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3.3.35 It is impossible, I think, to say whether Rawls was meaning to invoke the standard 
of reciprocity or the condition of mutual benefit with his references to ‘the principle of 
reciprocity’, ‘the principle of mutual benefit’ and ‘this reciprocity principle’ here, and I 
doubt very much that Rawls would have had a clear answer himself.  What is clear is that 
Rawls, in this passage, intends one or other of them to sustain the claims: a) of line [4] that 
‘there is no definite sense in which everyone necessarily benefits from the inequalities that 
are authorized by the utilitarian conception; b) of line [10] that a basic structure ordered by 
the principles of justice, because they embody the reciprocity principle (whatever that may 
be) will lead those living under it to have an attachment to their institutions due to the 
psychological principle that we tend to cherish what affirms our own good, and c) of line 
[11] that all representative men in a basic structure which is ordered by the principles of 
justice will, because the principles embody the reciprocity principle, benefit from the 
scheme.  What is also readily apparent is the implied claim d) of lines [12] and [4] that 
representative men in a utilitarian society may not benefit from the principle of utility, just 
because it doesn’t embody this reciprocity principle.  
 
3.3.36 Passage 3a (T of J Rev)1, whose claims form the primary focus of the investigation 
of this chapter, is obviously in large part, a re-edit of Passage 3i (DJ:SA). 3a’s line [7] is 
the analogue of 3i’s line [10]. 3a’s line [8] is 3i’s line [4] and 3a’s line [6]’s roots lie in the 
implicit claim of Passage 3i (DJ:SA) that the standard of reciprocity or condition of mutual 
benefit provide a sense in which the difference principle ensures that everyone benefits 
from social cooperation.  This will receive more explanation very shortly. 
 
3.3.37 What appears more clearly in Passage 3i (DJ:SA), than anywhere else, including 
‘Distributive Justice’, is that Rawls, in this second stage of his theory, was concerned that 
his stipulation that inequalities be to everyone’s advantage should provide a viable 
alternative to defining mutual advantage in comparison to the benchmark of a state of 
nature, which he again dismisses as irrelevant. 
 
3.3.38 What is also apparent from this passage is just how powerful a weapon, in the 
                                                 
1 pp. 125 – 126. 
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difference principle’s arsenal, Rawls, at that time, regarded the condition of mutual benefit 
to be.  All the advantages ascribed to the two principles of justice in the second paragraph 
of Passage 3i (DJ:SA)1 and all the disadvantages there ascribed to the utilitarian 
conception of justice are attributed to the former’s meeting this condition (‘this reciprocity 
principle’) and the latter’s failing to.  So, only if a conception of justice meets this condition 
should it be regarded as ‘affirming one’s good’, leading people to cherish it and have an 
attachment to their institutions regardless of their position.  And only if this condition is 
met can all representative men be regarded as benefiting from the scheme of cooperation.  
Furthermore, the implication is that any conception of justice that falls short of meeting this 
condition should actually be construed as harming them.  
 
3.3.39   Before proceeding to the question of whether Rawls continued to sustain the claim 
that the difference principle would meet the condition of mutual benefit in Theory, we 
should consider whether, even if it did, the condition of mutual benefit would be as 
powerful as Rawls portrays it.  And I think it should be fairly obvious from the 
observations just above that he has it punching well above its weight.  Not only would the 
worst off position have to be as well off as they could be, but no further advantages could 
be allowed to any other group that didn’t redound to the advantage of the group below for 
all the groups to even be considered as benefiting from the cooperative scheme.  Only if 
these conditions were met would everyone’s good be affirmed.  And, as just mentioned 
above, the further implication is that Rawls might then have even regarded groups as being 
harmed by conceptions of justice which didn’t meet this condition.  Counterexamples to 
these claims should not be hard to find, and indeed they’re not. 
 
3.3.40 First, suppose that the worst off cooperating group in society were impossible to 
help beyond a certain point, so it would be possible to raise the prospects of all groups bar 
the worst off, after the position of the worst off had been maximised. This would break the 
condition of mutual benefit since none of the advantages of the better off groups would 
count as being to the advantage of the worst off in the requisite way.  According to Rawls, 
the worst off group should then not be considered to have benefited from the cooperative 
                                                 
1 p. 143 
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scheme, their good would not have been affirmed and they might even be regarded as 
harmed by such a move.  But that is absurd.  They are no worse off than they would have 
been had the prospects of the more advantaged groups not been raised. 
 
3.3.41 Second, consider the example I introduced in §3.3.1 of the United Kingdom in 2016 
converting to utilitarianism, where the worst off group in society are a lot better off than 
they are now but could be still better off under Rawls’ difference principle.  The same 
argument applies.  It just seems intuitively wrong to regard the people who would be worst 
off after this conversion, who would be considerably better off than the worst off group in 
the United Kingdom are now, to have not benefited from social cooperation. 
 
3.3.42 We can conclude from the above that, although fulfilment of the condition of 
mutual benefit might give the difference principle some advantages in terms of ensuring 
stability, it is inadequate as an objective requirement that society conceived of as a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage must meet in order to be considered such, which 
is how Rawls presents it here.  
  
A Theory of Justice 
 
3.3.43 At any rate, by the time of A Theory of Justice Rawls had reverted to the position he 
took in ‘Distributive Justice’, where he conceded that should the conditions of close-
knitness and chain–connection fail to hold, meaning that the difference principle would no 
longer meet the condition of mutual benefit, the expectations of the worst-off group should 
still be maximised.1  In fact, he went further than before by introducing the idea of 
‘leximin’, allowing that once the expectations of the worst off group had been maximised 
the position of the next worst off group could be maximised (although they didn’t improve 
the position of the group below) and so on up the scale until the position of the best off 
group could be maximised so long as it wasn’t at the detriment of anyone lower down the 
scale.  But he still continued to deploy the condition of mutual benefit as a possible extra 
string to the difference principle’s bow just in case the conditions of close-knitness and 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.70 
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chain-connection did hold, referring to it variously as ‘the principle of mutual advantage’1 
,‘a further sense in which everyone is advantaged when the difference principle is 
satisfied’2, ‘a sense in which everyone benefits when the difference principle is satisfied’3, 
‘a conception of reciprocity’, ‘a principle of mutual benefit’4, ‘the condition of mutual 
benefit’5, ‘the criterion of mutual benefit’6 and, perhaps, in Passage 3a (T of J Rev)7 as ‘a 
sense defined by the difference principle in which everyone is benefited by social 
cooperation.’8  
 
3.3.44 As noted above (§3.3.26), in ‘Distributive Justice’ Rawls suggested that ‘[s]hould 
these positions fail, then, the second principle would have to be stated in another way.’  
And, true to his word, he did state it in another way that the difference principle could be 
assured of fulfilling with or without those conditions obtaining, though it is fair to speculate 
that he can’t have been too satisfied with it.  This is the sense whereby the difference 
principle ensures that ‘each man’s situation is improved with respect to the initial 
arrangement of equality’.9   
 
3.3.45 I’m now in the position to clarify further the remarks I made earlier (§3.3.35) about 
it being impossible to say which ‘sense defined by the difference principle in which 
everyone is benefited by social cooperation’ Rawls intended to lie behind the assertions of 
Passage 3a (T of J Rev). The surrounding claims about the difference principle’s affirming 
one’s good, where utilitarianism, by implication, wouldn’t, and the principle of utility 
providing no assurance that everyone benefits from the scheme of cooperation clearly have 
their historical roots in Passage 3i (DJ:SA 1968) from ‘Distributive Justice: Some 
Addenda’ where Rawls presented the condition of mutual or standard of reciprocity as the 
only contender for the sense in question.  So that sense must be read as lying behind the 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 69. 
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 69 
3 Rawls T of J Rev 1999  p. 70 
4 Both Rawls T of J Rev 1999  p. 88 
5 Rawls T of J Rev 1999  p. 103 
6 Rawls T of J Rev 1999  p. 89  
7 p. 143 
8 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp. 154-155 
9 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 69 
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claims of the Passage 3i (DJ:SA 1968)1.  But how to tell which is supposed to lie behind 
the same claims in Theory when that sense has been downgraded to a secondary one, a new 
one has been asserted as the main one, and the author has given no indication as to which 
one he has in mind?  The question is unanswerable. 
 
3.3.46 But we can ask the following two questions: firstly, whether the primary sense 
would provide a better definition of social cooperation’s being to one’s advantage than the 
secondary one that we have already seen to be inadequate; and, secondly, whether this 
primary sense would provide better support for the surrounding claims than the secondary 
one. 
 
3.3.47 Rawls hypothesizes that the parties in the original position would choose the 
difference principle in two stages.  First, they would choose to distribute all income and 
wealth equally. Then, they would choose to allow inequalities that worked to everyone’s 
advantage, and would select the distribution that maximised the position of the worst off 
out of those unequal distributions.  The parties don’t know which generation they belong 
to.  So the initial arrangement of equality referred to as the baseline from which the 
difference principle ensures that everyone is advantaged is whatever distribution would 
have resulted from extending a principle of flat equality through the past, at whatever time 
the choice from the original position is imagined to take place and the veil of ignorance is 
lifted. 
   
3.3.48 This does not constitute a good definition of social cooperation’s being to one’s 
advantage, and its inadequacy as a definition of that notion can be illustrated, I think, by 
seeing it in the light of the evolution of the second principle of justice’s stipulation that 
inequalities be to everyone’s advantage that I have been concerned to outline in this 
Chapter, and in particular the implicit version that he let slip, as though in error, in Passage 
1k (DJ 1967)2.  That version, as I interpreted it, lay halfway between the version of his first 
model which compared practices where everyone enjoyed equal freedom with practices that 
allowed pareto-preferred advantages measured in economic terms, and his final version 
                                                 
1 p. 143 
2 p. 53 
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where the benefits of economic inequalities are measured in comparison to a benchmark of 
economic equality.  The hybrid version had the parties in the original position swapping 
their imagined equal freedom for the economic advantages that social cooperation would 
bring, and was tantamount, I suggested, to imagining advantages to be defined against the 
benchmark of a hypothetical state of nature defined as the no-agreement point.1  That, I 
suggested, might have provided a good definition of the notion of social cooperation’s 
being to one’s advantage.  The difference principle as presented in Theory has to be seen as 
a reluctant compromise on Rawls’s original ambitions for his second principle of justice. 
 
3.3.49 But although the primary sense in which the difference principle ensures that 
inequalities are to the advantage of all is inadequate as a definition of social cooperation’s 
being to one’s advantage, we can ask, parenthetically, whether the principle of utility 
would, as Rawls claims, provide no assurance that everyone benefits if measured by that 
standard.  And the answer to that depends on what economic theory one holds.  According 
to some of the assumptions Rawls makes that underlie his theory, it is not at all clear that he 
should regard the principle of utility as failing according to this standard.  For he holds that 
the main reason that inequalities might be required for the position of the worst off in 
society to be maximized is that the more advantaged need incentives in order to be more 
productive.  It is quite possible that the deadening effect of allowing no incentives on the 
economy would mean that flat equality would make the position of the worst off group 
worse than they would be under either the difference principle or the principle of utility.2  
In fact, although he does not explicitly address this question, there is an indication that 
Rawls himself would take this view revealed in the diagrams he uses to illustrate the 
difference between the principle of utility and the difference principle.  These take the 
origin, 0, to represent the hypothetical state in which all goods are distributed equally, and 
                                                 
1 Although I have read Rawls in Theory as interpreting his second principle of justice’s stipulation that 
inequalities be to the benefit of all as given by the primary sense in which the difference principle 
ensures that inequalities are to everyone’s advantage, there are still echoes of the broader sense in which 
he had earlier conceived of it surviving in Theory.  For example, he remarks ‘that there are indefinitely 
many ways in which all may be advantaged when the initial arrangement of equality is taken as a 
benchmark’, (p.65) before going on to consider systems of natural liberty, liberal equality and 
democratic equality as possible interpretations of ‘everyone’s advantage’.  But the difference principle 
forms part of the conception of democratic equality.  The other conceptions are not nearly so 
‘egalitarian’ or supportive of the worst off. 
2 I am indebted to Mike Otsuka for this point. 
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describe a curve where the principle of utility gives the worst off representative man less 
than the difference principle would but more than equality would.1  So even if the primary 
sense in which the difference principle ensures that inequalities are to the advantage of all 
is taken to lie behind Rawls’ claims in Passage 3a (T of J Rev)2, it appears that he could 
not sustain the claim that the difference principle defines a sense in which social 
cooperation is to everyone’s advantage while the principle of utility provides no such 
assurance. 
 
3.3.50 As showed at the start of this chapter, the most coherent definition Rawls deploys of 
social cooperation’s being to everyone’s advantage is by comparison to a state of nature 
taken to be one of general egoism.  And he is implicitly committed to taking the principle 
of utility to ensure that social cooperation is to everyone’s advantage by this comparison.  
So we can conclude that Rawls cannot sustain the claim in question. 
 
 
4 Sacrifices for others 
 
3.4.1 The purpose of this section is not just to undermine Rawls’s argument from Justice 
as Fairness – that is, that the parties in the original position would not favour the principle 
of utility because of the sacrifices it requires – but also to mitigate the widely held view that 
there must be something wrong with utilitarianism just because it requires sacrifices.  This 
is held by philosophers who are not at all sympathetic to Rawls’s theory of Justice as 
Fairness.  To take a case in point, Robert Paul Wolff, who, as we have already seen, is a 
trenchant critic of Justice as Fairness, wrote in Understanding Rawls, that, ‘Utilitarianism, 
in even its most sophisticated and complicated versions, countenances the sacrifices of 
some persons to the happiness of others.’3 
 
3.4.2 The term ‘sacrifice’ is an emotionally charged one, and I think many people reading 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp.66-67.  He repeats what is essentially the same diagram in Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement 2001 p.62 suggesting his views had not changed, though he does not there 
specify what the origin represents. 
2 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp.154-155 
3 Wolff 1977 p 12 
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that quotation of Wolff’s would instantly recoil against the idea of endorsing a moral theory 
that would ‘sacrifice’ some people for the ‘happiness of others’ and be inclined to go 
looking for an alternative moral theory with less ‘abhorrent implications’1  Several of the 
claims of Passage 3a (T of J Rev)2 lodge an appeal to that intuitive response, and so are 
likely to have had an influence in prejudicing people against utilitarianism, that is entirely 
independent of the role they play in Justice as Fairness. 
 
3.4.3 My argument of this section will not succeed in demonstrating that utilitarianism 
does not countenance the sacrifice of some persons for the happiness of others.  But it will 
succeed in showing that Rawls’s two principles of justice would also sacrifice some 
persons for the sake of others.  This is something that Rawls does not explicitly deny, but 
its denial is implicit in his pressing of the claims against utilitarianism. I shall also suggest 
that justice requires sacrifices of persons for the sake of others, and those sacrifices are 
sacrifices of natural liberty, though it is beyond the remit of this thesis to prove this 
conclusively. 
 
3.4.4 What I will be able to prove is that Rawls was unable to establish any basis for a 
claim that his principles do not sacrifice some persons for others.  I may as well signal in 
advance that my argument does not, I think, show Rawls in a particularly flattering light.  
For by tracing the historical development of the ‘sacrifice’ claims of Passage 3a (T of J 
Rev), I shall show that he certainly considered what I have suggested is the correct position 
regarding justice and sacrifices of liberty, but he was not prepared to acknowledge it, at 
least not in Theory. 
 
3.4.5 Before embarking on the task of tracing the history of Rawls’s sacrifice claims I 
should first verify that Passage 3a (T of J Rev) does indeed put forward the claims I am 
attributing to Rawls.  This will require my showing firstly, that Rawls is making a claim 
that the principle of utility requires sacrifices for others per se, rather than sacrifices of the 
less advantaged for the sake of greater benefits to the more advantaged.  And secondly, that 
                                                 
1 Wolff 1977 p 11 
2 pp. 125 - 126 
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he also made the implicit claim that his two principles would avoid sacrifices per se. 
 
3.4.6 The first of these is necessary because some commentators have interpreted Rawls 
as just charging the principle of utility with requiring sacrifices of the less advantaged for 
the sake of greater benefits to the more advantaged. Following David Brink, I shall call 
these ‘bottom-up’ sacrifices.1 There are good reasons for such an interpretation. Some of 
the sentences of Passage 3a (T of J Rev)2 are worded in such a way that they could be 
plausibly interpreted as an objection to ‘bottom-up’ sacrifices; for example, the claim of 
sentence [15] that ‘[e]ven when we are less fortunate, we are to accept the greater 
advantages of others as a sufficient reason for lower expectations over the whole course of 
our life.’  And, pertinently, my comparison in Chapter 1 of Passage 1s (T of J Rev)3 from 
Theory with its progenitor Passage 1j (DJ 1967), interpreted Passage 1s (T of J Rev) as 
containing an objection to bottom up sacrifices.  Furthermore, the standard of reciprocity is 
an objection to bottom up sacrifices. 
 
3.4.7 However, other sentences in Passage 3a (T of J Rev) cannot be plausibly 
interpreted as objections to bottom up sacrifices, and I shall set these out in the order that 
they appear in Passage 3a (T of J Rev). 
 
3.4.8 First there is sentence [9]: ‘Allegiance to the social system may demand that some, 
particularly the less favored, should forgo advantages for the sake of the greater good of the 
whole.’  Next there is sentence [10] ‘Thus the scheme will not be stable unless those who 
make sacrifices strongly identify with interests broader than their own’.  Thirdly, there is 
the couplet of sentences [13] and [14], ‘The principles of justice apply to the basic structure 
of the social system and to the determination of life prospects. What the principle of utility 
asks is precisely a sacrifice of these prospects.’ Finally, there is the last pair of sentences of 
Passage 3a (T of J Rev), [21] and [22], ‘We need not suppose, of course, that in everyday 
life persons never make substantial sacrifices for one another, since moved by affection and 
ties of sentiment they often do. But such actions are not demanded as a matter of justice by 
                                                 
1 Brink 1993 p.6 
2 pp. 125 – 126. 
3 p. 67 
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the basic structure of society.’   
 
3.4.9 It is difficult to see how Rawls could sustain these claims, without also conceding 
that similar charges could be levelled against his two principles of justice.  Rawls does not 
specify how sacrifice is to be construed, but one possibility would be to measure it as the 
difference between what someone would have in the well-ordered society governed by one 
conception of justice compared with what they would have in the well-ordered society 
governed by an alternative conception of justice.  However, this measure would construe 
both the two principles of justice and the principle of average utility as requiring sacrifices.  
Those who would fare better under the principle of average utility would, in the terms of 
[13] and [14], undergo a ‘sacrifice’ of ‘life prospects’ in comparison to what they would 
have under the principle of average utility.1   
 
3.4.10 But the tone of the sentences just cited, coupled with the context of the passage 
imply that Rawls did not concede that the two principles of justice would be subject to 
similar charges.  The context is that the parties are choosing between alternative 
conceptions of justice, and the charges in question are presented as reasons for them 
favouring the principles of justice over the principle of average utility.  These charges 
should not provide such reasons if the two principles of justice were open to the same 
objections. 
 
3.4.11 Rather than consider any alternative possible measures of sacrifice, I turn now to the 
history of Rawls use of the term ‘sacrifice’ in the essays preceding Theory.  I’m confident 
that the light of that history will reveal Rawls’s claims that the principle of utility would 
require sacrifices per se, that his principles could somehow avoid, to be unsustainable. 
 
3.4.12 The first reference to sacrifice was in the ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1) in the context of 
the parties in the first original position choosing the second principle of justice.  Rawls 
asserted that ‘Each person will, however, insist on a common advantage, for none is willing 
                                                 
1 It should be borne in mind that by this stage in Theory, Rawls had narrowed the choice of 
utilitarian conceptions of justice down to the principle of average utility, making it a ‘fixed sum 
game’, so one person’s loss under the principle of average utility would equate to another person’s 
gain under the two principles of justice and vice versa. 
154 
 
to sacrifice anything for the others.’1  
 
3.4.13 From the perspective of the parties in the first original position, choosing the 
principle of utility could have been read as requiring a willingness to sacrifice ‘something’ 
for others.  The context of Rawls’s assertion in the paragraph above assumes that the parties 
in the first original position have already accepted a baseline of equal liberty because, 
‘Since there is no way for anyone to win special advantage for himself, each might consider 
it reasonable to acknowledge equality as an initial principle.’  So as measured from the first 
model’s baseline of equal economic distribution and equal liberty (as I explained in Chapter 
2, they amounted to the same thing in the first model), the parties in the first original 
position would not be required to make sacrifices by the two principles of justice but would 
by the principle of utility. 
 
3.4.14 In ‘Justice as Fairness’ (2), Rawls repeated the same assertion as in (1) but 
remarked in addition, ‘I do not want, therefore, to be interpreted as assuming a general 
theory of human motivation: when I suppose that the parties are self-interested, and are not 
willing to have their (substantial) interests sacrificed to others,’2 
 
3.4.15 These remarks are the origin of the theme that the principle of utility required 
sacrifices for others that the two principles of justice would avoid; a theme that Rawls 
appears to have been determined to pursue, despite the fact that the underlying assumptions 
of his model changed so as to make the charge no longer viable. 
 
3.4.16 Another feature of the first model that is relevant to my argument of this section is 
that whilst Rawls acknowledged that acting in accordance with the principle of fair play 
involved a ‘restriction of liberty’, his first model provided him with the means to claim that 
by another sense of liberty, the two principles of justice avoided a loss of liberty while the 
principle of average utility did not.  This would be because, as explained in Chapter 2, the 
two principles of justice would provide all with an equal or greater liberty, while the 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1957  p.657 
2 Rawls 1958  p.175 
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principle of utility would provide them with a less than equal liberty, ‘liberty’ then being 
measured in terms of the economic benefits that a certain assignment of rights would 
bestow on the participants in a practice or cooperative venture. 
 
3.4.17 However, Rawls was to change his position regarding both liberty and ‘sacrifice’ 
when he abandoned the first form of the model.  In ‘The Sense of Justice’ (1963), he was 
prepared to concede that both Justice as Fairness and the principle of utility would require 
sacrifices of interests  
 
 
Passage 3j (S of J 1963): sacrifice in accordance with justice as fairness 
 
justice as fairness is correct in viewing each person as an individual 
sovereign, as it were, none of whose interests are to be sacrificed for the sake 
of a greater balance of happiness but rather only in accordance with 
principles which all could acknowledge in an initial position of equal 
liberty.1  
 
3.4.18 This is a particularly significant passage.  It does not present the objection to 
utilitarian sacrifices as the sentences analysed in paragraph §3.4.8 do, and as the quotation 
from Wolff does (§3.4.1), as objections to sacrifices per se.  Instead, it presents an 
objection to sacrifices for the purpose of promoting the greatest balance of happiness rather 
than sacrifices that are in accordance with principles which all could acknowledge in an 
initial position of equal liberty, i.e. than in accordance with Justice as Fairness.   
 
Sacrifices: the only viable position 
 
3.4.19  This, I think, is the only viable position that Rawls considered regarding sacrifices.  
That position is that Justice as Reciprocity requires sacrifices.  What Rawls hoped would 
distinguish the two principles of justice from the principle of average utility, in Passage 3j 
(S of J 1963), in his essay ‘The Sense of Justice’ was that the two principles of justice 
                                                 
1 Rawls S of J 1963 p. 304 
 
156 
 
would be selected by Justice as Fairness while the principle of utility wouldn’t.  Then the 
criticism of the principle of utility from the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity would 
make sense.  It would not be that the principle of utility required sacrifices per se that was 
what was wrong with it.  It would be that the principle of utility required sacrifices just for 
the purpose of promoting the greatest happiness whereas the two principles of justice would 
only allow sacrifices in accordance with principles that people would choose in the original 
position.  The principles of justice would, then, require sacrifices, but sacrifices which were 
fair.  
 
3.4.20 The explanation for Rawls presenting this objection this way is that his essay ‘The 
Sense of Justice’ assumed that the two principles of justice had already won the argument 
from Justice as Fairness, and defeated the principle of utility.  Therefore, Rawls could 
uphold a basic contrast between two conceptions of justice; the two principles of justice on 
the one hand, which were favoured by Justice as Fairness, and the principle of utility on the 
other, which aimed to promote the greatest happiness. 
 
3.4.21 However, the context of Passage 3a (T of J Rev)1 is very different.  The context of 
Passage 3a (T of J Rev) does not assume that the argument from Justice as Fairness has 
been won.  Rather, it is the very question of who will win that contest which is at stake, and 
the fact that the principle of average utility imposes sacrifices on some – sacrifices that the 
two principles of justice would, by implication, avoid - is a factor that is supposed to help 
determine the result of that contest. 
 
3.4.22 This is just one of several places in Theory where Rawls did not take the context of 
the argument from Justice as Fairness properly into account.  It is particularly evident in 
sections from Part Three of Theory.  I will reveal this fully in the forthcoming sections 
addressing the claim of sentence [20] from Passage 3a (T of J Rev), that the parties would 
reject the principle of utility in favour of a principle of reciprocal advantage, and the claims 
of [4], [5] and [19] regarding the greater stability of the two principles in comparison with 
the principle of average utility. 
                                                 
1 pp. 125 - 126 
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3.4.23 Passage 3i1 allowed that citizens in a society ordered by the two principles of 
justice would have to undergo sacrifices of their interests.  But it didn’t quite equate those 
sacrifices with a loss of liberty.  Rawls came closest to doing this in the essay following 
‘The Sense of Justice’, ‘Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play’ (1964)   
 
Passage 3k (LO & DFP 1964): principle of fair play 
 
The principle of fair play may be defined as follows. Suppose there is a 
mutually beneficial and just scheme of cooperation, and that the advantages 
it yields can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. 
Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each 
person, or at least a loss of liberty.2 
 
3.4.24 What is remarkable about Rawls’s position in these two passages is the shift they 
display from Rawls’s position of the first model which held that the two principles of 
justice would not require any sacrifice of interests or loss of liberty, to a position where he 
acknowledges that they would require sacrifices or a loss of liberty. Rawls’s new position 
retains one feature of the old model in equating sacrifices of interests with loss of liberty.  
The concession that the principles of justice would require a sacrifice of liberty (as I shall 
assume it can reasonably be interpreted) was prompted, I would speculate, by Rawls’s 
realization that the first model’s goal of having the two principles of justice continuous with 
each other, with the second providing all with more liberty than the first, was unachievable.  
But there were two unfortunate side-effects of Rawls’s changing underlying assumptions, 
from the point of view of Justice as Reciprocity. The first is that they required more weight 
to be placed on the choice of the parties in the original position. The second is the removal 
of the very feature that made the principles of justice most attractive from the point of view 
of Justice as Reciprocity, which was that only they, in contrast to the principle of utility, 
would ensure that all did as well or better than in a position of equal liberty. 
 
3.4.25 Rawls was to try one more approach to this theme before Theory, and that was in 
                                                 
1 p. 143 
2 Rawls LO& DFP 1964 p.122 
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‘Distributive Justice’, with the problematic argument of Passage 1k (DJ 1967)1, which 
entertained the idea that the principle of utility would not provide all with compensating 
advantages for their loss of the liberty of the original position.  This idea can be seen as a 
brief attempt to recapture the idea of the first model that the principle of utility would 
disadvantage people with respect to a baseline of equal liberty.  It is not hard to understand 
the appeal of this idea from Rawls’s perspective.  If it had proved viable then he would 
have been able to sustain lines of argument along the lines of those of those of Passage 3a 
(T of J Rev) under scrutiny, as I demonstrate with a fictional scenario just below. 
 
3.4.26 Imagine, then, that Freedonia was an island where everyone enjoyed the equal 
liberty of the original position, and that in Freedonia, everyone was able to advance their 
interests to some extent, without the need for any rules of social cooperation.  But there 
existed another island, Utilitaria, which already had an indigenous population who were on 
the brink of extinction as they were unable to look after themselves.  The governor of 
Utilitaria calls for the people of Freedonia to come to migrate on mass to Utilitaria, where 
they would be placed under the rule of institutions governed by the principle of average 
utility.  If the free people of Freedonia were to accept his call then at least some, if not all, 
of them would end up worse off than they would be remaining in Freedonia, in part because 
of the burden of supporting the indigenous population of Utilitaria.  We can also suppose 
that both the principle of average utility and the principle of classical utility would favour 
the migration to Utilitaria as the natives of Utilitaria would gain more than the free people 
of Freedonia would lose.  If the Freedonians were to answer the governor of Utilitaria’s 
call, then the sacrifice claims of Passage 3a (T of J Rev) could be upheld. 
 
3.4.27 Take first, sentence [9] of Passage 3a (T of J Rev): ‘Allegiance to the social system 
may demand that some should, particularly the less favoured, forgo advantages for the sake 
of the greater good of the whole.’ Allegiance to the social system of Utilitaria would 
require some to forgo the advantages they enjoyed under the equal liberty of Freedonia for 
the sake of the greater good of the whole, the whole being the combined population of the 
two islands. Then take sentence [10] ‘Thus the scheme will not be stable unless those who 
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make sacrifices strongly identify with interests broader than their own’.  If we assume that 
the people of Freedonia had the option of giving up and returning home and resuming their 
previous lifestyles, then the scheme would not be stable unless those who lost through their 
move to Utilitaria identified with the interests of the native Utilitarians.  Third, the claim of 
sentences [13 and [14], ‘The principles of justice apply to the basic structure of the social 
system and to the determination of life prospects. What the principle of utility asks is 
precisely a sacrifice of these prospects.’ The principle of utility, which would direct the 
Freedonians to set sail for Utilitaria would, in so doing, ask at least some them to sacrifice 
the greater prospects they would have enjoyed staying put.  Finally, [21] and [22], ‘We 
need not suppose, of course, that in everyday life persons never make substantial sacrifices 
for one another, since moved by affection and ties of sentiment they often do. But such 
actions are not demanded as a matter of justice by the basic structure of society.’  The 
principle of utility, and the governor of Utilitaria, would have demanded substantial 
sacrifices on the part of at least some Freedonians, as measured by the loss of their 
advancement of their interests they would have enjoyed in Freedonia. 
 
3.4.28 It should also be observed that Wolff’s criticism that ‘Utilitarianism, in even its 
most sophisticated and complicated versions, countenances the sacrifices of some persons 
to the happiness of others,’ could then be interpreted in such a way as to be upheld.  If we 
take utilitarianism to be ‘act utilitarianism’ which, as I explained in Chapter 1, requires 
everyone, no matter what position they may be in, to act so as to maximize utility, then act 
utilitarianism would demand the sacrifice of the people of Freedonia.  This could be 
interpreted as a sacrifice of their natural liberty, for the sake of promoting the happiness of 
the natives of Utilitaria, through its demand that they obey the governor of Utilitaria’s call 
for assistance.   
 
3.4.29 I believe that even if Rawls had persisted with the idea that the principle of utility 
would not provide all with compensating advantages for their loss of the liberty of the 
original position he would have faced serious difficulties in translating the idea that the 
principle of utility would not compensate all the parties in the original position for their loss 
of the ‘liberty of the original position’ into the idea that the principle of utility would 
impose sacrifices on the citizens of the well-ordered utilitarian society.  However, I do not 
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need to address this question since, as shown previously, Rawls abandoned this idea in 
favour of assumptions according to which the principle of utility would not sacrifice people 
by comparison with what they would have in a state of natural liberty, that being equivalent 
to a state of general egoism. 
 
3.4.30 The correct position regarding the justice or injustice of sacrifices and their 
relationship to liberty and interests is, I believe, the one Rawls considered in his essays 
‘The Sense of Justice’ and ‘Legal Obligation and the Principle of Fair Play’ which held that 
justice required a sacrifice of interests or of liberty.  He would also have been right to 
clearly equate the two, as he nearly did in ‘Legal Obligation and the Principle of Fair Play.’ 
Justice requires a sacrifice of the liberty to pursue one’s interests.  I cannot offer conclusive 
proof that this is the right position but I can offer some considerations in its favour. 
 
3.4.31 Imagine the case of a gifted lawyer who turns down the opportunity to work as 
consigliere for the Mafia out of respect for the law, in a society that is well-ordered by the 
two principles of justice.  She might be said to have forgone advantages or made a sacrifice. 
She could have made millions with the mafia, but is instead settling for hundreds of 
thousands and the sacrifice or sum of advantages forgone is measured by the loss of 
earnings over her life due to this choice. 
 
3.4.32 Her cooperation with the law of might also be said to involve a ‘loss of liberty’, to 
use the terms Rawls used in his description of the principle of fair play in Passage 3k (LO 
& DFP).1  The liberty in question would be the natural liberty to do whatever she wanted in 
pursuit of her goals.  If we assume that she would have quite liked to reap the rewards of 
working for the mafia were it not for her sense of justice directing her to constrain such 
self-interested behaviour, then she could be regarded as having lost her liberty in the 
relevant sense.   
 
3.4.33 Or, to take a more high-minded example, we could imagine a practitioner of a 
religion that abhors blasphemy against their religion.  One of the tenets of their religion 
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demands the destruction of any material that it blasphemous towards their most important 
prophets.  But a rival religion has an evangelical commitment to denigrating the prophets of 
their rivals, in order to win converts, which extends to publishing material that the 
practitioners of the first religion would deem blasphemous.  There would appear here to be 
a clash between upholding the basic liberty of conscience and the basic liberty of freedom 
of speech, both of which are protected by the first principle of justice.  It would, I think, be 
in the general spirit of Rawls’s first principle of justice to resolve the dispute on the side of 
the blasphemous religions.  But this resolution would still require restraint on the part of the 
practitioner of the blasphemy-abhorring religion.  If this resolution is right the practitioner 
of the blasphemy-abhorring religion should refrain from destroying the ‘blasphemous’ 
literature of the other religion.  Although any restraint on the part of the practitioner of the 
blasphemy-abhorring religion might be described as done in the name of freedom, that 
‘freedom’ being the freedom guaranteed by the basic liberties, it should also, I think, be 
interpreted as requiring a sacrifice of the natural liberty to pursue one’s interests by 
whatever means one can, and as a sacrifice of the interests of the practitioner of the 
blasphemy-abhorring religion.  Justice in the society that is well-ordered according to the 
two principles of justice would still require sacrifices both of liberty and of ‘life prospects’, 
to use the term Rawls utilizes in sentences [13] and [14] of Passage 3a (T of J Rev). 
 
3.4.34 So that, I think, is the only viable position that Justice as Reciprocity can take.  Just 
behaviour requires a sacrifice of liberty in return for the benefits provided for a similar 
sacrifice of liberty undertaken by others.  Whether or not the principle of utility is unjust 
from the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity will depend on other factors than that it 
imposes sacrifices on its citizens.  All the conceptions of justice (apart from the non-starter 
of general egoism) would. 
 
5 Principle of Reciprocal Advantage 
 
3.5.1 There is only one sentence in Passage 3a (T of J Rev) where Rawls maintains that 
the principle of utility is not a principle of reciprocal advantage and that is Sentence [20].  
The question of what potential power that charge might have has already been addressed 
above (§3.2.3).  So the question that remains is: what principle was Rawls referring to by 
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‘principle of reciprocal advantage’? 
 
3.5.2 There are three possibilities.  The first is that it is another term for the ‘condition of 
mutual benefit’ or ‘the standard of reciprocity’.  I argued above that the ‘condition of 
mutual benefit’ was an inadequate condition of reciprocity and indeed, that Rawls conceded 
it to be such (§3.1.43), so the condition of mutual advantage needs no further consideration 
here.  The second is that it is the principle of reciprocity considered in Chapter 2 and in 
Rawls’s essay ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ (1971).  The third is that it is a ‘reciprocity 
principle’1 that Rawls evokes in Part 3: Section 76 of Theory, that may, or may not, prove 
to be distinct from the standard of reciprocity already discussed.  I shall consider the 
question of whether it is an alternative principle of reciprocity in Section 5 after swiftly 
disposing of the second possibility just raised; that it is the principle of reciprocity Rawls 
referred to in his essay ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ (1971). 
 
3.5.3 In ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ (1971) Rawls wrote that ‘[t]he principle of reciprocity 
requires of a practice that it satisfy those principles which the persons who participate in it 
could reasonably propose for mutual acceptance under the circumstances and conditions of 
the hypothetical contract.’2  All those conceptions should presumably be regarded as 
‘reasonable to propose’.  So to preserve the spirit, if not the letter, of the ‘principle of 
reciprocity’ of ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ it seems fit to translate principle of reciprocity as 
requiring of institutions3 that they are in accordance with the principle or principles that the 
parties would eventually choose from those that could be reasonably proposed.  On this 
interpretation, Rawls had no right to assert in Passage 3a (T of J Rev) ‘the parties would 
reject the principle of utility and adopt the more realistic idea of designing the social order 
on a principle of reciprocal advantage.’  For the context of Passage 3a (T of J Rev) has the 
parties choosing which principles would fit the bill of Justice as Fairness.  If they chose the 
principle of utility then it would be the principle of reciprocity.  
 
3.5.4 The sections surrounding 75 and 76 also go into Rawls’s claim of Passage 3a (TofJ 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.437 
2 Rawls 1971 p.208.  As already cited in Passage 2n (J as R 1971) Chapter 2.  
3 ‘Institutions’ is here substituted for ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ (1971)’s reference to ‘practices’. 
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Rev) that the well-ordered utilitarian society, in contrast to the two principles of justice, 
would have to rely on sympathy and benevolence in order to be stable.  The claim that the 
well-ordered utilitarian society would depend on sympathy in contrast to the well-ordered 
society that instantiated the two principles of justice is one that is reiterated at length in 
Justice a Fairness: A Restatement, providing further reason for examining it in detail. 
 
6 Reciprocity versus sympathy 
 
3.6.1 I repeat the three relevant sentences of Passage 3a (TofJ Rev) here for convenience.  
 
[4] At the moment we may observe that the principle of utility seems to 
require a greater identification with the interests of others than the two 
principles of justice. [18] It is evident then why utilitarians should stress the 
role of sympathy in moral learning and the central place of benevolence 
among the moral virtues. [19] Their conception of justice is threatened with 
instability unless sympathy and benevolence can be widely cultivated. 
 
3.6.2 These claims look clearly relevant to the main argument of my thesis, that Justice as 
Reciprocity can lead to the classical principle of utility.  But can they be sustained?  Would 
the principle of average utility have to depend on sympathy any more than the two 
principles of justice would? 
 
3.6.3     Rawls’s argument that it does turns out to depend on the aforementioned ‘standard 
of reciprocity’, though one has to read Sections 75 and 76 of Theory very carefully to work 
that out. 
 
3.6.4 Here is the passage from Section 76 of Theory where Rawls mentions goes into the 
question at length.    
 
Passage 3l (T of J Rev): the well-ordered society paired with the 
principle of utility. 
 
164 
 
[1] We can confirm this suggestion by considering the well-ordered society 
paired with the principle of utility.  [2] In this case, the three psychological 
laws would have to be altered.  [3] For example, the second law now holds 
that persons tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who with evident 
intention do their part in cooperative schemes publicly known to maximize 
the sum of advantages, or the average well-being (whichever variant is 
used).  [4] In either case the resulting psychological law is not as plausible as 
before.  [5] For suppose that certain institutions are adopted on the public 
understanding that the greater advantages of some counterbalance the lesser 
losses of others?  [6] Why should the acceptance of the principle of utility 
(in either form) by the more fortunate inspire the less advantaged to have 
friendly feelings toward them?  [7] This response would seem in fact to be 
rather surprising, especially if those in a better situation have pressed their 
claims by maintaining that a greater sum (or average) of well-being would 
result from their satisfaction. [8] No reciprocity principle is at work in this 
case and the appeal to utility may simply arouse suspicion.  [9] Thus the 
attachments generated within a well-ordered society regulated by the utility 
criterion are likely to vary widely between one sector of society and another. 
[10] Some groups may acquire little if any desire to act justly (now defined 
by the utilitarian principle) with a corresponding loss in stability. 
 [11] To be sure, in any kind of well-ordered society the strength of the 
sense of justice will not be the same in all social groups. [12] Yet to insure 
that mutual ties bind the entire society, each and every member of it, one 
must adopt something like the two principles of justice. [13] It is evident 
why the utilitarian stresses the capacity for sympathy. [14] Those who do not 
benefit from the better situation of others must identify with the greater sum 
(or average) of satisfaction or else they will not desire to follow the utility 
principle. [15] Now such altruistic inclinations no doubt exist. [16] Yet they 
are likely to be less strong than those brought about by the three 
psychological laws formulated as reciprocity principles: and a marked 
capacity for sympathetic identification seems relatively rare.  [17] Therefore 
these feelings provide less support for the basic structure of society.1  
 
3.6.5 The clues that it is ‘the standard of reciprocity’ doing the bulk of the work here is in 
Sentences [5] to [8] and [14].  The essence of Rawls’s argument is that the worst-off in 
society wouldn’t require sympathy in the well-ordered society paired with the two 
principles of justice, because then they would know that the advantages allowed to the 
more advantaged would be helping them (or at least not harming them). 
 
3.6.6 Before considering the strength of this argument, I will set aside a red herring, 
which is provided by Sentence [2]’s assertion that ‘the psychological laws would have to be 
                                                 
1Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.437 
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altered’ in the well-ordered society paired with the principle of utility and by [15] and 
[16]’s implication that ‘the three psychological laws formulated as reciprocity principles’ 
couldn’t apply to the well-ordered society.  These might be taken to imply that Rawls had 
another viable principle of reciprocity in mind, which is independent of the standard of 
reciprocity.  He didn’t, and once more there is a historical explanation for the appearance 
that he had, which I shall explain after first demonstrating that the second psychological 
law is entirely consistent with the principle of utility. 
 
3.6.7  The second psychological law in question reads 
 
   Passage 3m (T of J Rev) 
 
given that a social arrangement is just and publicly known by all to be just, 
then this person develops ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others in 
the association as they with evident intention comply with their duties and 
obligations, and live up to the ideals of their station. 1 
 
3.6.8 Now the context of Passage 3l (T of J Rev) is that Rawls is comparing the well-
ordered society paired with the principle of utility on the assumption that it has been 
chosen by the parties in the original position with the well-ordered society pared with the 
two principles of justice on the assumption.  If the principle of utility had been chosen by 
the parties, the social arrangements under it would, to use the words of Passage 3m (T of J 
Rev), be just and known to be just.  So there would be no need to alter the wording of the 
second law as Rawls asserts there is in Sentence [2] of Passage 3l (T of J Rev). 
 
3.6.9 The historical explanation behind the implication that the psychological laws are 
incompatible with the principle of utility lies in the fact that they were first formulated in 
Rawls’s essay ‘The Sense of Justice’ (1963).   As I observed above (§§3.2.20 – 3.2.22) this 
essay assumed that the two principles of justice had been selected by Justice as Fairness, 
and that the principle of utility hadn’t.2  In the context of ‘The Sense of Justice’ (1963), 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 pp. 429-430 
2 Rawls repeatedly fails to take the fact that it is an open question which principles, the two 
principles of justice or the principle of utility, the parties would ultimately choose in Part 3 of 
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then, the implicit claim of Sentence [16], that the three psychological laws formulated as 
reciprocity principles could only apply to the well-ordered society paired with the two 
principles of justice, and not to the well-ordered society paired with the principle of utility 
would have arguably made more sense. The term ‘reciprocity’ could have carried with it 
the same connotations as the term carried in the context of ‘the principle of reciprocity’ of 
Rawls’s essay ‘Justice as Reciprocity’ (1971) or as used in ‘Justice as Fairness’ (1)1, which 
meant roughly ‘as selected by Justice as Fairness’.  But it is inappropriate for ‘reciprocity’ 
to carry that connotation in the context of the argument of Part 3 of Theory, when it is the 
very question of which principles would be selected by Justice as Fairness which is at stake. 
 
3.6.10 So my conclusion of the last three paragraphs (§§3.6.3 – 3.6.9) is that any 
appearance that there is an alternative reciprocity principle to the ‘standard of reciprocity’ 
doing any work in the argument of Passage 3l (T of J Rev) should be disregarded.  Either 
the psychological laws formulated as reciprocity principles should be read as compatible 
with the principle of utility or they should be taken to rely covertly on the standard of 
reciprocity.2 
                                                                                                                                                    
Theory. So he wrote, ‘[t]hus in arguing further for the principles of justice as fairness, I should like 
to show that this conception is more stable than other alternatives.’ (Rawls T of J Rev 1999 
p.399)He clearly means ‘the two principles of justice’ by ‘the principles of justice as fairness’ 
while his theory of Justice as Fairness is open to selecting one of the other alternatives to live up to 
the designation.  In a similar vein, he writes, ‘[b]ut a decision in the original position depends on a 
comparison: other things equal, the preferred conception of justice is the more stable one.  Ideally, 
we should compare the contract view with all its rivals in this respect, but as so often I shall only 
consider the principle of utility.’ (Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p.436) Here ‘the contract view’ is used to 
refer to the two principles of justice and not to the principle of utility, when, as the first sentence 
concedes, the decision in the original position is yet to be made. 
1 As examined in Chapter 2 (§§2.4.1 – 2.4.9) 
2 One commentator who appears to have embraced the idea that there is a psychological law of 
reciprocity which would attach to the two principles of justice but not to the principle of average 
utility is Samuel Scheffler.  Scheffler (2003) writes, ‘Rawls argues…that because his principles 
embody an idea of reciprocity or mutual benefit, and because reciprocity is the fundamental 
psychological mechanism implicated in the development of moral motivation, the motives that 
would lead people to internalize and uphold his principles are psychologically continuous with 
developmentally more primitive mechanisms of moral motivation… By contrast, utilitarianism does 
not embody an idea of reciprocity. If people are to be stably motivated to uphold utilitarian 
principles and institutions, even when those principles and institutions have not worked to their 
advantage, the capacity for sympathetic identification will have to be the operative psychological 
mechanism.’  As it has been a major concern of my thesis to demonstrate, in the light of Rawls’s 
endorsement in Theory of the benchmark of a state of general egoism as the benchmark by which to 
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3.6.11 I return now to the substantive issue of whether there really is a difference in kind 
between the motive ‘sympathy’ which the well-ordered society paired with the principle of 
utility would have to call on in order to be stable, and the motive of ‘reciprocity’ that the 
well-ordered society paired with the two principles of justice could depend on.  To address 
this question it will help to focus on the pair of sentences ‘[13] It is evident why the 
utilitarian stresses the capacity for sympathy. [14] Those who do not benefit from the better 
situation of others must identify with the greater sum (or average) of satisfaction or else 
they will not desire to follow the utility principle’ from Passage 3l (T of J Rev).   
 
3.6.12 To simplify the question let us consider, as Rawls so often does, how the claims of 
these sentences would apply to the worst-off group in society.  And I shall take my 
consideration of these claims again against the backdrop of the ‘plausible picture of what 
would likely happen in the real word were a society to adopt the principle of average 
utility’ that I set out at the start of this chapter (§§3.1.1 – 3.1.2).  So the worst off group in 
the United Kingdom would be better off than the worst of group is now but not as well off 
as they would be if the United Kingdom had adopted the two principles of justice.  Rawls’s 
claim of sentence [14] then, as applied to that example, might be that the unemployed 
would only stick to the straight and narrow rather than resorting to a life of crime if they 
had sympathy for the working taxpayer they might harm by their criminal activity. They 
must identify with the greater sum (or average) of satisfaction (in this case a lower tax 
burden for the working taxpayer) or else they will not desire to follow the utility principle 
(by embarking on a life of crime). There is also an implicit claim contained within these 
sentences, which is that the unemployed would not need to rely on sympathy under the two 
principles of justice because they realized that the relative advantages of the working 
taxpayer redounded to their advantage, and were not won at their expense.   
 
3.6.13 However, a claim analogous to sentence [14] could be pressed against the two 
principles of justice.  Under the two principles of justice, the average working taxpayer, we 
can assume, would have less than she would have under the principle of average utility.  
                                                                                                                                                    
gauge ‘mutual advantage’, Scheffler’s assertion that utilitarian ‘principles and institutions have not 
worked to [the citizens in a well-ordered utilitarian society’s] advantage’ begs the question.   
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Her conformity to the principles of justice might require her to not subscribe to illegal tax 
avoidance schemes.  So it could be argued, analogously to Sentence [14], that under the two 
principles of justice ‘those who do not benefit from the difference principle’s requirement 
that the worst-off be as well off as possible (by comparison to what they could have under 
the principle of average utility) must identify with the plight of the worst off group in 
society or else they will not desire to follow the two principles of justice.’ 
 
3.6.14 The point of raising the analogous claim that might be put on behalf of the working 
taxpayer who might have more under the principle of utility than under the two principles 
of justice is to query why sympathy for the worst off would not need to be fostered in the 
well-ordered society governed by the two principles of justice, just as sympathy for the 
better off would need to be fostered in the well-ordered society paired with the principle of 
utility? 
 
3.6.15  Rawls does have an answer to that question, but not, to my mind, a convincing one.  
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls supposes that the more advantaged 
may be willing to accept losses imposed on them by the two principles of justice in 
comparison to what they might have under an alternative arrangement of society, because 
‘they are mindful of a deeper idea of reciprocity implicit in the difference principle’1 in 
addition to its fulfilment of the standard of reciprocity.2  This deeper idea implicit in the 
difference principle is that ‘social institutions are not to take advantage of contingencies of 
native endowment, or of initial position, or bad luck over the course of life except in ways 
that benefit everyone, including the least favoured.’3  So Rawls’s argument is that the more 
advantaged do not need to rely on sympathy to motivate them to help the least favoured as 
they accept that reciprocity requires them to use their advantages in ways that benefit 
everyone.  However, a counter-example can be given to question whether acceptance of 
                                                 
1 Rawls 2001 p.126 
2 Rawls does not refer to ‘the standard of reciprocity’ in those words in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement.  Instead he refers to it as ‘the following reciprocity condition:  those who are better off 
at any point are not better off to the detriment of those who are worse off at that point.’ (Rawls 2001 
p.124)  This stipulates the same conditions as the standard of reciprocity examined in this chapter 
(§§3.3.32 – 3.3.33). 
3 Rawls 2001 p.124.     
169 
 
this deeper idea of reciprocity must really favour the difference principle over the principle 
of average utility.  Suppose a working, and conscientious, taxpayer had a choice between 
voting for three political parties.  The Blue party would cut his tax bill.  The Brown party 
would increase his tax bill and spend it on helping the worst off group in society, who 
happen to be a small minority of congenitally disabled people who are very expensive to 
help.  The Purple party would increase his tax bill by the same amount as the Brown party 
but invest it in education in deprived areas, and in so doing provide substantial benefits for 
a large, relatively badly off group, who aren’t the worst off group.  The principle of utility 
would favour his voting for the Purple party.  If this taxpayer voted for the Purples rather 
than the Blues, this could be due to an acknowledgement that he had an obligation to use 
his advantages in ways that are to everyone’s advantage despite the fact that he would not 
be helping the worst off group in society.  So this deeper idea of reciprocity does not seem 
to necessarily favour the two principles of justice over the principle of average utility.  If 
the more contingently advantaged are to be persuaded to care more about helping the worst 
off group than other groups, it seems to me that a ‘tie-breaker’ would be needed once ‘the 
deeper idea of reciprocity’ that directs one to put one’s talents to everyone’s advantage has 
been acknowledged.  That tie-breaker will blur any clear distinction between sympathy and 
reciprocity.   
 
3.6.16 My conclusion to this section is that Rawls failed to establish the claims of Passage 
3a (T of J Rev) that the principle of utility must rely on sympathy rather than reciprocity.  I 
repeat them here: [4] At the moment we may observe that the principle of utility seems to 
require a greater identification with the interests of others than the two principles of justice 
and [18] It is evident then why utilitarians should stress the role of sympathy in moral 
learning and the central place of benevolence among the moral virtues. [19] Their 
conception of justice is threatened with instability unless sympathy and benevolence can be 
widely cultivated. 
 
 3.6.17 There is some truth in the claim, I think, that it would be especially hard to motivate 
the less advantaged to comply with rules for the sake of greater benefits to the more 
advantaged, but this difference in motivation is a matter of degree rather than kind. 
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3.6.18 Two final remarks can be made regarding the claim that utilitarians must stress the 
role of sympathy and the central place of benevolence in moral learning.  The first is that 
the principle of utility would be able to accommodate any instability that might be caused 
by losses incurred by the worst-off in comparison with how they would fare within the 
principle itself.  If the worst-off threaten to undermine society by not complying with the 
rules of society the principle of utility says ‘give them more’.  Not to do so, and to permit a 
dangerous and restless underclass to exist, would be not to maximize utility.  So the 
principle of utility would provide benefits to those who could cause sufficient trouble when 
it would deny them those benefits if they didn’t have the potential to cause trouble 
 
3.6.19 The second remark is that where our sympathies lie is a contingent matter.  Many 
people are concerned about issues such as global warning which threaten to destroy the 
planet (or at least make large parts of it uninhabitable).  It is fair to suppose that those 
people would prioritize such issues over making the worst off as well off as possible.  If 
more people develop sympathies or benevolence in an outward looking direction, then 
principles of distribution, such as the principle of utility, that take those sympathies into 
account, may provide more stability than those that don’t. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
3.7.1 In the opening section of this chapter I described the position that Rawls’s theory of 
Justice as Reciprocity was in due to the failure of his first model.  The effect of shifting to 
an endorsement of a benchmark of general egoism had potentially unblocked the route from 
Justice as Reciprocity to the principle of utility.   
 
3.7.2 This chapter has looked at Rawls’s attempts to erect new blocks and argued that 
they all failed. In Section 3 I argued that Rawls did not have the means to sustain his claim 
that not everyone would benefit through cooperation in the well-ordered society paired with 
the principle of utility.  In Section 4 I argued that Rawls’s implicit claim that the principle 
of utility would impose sacrifices on people while the two principles of justice would avoid 
imposing sacrifices on people was false.  Importantly, I also suggested that Justice as 
Reciprocity would require sacrifices from the citizens of the well-ordered society: sacrifices 
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of their natural liberty and the extra benefits they might acquire through the unconstrained 
pursuit of their conception of the good.  In Section 5, I addressed the question of what 
Rawls meant by his claim that the parties would reject the principle of utility in favour of a 
principle of reciprocity and suggested that the only principle of reciprocity that the 
principle of utility could be claimed to violate was the ‘standard of reciprocity’.  In Section 
6 I looked at Rawls’s claim that the principle of utility must rely on the motive of 
sympathy, while the two principles of justice could rely on the different motive of 
reciprocity and argued that he had not succeeded in sustaining that claim. 
 
3.7.3 So, at the end of this chapter, Rawls’s theory of Justice as Reciprocity is in pretty 
much the same condition as it was at the beginning.  According to the assumptions of 
Theory, the utilitarian conceptions of justice would meet the mutual advantage condition of 
Justice as Reciprocity; and there appears to be no other condition rooted in the conception 
of Justice as Reciprocity that would rule out utilitarianism. 
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Chapter 4.  Reconstructing Rawls 
 
In this Chapter I attempt to show that the classical principle of utility can be reconciled with 
the conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  The course my argument will take roughly 
follows the outline given of this chapter in the ‘Chapter by Chapter Outline of Thesis’.1  So 
Section 1 argues that, given the assumptions of Theory and Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, classical act-utilitarianism would be fully reconcilable with Justice as 
Reciprocity.  In Section 2 I take account of the fact that the assumptions of Theory are 
wrong, and that accommodating that fact would lead to modifying classical act- 
utilitarianism by exempting those for whom the demand to maximize utility afforded 
sufficiently dismal life prospects from the obligation to maximize utility.  The resulting 
conception of justice I call ‘Reciprocal Classical Utilitarianism’.  In Section 3 I consider 
the implications of Justice as Reciprocity’s reconcilability with ‘Reciprocal Classical 
Utilitarianism’ for the three tenets of deontological liberalism.  I show that it motivates the 
core tenet, but not the other two.  
 
The central argument of this thesis will be concluded by the end of Section 3, as my goal of 
establishing that the classical principle of utility is reconcilable with the conception of 
Justice as Reciprocity will have been achieved.  But, in what might initially be viewed as 
something of a side issue, in Section 4 I examine Rawls’s widely known and highly 
influential ‘separateness of persons’ objection to utilitarianism.  This has often been 
interpreted as an objection to utilitarianism that is entirely independent of Rawls’s 
conception of society as a cooperative venture for mutual enterprise with its concomitant 
conception of Justice as Reciprocity.  But, in what I believe is an original interpretation of 
the objection, I put forward a case that it should be interpreted as essentially the same as 
‘the exclusion of aggregation’ of Rawls’s first model that was examined in Chapter 2: that 
is, it is an objection to violations of the mutual advantage condition.2  This fits well with 
my thesis’s theme of demonstrating that Rawls’s fundamental objection to utilitarianism 
                                                 
1 This thesis p. 14 
2 First defined in §2.1.18 
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was that it was incompatible with Justice as Reciprocity; the appearance that the 
separateness of persons’ objection to utilitarianism is a distinct objection is, I propose, 
illusory. 
 
1 From Justice as Reciprocity to Classical Act-Utilitarianism 
 
4.1.1 At the close of Chapter 1, it was suggested that it would be rational for anyone, even 
if they knew they would be in the worst off group in society, to sign a contract pledging 
allegiance to a classical utilitarian Leviathan, even if they also knew the classical utilitarian 
Leviathan would be prepared to subject them to the most abject of slaveries.  It would be 
rational for them to sign such a contract as their expectations under the classical utilitarian 
Leviathan would still be better than in the default position of general egoism.  In which 
case, Justice as Reciprocity would have proceeded, via Justice as Fairness, to have 
instituted classical act utilitarianism.  In this section I review that suggestion in light of the 
findings of Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
4.1.2 The three requirements of Justice as Reciprocity that classical act utilitarianism 
would have to meet were the constraint requirement, the mutual advantage condition 
and the fairness condition.  The fact that classical act-utilitarianism would meet the first 
requirement can be swiftly demonstrated.   All conceptions of justice, bar general egoism, 
would require constraint on the part of the cooperating members of society.   
 
4.1.3 Classical act-utilitarianism would meet the mutual advantage condition on Rawls’s 
assumptions of the third model of Theory.  This has already been demonstrated in Chapter 
1.  On Rawls’s assumptions all the other conceptions of justice, including the utilitarian 
ones, offer better expectations than general egoism.1  And general egoism represents the 
no-agreement point for Justice as Reciprocity, which I am taking to be the relevant situation 
of equal liberty by which to gauge whether the mutual advantage condition has been met.  
 
4.1.4 The most difficult condition to assess is the fairness condition.  I won’t be able to 
                                                 
1 See Passage 1s (T of J Rev) p. 67. 
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show that the classical principle of utility is the conception of justice that is uniquely fair.  
But I will be able to offer a couple of considerations that suggest that it is at least not 
obviously unfair.  And I shall do so via a discussion of the history of Rawls’s approach to 
the fairness condition over the course of the development of his theory. 
 
4.1.5 Chapter 1 explained how, on the first form of Rawls’s model, the two principles of 
justice appeared to be uniquely suited to satisfying the fairness condition.  According to 
Rawls’s theory at the time, this would be because they would be the principles that would 
be chosen in the original position.  But I suggested that what made that choice fair was that 
they were the only principles that met the mutual advantage condition of Justice as 
Reciprocity.1   
 
4.1.6 However, in Chapter 3, I maintained that the revised Justice as Fairness of the third 
model was actually unfit for the purpose of selecting principles that would meet the fairness 
condition.  This was because the device of choice from behind a veil of ignorance made it 
possible for the parties to choose principles that didn’t offer an improvement over the 
relevant situation of equal liberty.  If a conception of justice doesn’t meet the mutual 
advantage condition it can’t meet the fairness condition, as it doesn’t offer cooperating 
members any return for their cooperation it can’t offer them a return that is fair. 
 
4.1.7 This leaves open the question of what the fairness condition in the third model of 
the theory might involve.  If only the two principles of justice could meet the mutual 
advantage condition (as was the case in Rawls’s first model) then they would be the only 
conception of justice that could possibly meet the fairness condition.  However, on the 
assumptions of the third model, all the conceptions of justice (bar general egoism) met the 
mutual advantage condition.  But it does not follow from the stipulation that a conception 
of justice must meet the mutual advantage condition in order to count as fair, that all 
conceptions of justice that meet that condition are fair. 
 
4.1.8 Although it is beyond the remit of this thesis to resolve the question of what the 
                                                 
1 §§ 2.2.1 – 2.2.8 
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requirements of the fairness condition are, I am able to counter two arguments that might be 
thought to tell against the utilitarian conceptions of justice in favour of Rawls’s two 
principles of justice.  The first is that the two principles of justice are fairer because they are 
in some way neutral between conceptions of the good.  The second is that the two 
principles of justice are fairer because they reject ‘the justice of inequalities based on 
morally arbitrary advantages’.1 
 
4.1.9 Chapter 2 argued that Rawls’s first model of his theory was neutral between 
conceptions of the good (§§2.6.13 – 2.6.14).  This was because the two principles of justice 
appeared to be the only conception of justice that could meet the mutual advantage 
condition of Justice as Reciprocity, and meeting the mutual advantage condition is a 
necessary condition for any conception of justice to be suited to the conception of Justice as 
Reciprocity.  But the shift to the baseline of general egoism in the third model, allowing a 
variety of conceptions of justice to meet the mutual advantage condition, opens up the 
possibility of choosing between them on other grounds than that they meet the mutual 
advantage condition.   
 
4.1.10 Rawls put forward some other considerations designed to argue that the two 
principles of justice were peculiarly suited to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity, 
revolving around the issue of stability; if those arguments were successful then there would 
be a case for claiming that selection of the two principles of justice was in some way 
neutral, rather than taking sides, between conceptions of the good.  But in Chapter 3 I 
argued that the claim that the principles of justice were inherently more stable was a 
contingent matter (§§3.6.11 – 3.6.17).  People might be more sympathetic to the worst off 
group, but they might be more sympathetic to helping intermediate groups or making the 
planet a better place for future generations.  I also noted that the principle of utility could 
take care of any issues regarding stability internally (§3.6.18).  The truth is that it is 
impossible to be neutral between conceptions of the good.  All conceptions of the good will 
require sacrifices for others.  The choice between the utilitarian conceptions of justice and 
the two principles of justice boils down to which ‘others’ those sacrifices should be made 
                                                 
1 Barry 1989 p. 239 
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for.  And that is a question about which is the preferable theory of benevolence.  Strict 
neutrality is impossible. 
 
4.1.11 The second claim is that the two principles of justice reject the injustice of 
inequalities based on morally arbitrary advantages.  But, as Allan Gibbard has pointed out, 
they do not entirely reject the inequalities based on morally arbitrary advantages; the 
difference principle is prepared to bestow advantages on those who have natural talents but 
need incentives, for the sake of raising the level of the worst off group in society.1 That 
constitutes inequalities based on morally arbitrary advantages.  What can be said of the two 
principles of justice is that they don’t set out to deliberately reward factors that are morally 
arbitrary from a moral point of view, as meritocratic theories of justice might do.  But that 
could also be said of the utilitarian conceptions of justice. 
 
4.1.12 In conclusion of this section, it appears that the demands of Justice as Reciprocity 
might turn out to be identical to the demands of Justice as Benevolence.  All the 
conceptions of justice meet the mutual advantage condition.  It is possible that for a lucky 
few, the demands of a particular conception of justice will exactly coincide with their 
conception of the good; in which case no constraint of behaviour will be required of those 
few.2  Most, however, will have to constrain the pursuit of their conception of the good.  
The question of what the fairness condition might turn out to require has been left open; it 
may turn out to be unresolvable.  There seems to be no reason within Justice as Reciprocity, 
on the showing so far, for a classical act-utilitarian to not believe that their doctrine is fully 
in conformity with Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
2 From Justice as Reciprocity to Reciprocal Classical Utilitarianism 
 
4.2.1 But the route from Justice as Reciprocity to classical act utilitarianism surely rests 
on one or more mistaken assumptions.  Firstly, it is questionable whether the classical 
principle of utility will inevitably improve everyone’s lot in comparison to a state of 
                                                 
1 Gibbard p. 274 
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general egoism.  As already noted, Nozick pointed out that the worst possible future state 
might be worse than ‘the most pessimistically described state of nature’. It would be easy to 
devise science fiction scenarios where a minority are forced to endure prospects of not-
worth-living lives for the sake of the good of advantages to the rest of the population.  
Secondly, it is debatable whether a state of general egoism is the relevant state of equal 
liberty by which to gauge mutual advantage.  Mightn’t it be possible for all to fare better 
than in a state of general egoism, but still have lives which weren’t worth living?  Does a 
life not worth living count as an ‘advantage’ to the person who lives it, even if they do 
enjoy better prospects than in the state of nature? 
 
4.2.2 Fortunately, I don’t need to provide definitive answers to these questions in order to 
show that people have the right to act in accordance with, and prescribe for others in 
society, the classical principle of utility as the predominant principle of distribution in 
society.  The device I shall use to demonstrate that people have this right is to imagine the 
deliberations that Rufus T Firefly might go through if he were an ‘ideal legislator’ charged 
with the task of imposing institutions on Freedonia.  But rather than being the utilitarian 
ideal legislator invoked by Rawls,1 who was conceived of as solely concerned with 
arranging institutions in such a way as to maximize utility, he is to be conceived of as the 
Ideal Legislator (Reciprocity).  As such, he must ensure that the institutions he imposes are 
suitable for the conception of Justice as Reciprocity, and incorporate whatever constraints 
on the pursuit of maximizing utility that conception of justice may require. 
 
4.2.3 We can suppose, as I did in Chapter 2 (§2.6.14), that Firefly has utilitarian 
sympathies and knows that a substantial section of the population shares them.  But he also 
knows that many of them have other conceptions of the good: some are prioritarians, some 
have strong religious convictions, and some are self-interested hedonists who may 
nevertheless have a sense of justice that would motivate them to follow the rules of 
society’s governing institutions.   
4.2.4 So Firefly’s instinct would be to decree the classical principle of utility as 
Freedonia’s official conception of the good.  As asserted above, neutrality between 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1999 p. 24 
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conceptions of the good is impossible (§5.1.10).  But the fact that neutrality is impossible 
doesn’t mean that all conceptions of the good are equally compatible with Justice as 
Reciprocity.  The principle of classical utility is more liable to place people in a situation 
that is worse off absolutely than other conceptions of justice, such as the two principles of 
justice.  Isn’t that liability enough to disqualify it as suitable to Justice as Reciprocity? 
4.2.5 My answer that it is not so disqualified, I shall argue, depends on Hume’s doctrine 
of the circumstances of justice, which Rawls endorses.1  Hume argues that in sufficiently 
adverse conditions ‘the strict laws of justice are suspended…and give place to the stronger 
motives of necessity and self-preservation.’2 He outlines several scenarios, including a 
shipwreck, in which he judges this suspension would be justified.  Hume’s interpretation of 
the doctrine of the circumstances of justice is, in part, a hedonistic one.  He writes, ‘[t]he 
use and tendency of that virtue [i.e. the virtue of justice] is to procure happiness and 
security, by preserving order in society: but where the society is ready to perish from 
extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and every 
man may now provide for himself by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or 
humanity permit.’3  For my argument that follows, I shall disregard Hume’s reference to 
security, and assume that the circumstances under which there is no call for the exercise of 
the virtue of justice includes those circumstances where the exercise of that virtue would 
fail to procure sufficient happiness. 
4.2.6 Now, the scenarios that Hume outlines are ones where all the people involved are in 
the same desperate boat.  But the logic of his position, it seems to me, implies that the 
virtue of justice might be suspended for individuals or a section of society, if cooperation 
held out an insufficient chance of procuring happiness for them.  In which case, if the 
classical principle of utility were to place some members of society in sufficiently adverse 
conditions, then they would no longer be in the circumstances of justice and, according to 
Hume’s doctrine, the ‘stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation’ could take over 
from ‘the strict laws of justice’. 
                                                 
1 In Theory (T of J Rev 1999), Rawls remarks that ‘Hume’s account of them [i.e. the circumstances 
of justice] is especially perspicuous and the preceding summary adds nothing essential to his much 
fuller discussion. 
2 Hume 1902 p. 186 
3 Hume 1902 p. 186 
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4.2.7 The logic of Rawls’s theory should commit him to the same position, for he writes 
that he ‘shall, of course, assume that the persons in the original position know that these 
circumstances of justice obtain’.1 If that is the case, then they should know that the people 
they represent are not in such dire straits that the laws of justice do not apply to them. 
4.2.8 Rawls would have no doubt taken issue with my hedonistic reading of the 
circumstances of justice, but that turns out not to matter to the case that Rufus T Firefly has 
the right to impose the classical principle of utility on Freedonia. 
4.2.9 We can imagine that Firefly does accept a hedonistic doctrine of the circumstances 
of justice.   Furthermore, he accepts Sidgwick’s view about rational self-interest.2  So he 
believes that it would be self-interestedly rational for an individual to maximize their 
expectation of happiness over the whole course of their life.  On Firefly’s interpretation of 
the circumstances of justice, then, any Freedonian’s obligation to act in accordance with the 
classical principle of utility would be suspended just when their overall life-expectancy of 
happiness became less than zero.   
4.2.10 The circumstances of justice, thus interpreted, define a threshold which arguably 
must be met in order for people to have an obligation to comply with the classical principle 
of utility.  The doctrine of the circumstances might be considered to define a basepoint, in 
addition to a situation of general egoism, which has to be exceeded in order for the mutual 
advantage condition of Justice as Reciprocity to be met.  In which case, classical act-
utilitarianism would not be compatible with Justice as Reciprocity.  For classical act-
utilitarianism requires everyone, no matter what position they might be in, to choose 
amongst those actions that would maximize utility.3 There is no room in the theory to allow 
a suspension of the laws of justice. 
4.2.11 But reciprocal classical utilitarianism can find room for such a suspension; it can 
simply relieve people from the obligation to act so as to maximize utility if doing so would 
mean that their own life expectation of happiness became less than zero.  Suppose then, that 
Firefly instituted serfdom in Freedonia and it turned out that the position of serf was so 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev 1999 p. 111 
2 Sidgwick pp. 89-95 and 119 - 122 
3 See Peter Singer’s statement §1.0.4 
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miserable that if the serfs willingly complied with the duties of their station they would be 
very unlikely to have a life worth living.  In their case the rules of justice would be 
suspended and they would have the right to rebel against Rufus or to attempt to flee to 
neighbouring Sylvania. 
4.2.12 The right described so far is a liberty-right.  Because the serfs would have this right, 
reciprocal classical utilitarian would uphold the core tenet of deontological liberalism, 
which grants certain people the liberty-right to not maximize utility. 
4.2.13 Next, the question arises as to whether reciprocal classical utilitarianism shouldn’t 
also accord people claim-rights.  The agricultural workers worked up until the date when 
Firefly began to contemplate the imposition of serfdom; why aren’t they owed the prospect 
of a worthwhile life, which would require others to respect at least their right to have that, 
and place them under the relevant constraints? 
4.2.14 The answer to that question is that as soon as people lose the prospect of a life 
worth living they cease to count as persons who have a duty to cooperate, and hence as 
those to whom a duty of reciprocity is owed.  The description of the requirements of Justice 
as Reciprocity in Chapter 1 confined the obligations to reciprocate to a closed community 
of benefactors and beneficiaries.1 However, that does not mean that all the fruits of 
cooperation have to be confined to the closed community of benefactors and beneficiaries.  
If it is a community of utilitarians then they have the right to insist on rules that may 
                                                 
1 In ‘Constructing Justice’ Gibbard appears to defend the right of a ‘master’ group to enslave a 
weaker group, asking ‘What if a group can be enslaved without excuses, and enslaved profitably? 
The group is excluded from the terms of voluntary cooperation not because it has nothing to offer, 
but because it can be kept under control. Sufficient contribution can be exacted from members of 
the group without calling on their motives of fair reciprocity’ (p. 272)  He then goes on to speculate 
that ‘[i]f an extant fair scheme of social cooperation includes everyone, then everyone is owed fair 
reciprocity’.  This is given as an interpretation of Rawls’s underlying theory of Justice as 
Reciprocity and raises a couple of interesting questions about the overall viability of Justice as 
Reciprocity.  If no extant schemes of social cooperation exist (as Barry asserts in Theories of 
Justice, also ascribing that view to Rawls (Barry 1989 p. 202) ) then why do we not retain the right 
to be egoistic?  In which case, why doesn’t anyone have the right to try to enslave anyone else if 
they have the power to do so?  Justice as Reciprocity threatens to collapse into Justice as General 
Egoism.  I believe an answer may lie in the idea of people who have benefited enough from 
partially just societies (such as the one I live in) having obligations to make substantial sacrifices, 
but have not been able to develop it yet.  In defence of the right to impose the principle of classical 
utility on the world, however, it can be observed that if we do have the right to do whatever we like 
in pursuit of our conception of the good then we certainly have the right to be a utilitarian. 
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distribute goods to third parties. 
4.2.15 A second question arises as to whether society would have the right to impose a 
principle on society that requires all to maximize utility once they have reached the 
threshold required by reciprocal classical utilitarianism.  Why shouldn’t people receive 
benefits in proportion to contribution? 
4.2.16 The trouble with the suggestion that contribution should be in proportion to benefit 
is that it appears to be impossible to gauge what any one individual’s ‘contribution’ or 
‘benefit’ would be when the relevant situation of equal liberty is a state of general egoism.  
A. J. Simmons has criticized the notion of using a state of general egoism as a yardstick to 
gauge benefit, asserting  
[i]t is far too easy to simply gesture at the horrors of a Hobbesian “war of all 
against all,” concluding that of course all citizens benefit on balance from 
cooperative political schemes, standing as we do far above the level of well-
being we would “enjoy” during a solitary, nasty, short life.  The relevant 
baseline of comparison must include the effects of efforts at self-provision 
(or small group provision) of goods like security, efforts that would 
undoubtedly occur…in any realistic non-political situation.’1  
But he offers no real justification for rejecting a Hobbesian war of all against all apart from 
the fact that it clashes with our intuitions about freedom and benefit.  Simmons seems to be 
suggesting that some citizens might not be considered as benefiting from society because 
they could do better if they were in a small group outside society.  But as Gibbard pointed 
out, ‘a coalition that withdraws from society renounces any claim to justice from those who 
remain. Why think they could take along their per capita share of nonhuman productive 
assets? Why think they could avoid slavery at the hands of everyone else?’2  Against a 
Hobbesian baseline the talented who are not allowed to emigrate, but enjoy a reasonable 
level of freedom within the society in which they are confined, do indeed count as 
benefiting from the restraint of others. 
4.2.17 So far, I have suggested that the doctrine of the circumstances of justice may 
support a threshold which has to be met before the obligation to reciprocate kicks in, and 
                                                 
1 Simmons 2001 p. 38 
2 Gibbard 1991 p. 272 
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given a hedonistic interpretation of what that threshold is.  But that threshold and the 
hedonistic interpretation of it are both controversial claims.  Many people alive today, I 
would speculate, live in societies where they have insufficient prospects of a happy life to 
qualify as having a duty of reciprocity on the account given so far but willingly comply 
with the rules of the societies they live in and believe they have an obligation to do so.  Are 
they wrong? 
4.2.18 They may be.  But there are other thresholds that might be taken into account as 
alternatives.  One is the state of general egoism which has already received plenty of 
attention.   
4.2.19 The final threshold to be considered here is the definition of ‘advantage’ in the 
mutual advantage condition.  I shall again consider this question within a hedonistic 
framework.  If cooperation with the classical principle of utility affords a person 
insufficient chance of a happy life, does the society in question count as being to her 
advantage?  This may turn out to be essentially the same as the threshold defined by the 
doctrine of the circumstances of justice. 
4.2.20 There is, however, no need to provide definite answers to these questions 
surrounding the determination of the threshold relevant to reciprocal classical utilitarianism 
in order to sustain the claim that society has the right to embrace the classical principle of 
utility as the predominant principle of distribution for society.  This is because whatever the 
answer turns out to be it will only provide those who fall beneath it a liberty-right to not 
maximize utility rather than a claim-right that places constraints on others’ behaviour to 
respect that right.  The point that no definite answers are needed to these questions can be 
clarified by considering the thought process that Firefly might go through before deciding 
whether to institute serfdom.  He believes that the threshold is determined by a hedonistic 
interpretation of the circumstances of justice and also hopes, and expects, that serfdom will 
not be so bad as to place people below that threshold.  But he can console himself with the 
thought that even if he turns out to be wrong on both counts he will still have the right to tie 
them to the land by force if necessary, and guard the borders to Sylvania to prevent people 
from leaving. 
 
3 The three tenets of deontological liberalism 
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4.3.1 The main planks of the argument that reciprocal classical utilitarianism is only 
reconcilable with the core tenet of deontological liberalism have already been laid in 
section 2, with its claim that reciprocal classical utilitarianism would only require 
acknowledgement of a liberty-right.  In this section I attempt to reinforce, and explain, the 
argument that Justice as Reciprocity does not underwrite the second tenet of deontological 
liberalism by first delving once more into the history of the development of Rawls’s theory, 
and pointing to an analogy with Hobbes’s theory in Leviathan.  I then expand on my claim 
above that it is impossible for principles of justice to be neutral between conceptions of the 
good.1 
 
4.3.2 In Theory, Rawls expressed his view that one of the key advantages of the contract 
view is its ability to underwrite our convictions of common sense regarding the nature of 
justice.  He wrote  
 
Passage 4a T of J Rev 
 
[1] It has seemed to many philosophers, and it appears to be supported by the 
convictions of common sense, that we distinguish as a matter of principle 
between the claims of liberty and right on the one hand and the desirability of 
increasing aggregate social welfare on the other; and that we give a certain 
priority, if not absolute weight, to the former.  [2] Each member of society is 
thought to have an inviolability founded on justice or, as some say, on natural 
right, which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. [3] Justice 
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared 
by others. [4] The reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different 
persons as if they were one person is excluded. [5] Therefore in a just society 
the basic liberties are taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not 
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. [6] Justice as 
fairness attempts to account for these common sense convictions concerning the 
priority of justice by showing that they are the consequence of principles which 
would be chosen in the original position.2 [my numbering of the sentences] 
 
4.3.3 The ‘claims of liberty and right’ that Rawls maintains are ‘supported by the 
convictions of common sense’, given the context of Theory, in which Rawls maintains 
                                                 
1 See §4.1.10 
2 Rawls T of J Rev pp. 24 - 25 
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that justice as fairness would result in the two principles of justice, should be interpreted 
as claim-rights; the basic liberties that are protected by the first principle of justice in 
Theory are certainly claim-rights, not liberty-rights.  They should also, I suggest, be read 
as applying to real people in the real world; the common sense intuition that Rawls aims 
to support is that actual existing members of societies have rights, whether those 
societies respect them or not.  If they are interpreted as claim-rights (as they should be), 
then Rawls’s ambition in this passage should be read as hoping that the contractualist 
theory of justice as fairness will be able to account for the first two tenets of 
deontological liberalism. 
 
4.3.4 Rawls goes on to argue that ‘while the contract doctrine accepts our convictions 
about the priority of justice as on the whole sound, utilitarianism seeks to account for 
them as a socially useful illusion.’1  This point can be exemplified by Mill’s example of 
the ‘qualified medical practitioner’ in Chapter 1.2 Mill believed very strongly that the 
kind of ‘basic liberties’ that would ordinarily protect a medical practitioner from being 
forced to do work she didn’t want to do should be respected by society, perhaps almost 
to the extent of being regarded as inviolable.  But ultimately he regarded the ‘strength of 
these persuasions’ as a ‘socially useful illusion’, as his being prepared to allow the 
kidnap of a medical practitioner in extreme circumstances attests. 
 
4.3.5 It is true that utilitarianism historically has generally sought to account for the 
common sense precepts of justice corresponding to the first two tenets of deontological 
liberalism as socially useful illusions, and it is also true that classical act-utilitarianism, 
as reiterated throughout this thesis, because of its commitment to unlimited aggregation, 
can’t account for them as sound. 
 
4.3.6 But Rawls couldn’t account for the first two tenets of deontological liberalism, I 
have argued in this thesis, because he never managed to solve the problem that it would 
be rational for anyone to prefer principles committed to unlimited aggregation in 
preference to a Hobbesian state of nature. 
                                                 
1 Rawls T of J Rev pp. 24 - 25 
2 §1.5.5 and Passage 1e p. 39 
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4.3.7 My diagnosis of the fundamental problem can be supported by again looking into 
the history of the development of Rawls’s theory.  Rawls first put claims similar to those 
of Passage 4a in his essay ‘Distributive Justice’, when he was committed to the second 
form of the model.  In ‘Distributive Justice’ he first put forward a claim equivalent to 
Theory’s claim that utilitarianism can only account for the common sense precepts of 
justice as a ‘socially useful illusion’, writing  
 
Passage 4b DJ 1967 
 
From the standpoint of utility, the strictness of common-sense notions of justice 
has a certain usefulness, but as a philosophical doctrine it is irrational. 
If then, we believe that as a matter of principle each member of society 
has an inviolability founded on justice which even the welfare of everyone else 
cannot override, and that a loss of freedom for some is not made right by a 
greater sum of satisfactions enjoyed by many, we shall have to look for another 
account of justice…The aim of the contract doctrine is precisely to account for 
the strictness of justice by supposing that its principles arise from an agreement 
among free and independent persons in an original position of equality.1 
 
4.3.8 I do not think any close comparison of these two passages is needed to justify 
reading Passage 4b as the historical antecedent of Passage 4a.  In both these passages 
Rawls expresses his hope of accounting for the two tenets of deontological liberalism 
with Justice as Fairness.   
 
4.3.9 However, the key ingredient which Rawls wanted to use to account for the two 
tenets of deontological liberalism in ‘Distributive Justice’ was the claim, closely 
scrutinized in Chapter 1, that rational individuals in the original position would not 
‘agree to a violation of their liberty for the sake of a greater balance of satisfactions 
enjoyed by others’ but would ‘insist upon institutions which returned compensating 
advantages for any sacrifices required.’2 I argued in Chapter 1 that rational individuals 
would not reject a principle, such as the classical principle of utility, on the grounds that 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1967 DJ p. 131 
2 Rawls 1967 DJ p. 132 
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it was committed to unlimited aggregation.1 It would instead be rational for them to 
accept a principle committed to unlimited aggregation since it could still be expected to 
compensate all, including those who would end up worst off under it, for their ‘sacrifice’ 
of natural liberty, when that natural liberty was the Hobbesian liberty to pursue one’s 
conception of the good by any means necessary.  Rawls’s hope of underwriting the first 
two tenets of deontological liberalism through justice as fairness, it seems to me, rested 
entirely on the notion that it would only be rational for the parties in the original position 
to choose non-aggregating principles over natural liberty. 
 
4.3.10 My suspicion is that it is impossible to motivate claim-rights, and thereby 
underwrite the second tenet of deontological liberalism, through Justice as Reciprocity, 
without taking the relevant situation of equal liberty by which mutual advantage is to be 
gauged as one in which people already have claim-rights.  Rawls’s first model of his 
theory, as shown in Chapter 2, upheld the second tenet of deontological liberalism but 
took the relevant situation of equal liberty to be the equal liberty guaranteed by the first 
principle of justice.  The model in between the first and second models, model 1.5, as we 
shall see below, also supposed that the relevant situation of equal liberty was a situation 
where people had claim-rights, though this time in the form of ‘constitutional liberties’ 
that the parties in the original position brought with them to the negotiating table.  My 
reading of the second model, and the argument of ‘Distributive Justice’, is that Rawls 
hadn’t fully managed to abandon the assumptions of the previous models and embrace 
the idea that rights would have to be justified as compensation for a loss of natural 
liberty, when that liberty is conceived of as the liberty of general egoism.2 
                                                 
1 §§ 1.10.4 – 1.10.9 
2 My reading can be supported in two ways.  First, the argument of Chapter 1 that examined the 
messy substitution in Theory of the claim that people wouldn’t choose a principle that permitted 
sacrifices of the worse off for the better off, for the second model’s premise that people wouldn’t 
sacrifice their liberty for the sake of greater satisfactions to others but would insist on principles that 
gave them compensating advantages.  Secondly, Rawls’s case against the principle of utility in the 
original edition of Theory where he argues ‘[y]et should a person gamble with his liberties and 
substantive interests hoping that the application of the principle of utility might secure him a greater 
well-being, he may have difficulty abiding by his undertaking. He is bound to remind himself that 
he had the two principles of justice as an alternative.’ (Rawls T of J orig 1971 p. 176).  The ‘people’ 
referred to are the parties in the original position who are representative of real people occupying 
positions in society.  But neither the parties in the original position, nor the real people in society 
should be conceived as already in possession of liberties.  Whether they have liberties or not is for 
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4.3.11 But Justice as Reciprocity is able to underwrite the core tenet of deontological 
liberalism, as shown above (§§4.2.5-4.2.20), by insisting on a threshold below which 
people should not be allowed to fall.  Those who do fall below it do not have an 
obligation to cooperate with the prevailing rules of society.  The liberty right that those 
who fall beneath the relative threshold would retain is enough to account for the idea 
that ‘each member of society [has] an inviolability founded on justice…which even the 
welfare of every one else cannot override.’1  Reciprocal classical utilitarianism could 
accommodate this precept.  It would say that a demand of classical act-utilitarianism for 
someone below this threshold to act so as to maximize utility would be overriding their 
liberty right to not maximize utility for the welfare of everyone else. 
 
4.3.12 Here an analogy can be made with Hobbes’s theory in Leviathan that helps 
illuminate the distinction between classical act-utilitarianism and reciprocal classical 
utilitarianism by first, supporting the idea that Justice as Reciprocity should acknowl9ge 
a threshold below which no-one should fall and secondly, supporting the idea that this 
threshold does not impact on society’s right to embrace the classical principle of utility.   
 
4.3.13 Hobbes famously argued that it was rational for all to surrender their natural 
liberty and agree to be unconditionally ruled by a Leviathan in exchange for everyone 
else doing the same.  Nevertheless, he maintained that should the Leviathan attempt to 
kill any individual, that individual had the liberty-right to resist the Leviathan.2  
Similarly, Justice as Reciprocity holds that it would be rational for anyone to agree to a 
principle, such as the classical principle of utility, which is committed to unlimited 
aggregation as the preferable alternative to the relevant situation of equal liberty: a state 
of general egoism.  Nevertheless, if the principle committed to unlimited aggregation 
threatened someone with an insufficient expectation of happiness, they would retain the 
right to not cooperate with the principle.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
the parties in the original position to decide.  This suggests to me that Rawls hadn’t quite ‘let go’ of 
the assumption of his previous models.  Rawls removed those two sentences for his second edition.  
1 In the words of Passage 4a. 
2 Hobbes 1996 pp. 145 -155 
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4.3.14 But Hobbes did not maintain that the right that some might have to resist the 
Leviathan led to a corresponding duty of the Leviathan to restrain his or her behaviour 
out of respect for that right.  On the contrary, the Leviathan was perfectly free to attempt 
to kill whomsoever he or she pleased. 
 
4.3.15 Similarly, a society which predominantly embraced the classical principle of 
utility would be free to apply that principle ruthlessly wherever it felt appropriate, even 
against those individuals who might be exempted from an obligation to comply with the 
principle themselves. 
 
4.3.16 Chapter 2 maintained that the first model of Rawls’s theory was better able to 
sustain the third tenet of deontological liberalism than subsequent models, though the 
Rawls of the first model was less obviously concerned with neutrality between conceptions 
of the good.1 But he expressed a commitment to the third tenet of deontological liberalism 
clearly in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.   
 
Passage 4c: (J as F:AR 2001) 
 
One role of political philosophy is to help us reach agreement on a political 
conception of justice, but it cannot show, clearly enough to gain general and 
free political agreement, that any single reasonable comprehensive doctrine, 
with its conception of the good, is superior. It does not follow (and justice as 
fairness as a political conception of justice does not say, and must not say) 
that there is no true comprehensive doctrine, or no best conception of the 
good. It only says that we cannot expect to reach a workable political 
agreement as to what it is. Since reasonable pluralism is viewed as a 
permanent condition of a democratic culture, we look for a conception of 
political justice that takes that plurality as given.2 
 
4.3.17 There is an implicit claim underlying this passage that Rawls’s conception 
of justice – the two principles of justice – is neutral.  I have argued that its 
appearance of neutrality is deceptive; accepting the difference principle favours 
those that would prefer to prioritize the worst off rather than promoting the greatest 
                                                 
1 §§2.6.12 – 2.6.16 
2 Rawls 2001 p. 84 
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happiness of the greatest number.  The first principle of justice has more claim to 
neutrality, but even that can be, and has been, accused of promoting a liberal 
conception of the good in preference to other conceptions.  The reason that the first 
model was better able to sustain the third tenet of deontological liberalism was that 
there appeared to be no room for considerations of what might be the best 
conception of benevolence to operate; meeting the demands of the mutual 
advantage condition mandated the second principle of justice.  The argument of this 
chapter, and the two preceding it, has, I hope, shown that a variety of conceptions of 
justice would meet the mutual advantage condition, including all the utilitarian 
conceptions of justice.  Where, in the first model, the worry was that any 
aggregation would violate the mutual advantage condition, the argument of this 
chapter should have shown that Justice as Reciprocity need not be concerned with 
that at all.  The unlimited aggregation that the classical principle of utility embraces 
is compatible with Justice as Reciprocity as, if combined with the threshold required 
by reciprocal classical utilitarianism, the worst unlimited aggregation can do to 
people is grant some of them the liberty-right to not maximize utility. It can’t 
violate anyone’s rights. 
 
4.3.18 The way is open, then, for society to choose which principles of justice to 
embrace on the grounds of which best fulfils the requirements of benevolence.  
Interestingly, Rawls accepts in Passage 4c that there may be ‘a true comprehensive 
doctrine’ and ‘best conception of the good’.  If utilitarians can win the case for the 
classical principle of utility being the best conception of the good, then they are 
entitled to try to promote it without fear that they will be acting unjustly according 
to the conception of Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
4.3.19 Of course, this does not mean that utilitarians must reject liberalism, or the 
‘reasonable pluralism’ that Rawls was so concerned to accommodate, or that ISUS1 
should try to emulate the example of ISIS2 and carve out a consequentialist 
caliphate across the Western world.  If Mill was right, then utilitarianism may 
                                                 
1 The International Society of Utilitarian Studies 
2 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
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provide a solid foundation for the liberal values that Rawls was so concerned to 
uphold.  And if my arguments are correct, the purported foundations for them in 
Justice as Reciprocity are very shaky indeed. 
 
4 The separateness of persons 
 
4.4.1. Possibly Rawls’s most influential criticism of utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice is 
his charge that it ignores ‘the separateness of persons’.1  This criticism of utilitarianism is 
accepted by some who have little regard for other aspects of Rawls’s theory, such as his 
contractualism and his two principles of justice.   And amongst those who are at least 
somewhat sympathetic toward Rawls’s philosophy, there is no clear consensus on how the 
separateness of persons’ objection to utilitarianism should be interpreted.  Some 
commentators, following Derek Parfit, have thought that we should prioritize benefits to the 
worst off in society in order to meet the objection.2  Others have claimed that the 
separateness of persons constitutes an objection to the priority view.3  Many commentators 
have associated the separateness of persons with egalitarianism, though it has been argued 
that it counts against ‘luck-egalitarianism’.4 
 
4.4.2 The broadest area of consensus appears to be that taking the separateness of persons 
seriously will result in a repudiation of utilitarian aggregation.  And some who hold this 
position also argue that taking the separateness of persons seriously motivates claim-
rights.5  But it has been suggested that this would not necessarily be so if utilitarianism was 
derived through contractualism.6 
 
                                                 
1 William Shaw remarks that ‘[i]n the past twenty-five years, many philosophers have been 
persuaded by John Rawls that the root problem is that utilitarianism ignores “the separateness of 
persons."  So widespread is this contention that it has become a virtual mantra.’ 
2 For example, Thomas Porter in ‘In Defence of the Priority View’ (2012) and Martin O’Neill in 
‘Priority, Preference and Value’ (2012). 
3 Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, Otsuka 2012 
4 Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey 2012 
5 E.g. Vallentyne 2006 and Nozick 1974 
6 Mckerlie 1988 and Hirose 2013 
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4.4.3 The contractualist interpretation is, in my opinion, along the right lines.  But I 
believe that the commentators who endorse the contractualist interpretation have missed 
something important by focussing on the objection as it was put in Theory.  In my view, the 
separateness of persons’ objection can only be properly understood in the context of the 
essay in which it was originally formulated, Rawls’s 1963 essay ‘Constitutional Liberty and 
the Concept of Justice.’ 
 
4.4.4 Here I put the case that the separateness of persons’ objection is an objection that is, 
at its core, very similar to the ‘exclusion of aggregation’ considered in Chapter 1.  In its 
original version it can, at least partly, be read as an objection that utilitarian aggregation 
would violate the mutual advantage condition of Justice as Reciprocity.  I shall also argue 
that the objection that utilitarian aggregation would violate the mutual advantage condition 
is the most important part of the objection from the perspective of Justice as Reciprocity. 
Finally, I suggest that reciprocal classical utilitarianism would take the separateness of 
persons’ seriously where classical act utilitarianism wouldn’t. 
 
4.4.5 In order to understand the separateness of persons’ objection properly, we need to 
first understand the state of development Rawls’s theory was in at the time he first put the 
objection.  That state lay halfway between Wolff’s ‘first and second models’, so I shall call 
it model 1.5.  The important similarities to the first model were first; that both principles 
were still supposed to apply to ‘liberty’, understood as an assignment of rights to different 
positions in the practices of society, and secondly; that the second principle of justice 
conferred its ‘advantageous inequalities’ to the relevant people in the form of greater 
‘liberty’, also understood as an assignment of such rights.1  
 
4.4.6 But there were two highly significant modifications to Rawls’s first model.  One 
was that Rawls had redefined the first principle in terms of the protection of a specific, and 
limited, set of ‘constitutional liberties’.  This modification would be retained in Theory 
where the set of liberties would be slightly altered and renamed the ‘basic liberties’.  The 
                                                 
1 This reading of model 1.5 is justified by the wording of Rawls’s explanation of how the 
inequalities permitted by the second principle of justice should be understood in CL&CJ p. 75, 
which is virtually identical to the wording of Passage 2c p. 82 
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second was that Rawls explicitly equated the liberty of the original position with the liberty 
that would be secured by the first principle of justice.  These two modifications are revealed 
by the following two passages 
 
Passage 4d (CL & CJ 1963) 
 
[1][t]o satisfy the concept of justice, there must then exist in society a 
position of equal citizenship within which the liberty of the person is 
secured and which will express in institutions the satisfaction of the first 
principle. [2] Given this equal liberty, there will exist a position from which 
the application of the second principle of justice may be discussed and a 
sense of community maintained.1 [my italics and numbering of the 
sentences] 
 
Passage 4e (CL & CJ 1963) 
 
[1] It is now possible to comment on why it is characteristic of the 
constitutional liberties that they must be equal; why, in respect to these 
liberties as defined by the structure of the social system in which each 
begins, no one can be favoured. [2] Their role is to mark off and to define a 
part of the social structure distinct from that part which allows differences in 
rights and powers and a varied distribution of good things in accordance 
with the second principle. [3] Roughly, the distinction between these two 
parts of the social structure is that the first part – the constitutional liberties – 
expresses in institutions the original position of equal liberty; it represents 
the position from which the application of the second principle may proceed 
among persons secure in their fundamental equality.  [4] The second part of 
the social structure contains those distinctions and of political, economic, 
and social forms necessary for efficient and mutually beneficial arrangement 
of joint activities; but such distinctions can be acknowledged only in matters 
of secular and personal interests or, roughly speaking, in matters of welfare.2 
[my italics and numbering of the sentences] 
 
4.4.7 The reading of the two aforementioned modifications into the passages can be 
justified as follows.  Sentence [1] of Passage 4d (CL & CJ 1963) describes the first 
principle of justice as securing a position of equal citizenship ‘within which the liberty of 
the person is secured’.  Sentence [2] of Passage 4e (CL & CJ 1963) clarifies that the 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1963 p. 84 
2 Rawls 1963 p. 88 
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‘liberty of the person’ secured by the first principle is the person’s possession of the 
constitutional liberties.  Sentence [3] equates the position of equal liberty with the liberty of 
the original position. 
 
4.4.8 Now it should be noted that this model really is quite different to both the first 
model of J as F (1&2) and the third model of Theory.  The differences to the first model 
have already been discussed.  The two significant differences to the third model are first - 
that the people in the original position know their identities and how the various ways the 
second principle of justice might be applied would affect them; and second, that they arrive 
at the negotiating table already in possession of their rights or liberties.  These rights should 
certainly be understood as meeting the requirements of the second tenet of deontological 
liberalism, which imposes on people a duty to restrain their behaviour in order to respect 
the rights of others: in other words, which accords people ‘claim-rights’.  Rawls’s extended 
discussion of the question of slavery in CL&CJ makes it quite clear that he did not only 
believe that slavery would violate a person’s right to be free, but that others had to respect 
that right.1 
 
4.4.9 With the background in place I can put forward my argument that the separateness of 
persons’ objection should be understood primarily as an objection to aggregation that 
would violate the mutual advantage condition.  There are, I believe, three distinct 
separateness of persons’ objections that need to be distinguished: the ‘exclusion of 
aggregation’, ‘the unanimity objection’ and ‘the construction objection’. 
 
4.4.10 The first two of these are contained in the following passage 
 
Passage 4f (CL & CJ 1963) 
 
[A] The peculiar feature of the concept of justice is that it treats each person 
as an equal sovereign as it were and requires a unanimous acknowledgement 
                                                 
1 See CL & CJ pp. 82-85. It should be recalled that the if people only had a right to ‘freedom of the 
person’ interpreted as a liberty-right, then no-one could be under the obligation to accept the 
bondage of slavery, but no-one would be under the obligation not to force slavery on people if they 
had the power to do so. 
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from an original position of equal liberty. [B] In contrast to the conception 
of social utility, the concept of justice excludes the possibility of arguing 
that the violation of the claims of some is justified (rendered just) by 
compensating advantages to others. [C] If there is any disadvantage which 
cannot be acknowledged, an institution is unjust.1 [my sentence lettering and 
italics] 
 
4.4.11  As we saw above, in Passage 4a T of J Rev2, Rawls wrote that ‘[3] Justice denies 
that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others.’3  If we 
bear in mind that what the parties in the original position have claim to in Model 1.5 
includes their constitutional liberties, it becomes apparent that Sentence [B] is CL & CJ’s 
equivalent to Theory’s Sentence [3].  Slightly more explanation is needed to show that it is 
closely related to J as F (2)’s ‘exclusion of aggregation.’ 
 
4.4.12 The exclusion of aggregation was expressed in Passage 2g (J as F 2)4 Sentence [4]: 
‘The principle excludes, therefore, the justification of inequalities on the grounds that the 
disadvantages of those in one position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those in 
another position.’5 At first sight this may appear to be a completely different objection.  But 
it should be recalled that in Rawls’s first model, ‘disadvantages’, ‘advantages’, and 
‘inequalities’ were all functions of the assignment of rights - i.e.‘liberties’- that different 
citizens had.  The justification of any inequalities on the grounds that the disadvantages of 
those in one position were outweighed by the greater advantages of those in another 
position would, then, deprive the disadvantaged citizens of the maximum ‘equal liberty’ 
they were guaranteed by the two principles of justice.  So in the first model, such 
justification could have been described in the terms used in Sentence [B] as ‘justifying the 
violation of the claims of some (to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty 
for all – measured in terms of economic advantage) by compensating advantages to others.’ 
 
4.4.13 The unanimity objection is expressed in both sentences [A] and [C].  The 
implication is that the kind of inequalities that utilitarian aggregation would be liable to 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1963 p. 95 
2 p. 185 
3 § 4.3.2 
4 p. 88 
5 See §2.1.17. 
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lead to would not receive unanimous acknowledgement in the original position. 
4.4.14 The construction objection is expressed in the paragraph following Passage 4f (CL 
& CJ 1963). 
 
Passage 4g (CL & CJ 1963) 
 
[1] The concept of justice is distinct from that of social utility in that justice 
takes the plurality of persons as fundamental, whereas the notion of social 
utility does not.  [2] The latter seeks to maximize one thing, it being 
indifferent in which way it is shared among persons except insofar as it 
affects this one thing itself.  [3] The conception of utility extends the 
principle of rational choice for one person to the case where there is a 
plurality of persons, for one person may properly count his advantages now 
as compensating for his own losses earlier or subsequently, but justice 
excludes the analogous reasoning between persons.  [4] The plurality of 
persons must construct among themselves the principles in accordance with 
which they are to decide between institutions, and the general 
characterization of the circumstances of this construction and the respective 
positions of persons within it are given by the analytic framework by which 
the two principles of justice were derived. [my sentence numbering and 
italics] 
 
4.4.15 Sentence [3] is Rawls’s first description of the utilitarian conception of society, 
described at length in Chapter 1 (§§1.8.1 – 1.8.4).  The construction objection can be 
defined as the objection that extending the principle of rational choice for one person to the 
case of society is the wrong way to go about constructing principles of justice. 
 
4.4.16 So there appear to be three distinct objections involved in ‘the separateness of 
persons’ objection to utilitarianism.  I can put my case that the most important objection is 
the exclusion of aggregation by again using the example of Rufus T Firefly, conceived of as 
the Ideal Legislator (Reciprocity) contemplating whether to impose serfdom on the 
agricultural workers of Freedonia. 
 
4.4.17 So far we have not considered how Firefly may have derived his utilitarian 
sympathies.  But let us now suppose that he embraces the utilitarian conception of society, 
so he derives his utilitarianism by applying the principle of rational choice for one person to 
society.  In making this decision he has treated separate lives as if they were separate 
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moments in the same person’s life, which is enough to make his decision fall foul of the 
construction objection.  But that still leaves the question as to exactly what is objectionable 
about making such decisions open.  This point can be brought home by observing that 
Sentence [3] of Passage 4g (CL & CJ 1963) consists of a descriptive claim in its first two 
clauses (‘The conception of utility extends the principle of rational choice for one person to 
the case where there is a plurality of persons, for one person may properly count his 
advantages now as compensating for his own losses earlier or subsequently’) and a 
normative one in its third clause (‘justice excludes the analogous reasoning between 
persons’).  Firefly’s decision fits the description of the first two clauses, and so is subject to 
the construction objection.  But why is that unjust?  And a second, related, question also 
naturally arises: what would ‘taking the separateness of persons seriously’ involve? 
 
4.4.18 These questions are not clearly answered in Theory, as the varying interpretations of 
the separateness of persons’ objection attests.  By contrast, I would maintain that Rawls 
answered them quite clearly in ‘Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice’.  
Sentence [1] of Passage 4g stipulates that justice, in contrast to social utility, takes the 
plurality of persons as fundamental and Sentence [4] goes into more detail about how that 
should be done: the plurality of persons – i.e. the persons in the original position – must 
construct the principles themselves. Passage 4f1 goes into still more detail in Sentences [A] 
and [C]: the principles the persons in the original position will construct will be those that 
can be unanimously acknowledged. The principle of utility, by implication, cannot be 
unanimously acknowledged.  So the Rawls of ‘Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of 
Justice’ appears to have regarded the unanimity objection as the core objection.  In answer 
to the question of why it is unjust to apply the principle of rational choice for one man to 
society, Rawls would have answered that doing so would be liable to lead to disadvantages 
which can’t be acknowledged.  And in answer to the question of what taking the 
separateness of persons seriously involves, he would have answered that it involves coming 
up with principles that could be unanimously acknowledged in the original position. 
 
4.4.19 But, with arguments similar to the ones made in Chapters 2 and 3, I would 
                                                 
1 pp. 193 - 194 
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maintain that the exclusion of aggregation is the core objection.1  In Model 1.5, as in 
the first model, the two principles of justice are the only conception of justice that 
offer an improvement over the relevant situation of equal liberty by which to 
measure mutual advantage.  In Model 1.5, the relevant situation of equal liberty by 
which to measure mutual advantage, as explained above (§§4.4.6 – 4.4.8), was a 
situation in which all are already assured of their constitutional liberties.  A 
principle committed to unlimited aggregation, then, would be liable to violate 
people’s liberties without giving them compensation for that violation.  If Rufus T 
Firefly imposed serfdom on Freedonia, serfdom would presumably violate one or 
other of the agricultural workers’ constitutional liberties, ‘liberty of the person’ 
and/or ‘freedom of movement’.2 And if Firefly did this for the sake of greater 
advantages to the non-agricultural workers, it could be maintained that this violation 
of the constitutional liberties was justified (made just) by compensating advantages 
to the non-agricultural workers.  This would be unjust according to the exclusion of 
aggregation expressed in Sentence [B] of Passage 4f3.  In depriving them of this 
liberty it would also place the agricultural workers below the relevant situation of 
equal liberty and thereby violate the mutual advantage condition of Justice as 
Reciprocity.4 
                                                 
1 §§2.2.8 – 2.2.10 and §§3.1.4 – 3.1.5 
2 Rawls 1963 p.74.  These are among the constitutional liberties listed by Rawls, but he does not 
describe their content. 
3 pp. 193 – 194. 
4 It is useful, I think, to locate my interpretation of the ‘core’ separateness of persons’ objection in 
relation to other interpretations.  Larry Temkin (2015 pp. 98 – 99) interprets Rawls as taking the 
construction objection to be central.  Iwao Hirose (Hirose 2013 p.193) reads the exclusion of 
aggregation to be the Rawls’s main ‘separateness of persons’ objection.  Interestingly, McKerlie 
(1988 p. 209) reads the exclusion of aggregation (which he refers to, following Parfit, as ‘the 
objection to balancing’) to be based, not on the separateness of persons, but on ‘a rights view 
assigning certain basic liberties to everyone’.  McKerlie’s view is closest to my own by taking 
Rawls’s insistence that just principles must take the separateness of persons’ seriously as a demand 
for contractualism.  He then makes the point that taking the separateness of persons’ seriously 
would only motivate egalitarianism, if egalitarianism would be the result of contractualism.  If 
contractualism led to utilitarianism then utilitarianism would take the separateness of persons’ 
seriously, rather than egalitarianism (McKerlie 1988 pp. 214-215).  However, McKerlie just 
focusses on the objection as it is presented in Theory.  In CL&CJ, contractualism would decisively 
reject the principle of utility as those who would be ‘losers’ under the principle of utility would 
know their identities and have the opportunity to veto it.  I have referred to the contractualist 
objection in CL&CJ as the ‘unanimity objection’ to emphasize the point that in CL&CJ, Rawls’s 
contract required unanimity amongst people who knew their identities and how various principles 
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4.4.20 Now it should be easy to understand how the ‘exclusion of aggregation’ 
might be regarded as the core separateness of persons’ objection, and the other two 
are of lesser importance.  Consider first the construction objection.  Applying the 
principle of rational choice for one man to the case of society is obviously not the 
right way to go about constructing principles suited for Justice as Reciprocity as it 
takes no account of the mutual advantage condition of Justice as Reciprocity.  But 
suppose Firefly did not derive his utilitarianism by applying the principle of rational 
choice for one man to society, but had another foundation for his utilitarianism.1  
His utilitarianism would still lead him to impose serfdom on Freedonia and violate 
the mutual advantage condition.  Consider next the unanimity objection.  In model 
1.5 the agricultural workers, who know how the principle of utility would affect 
them, would not acknowledge the disadvantages imposed on them by serfdom, so 
utilitarian aggregation would be subject to the unanimity objection.  But the reason 
they would not acknowledge these disadvantages is because they disadvantage them 
with respect to the relevant situation of equal liberty, i.e. they violate the mutual 
advantage condition.  
 
4.4.21 My interpretation of Rawls’s core separateness of persons’ objection to 
utilitarianism as presented in CL&CJ can be summarized, then, as an objection that 
utilitarianism would be liable to deprive some people of what they would have 
claim to in the relevant situation of equal liberty and to justify that deprivation in 
terms of compensating advantages to others.  Importantly, for the forthcoming 
reconsideration of whether classical utilitarianism would be subject to the objection 
given the revised assumptions of Theory, it should be noted that this interpretation 
does not necessarily object to the violation of the claims of some so long as they 
receive compensation for that violation themselves.  Classical act utilitarianism and 
                                                                                                                                                    
would be likely to affect them.  The contractualism of CL&CJ can lay fair claim to take the 
separateness of persons more seriously than the contractualism of Theory.  However, for the reasons 
laid out below (§4.4.20), I would maintain that the exclusion of aggregation still represented the 
core objection in CL&CJ. 
1 In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit suggested that a ‘reductionist view of personal identity’ 
provides a sounder foundation for utilitarianism (Parfit 1984 pp. 330 – 345) 
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reciprocal classical utilitarianism would both be subject to the objection on this 
interpretation, in model 1.5, as they would both be liable to justify the violation of 
the claim rights people have in the relevant situation of equal liberty (the original 
position) by compensating advantages to others.1   
 
4.4.22 However, the revised assumptions of Theory reopen the question of whether 
utilitarianism would be subject to the objection in the third model.  As explained in 
Chapter 1, the relevant situation of equal liberty in Theory by which mutual 
advantage is to be gauged is a state of general egoism, and all the conceptions of 
justice, including the utilitarian ones, were assumed to be advantageous to all in 
comparison with this benchmark.2  In which case, if Rufus T Firefly imposed 
classical act-utilitarianism and serfdom on Freedonia, he could try to argue that he 
was not violating Theory’s exclusion of aggregation as expressed in Passage 4a3 
Sentence [3].  He was not making right the loss of freedom for the agricultural 
workers by a greater good shared by the non-agricultural workers.  The agricultural 
workers receive compensation for their loss of natural liberty – understood as the 
Hobbesian liberty to do whatever they wanted in pursuit of the good – themselves.  
This compensation came in the form of a greater expectation of happiness than they 
would enjoy had they retained their natural liberty.   
 
4.4.23 That line of argument is problematic, for the same reasons that the argument 
from Justice as Reciprocity to Classical Act-Utilitarianism discussed above was 
problematic.4  It is questionable whether classical utilitarianism would improve 
everyone’s position with respect to a state of general egoism or, even if it did, 
whether lives with sufficiently dismal expectations should count as advantageous to 
those who have such low life expectations.   To illustrate this point with reference to 
the example in hand, if serfdom turned out to be sufficiently miserable, then any 
assertion by Firefly that their loss of natural liberty was made right by compensating 
advantages to the serfs – even when that liberty is understood as the liberty of 
                                                 
1 As demonstrated with the example of Firefly and Freedonia above (§4.4.20) 
2 §§1.9.32 – 1.9.40 
3 p. 185 
4 §§ 4.1.1 – 4.1.12 
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general egoism for all – would be risible.  Classical act utilitarianism would be 
subject to the separateness of persons’ objection because it would deprive some 
people of their natural liberty without giving them adequate compensation in return.  
Because they received insufficient compensation for their loss of natural liberty 
themselves, they could be described as having the violation of their claim to what 
they would have in the relevant situation of equal liberty – the right to pursue their 
own conception of the good by any means necessary – justified by compensating 
advantages to others. 
 
4.4.24 But reciprocal classical utilitarianism would not fall foul of my 
interpretation of the core separateness of persons’ objection.  Those who were 
offered sufficiently dismal life expectations by the classical principle of utility 
would retain their liberty-right to pursue their conception of the good by any means 
necessary.1  So no one would be in the position of having the violation of their 
claim to what they would have in the relevant situation of equal liberty – the right to 
pursue their own conception of the good by any means necessary – justified by 
compensating advantages to others.  Either they would receive compensation for 
their loss of natural liberty themselves, or they would retain their natural liberty.  It 
is for this reason that I emphasized that my interpretation of the core separateness of 
persons’ objection did not necessarily object to the violations of the claims of some 
so long as they received compensation for that violation themselves.  
 
 4.4.25 Reciprocal classical utilitarianism could also be described as taking the separateness 
of persons’ seriously in a way that classical act-utilitarianism wouldn’t.  Sentence [2] of 
Passage 4g (CL & CJ 1963) gives a description of how ‘the notion of social utility’ might 
be regarded as not taking the separateness of persons’ seriously: it ‘seeks to maximize one 
thing, it being indifferent in which way it is shared among persons except insofar as it 
affects this one thing itself.’  This theme was retained in Theory where Rawls wrote 
 
On this [the utilitarian] conception of society separate individuals are 
                                                 
1 The question of what threshold is relevant for Justice as Reciprocity is discussed above §§ 4.2.1 – 
4.2.20 
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thought of as so many different lines along which rights and duties are to be 
assigned and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in accordance with rules 
so as to give the greatest fulfillment of wants. The nature of the decision 
made by the ideal legislator is not, therefore, materially different from that 
of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximize his profit by producing this or 
that commodity, or that of a consumer deciding how to maximize his 
satisfaction by the purchase of this or that collection of goods.1 
 
4.4.26 The ideal legislator in this passage is the ideal legislator Rawls associated 
with the concept of Justice as Benevolence.2  The Ideal Legislator (Benevolence) is 
to take the maximization of utility to be the ‘one thing’ that determines the 
distribution of rights and duties.  But this is not true of the Ideal Legislator 
(Reciprocity).  As argued above (§§4.2.2 – 4.2.20), he or she would have to take a 
threshold into account, and those citizens who would fall below the threshold if they 
acted in accordance with the classical principle of utility would retain the right to 
pursue their conception of the good by whatever means necessary.  These rights 
would not be determined by the maximization of utility; it is quite conceivable that 
maximizing utility would assign those with very dismal life prospects a duty to act 
so as to maximize utility rather than a right to pursue their conception of the good.  
So, in contrast to classical act-utilitarianism, reciprocal classical utilitarianism 
would be concerned with the distribution of two things: utility and ‘natural’ rights.  
The rights can be appropriately referred to as natural, as they are the rights that 
people would have in the ‘state of nature’, understood as a state of general egoism.  
So reciprocal classical utilitarianism could be described as taking the separateness 
of persons seriously in the terms of Passage 4g (CL & CJ 1963): it would not ‘be 
indifferent in which way..[one thing] is shared among persons except insofar as it 
affects this one thing itself.’ 
 
4.4.27 An important implication of my interpretation of the separateness of 
persons’ objection to utilitarianism is that ‘taking the separateness of persons 
seriously’ would not, as some commentators have supposed, establish claim-rights 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1971 p. 27.  In fact, as seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis (§§2.4.12 – 2.4.19), the idea of the 
ideal legislator organising rights and duties with the sole aim of giving ‘the greatest fulfilment of 
wants’ appeared in J as F (1) so predated Rawls’s utilitarian conception of society. 
2 See §§ 1.8.5 – 1.8.8 and §§2.4.12 – 2.4.19 
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but only liberty- rights.1 This is because, as explained above (§4.4.24), the right that 
those who would not receive sufficient compensation for their loss of natural liberty 
through the application of the classical principle of utility would retain – the right to 
act egoistically – is a liberty-right, not a claim right.  It does not place anyone under 
a duty to constrain their own behaviour out of respect for that liberty right. 
 
4.4.28 In summary of this lengthy section, I have offered an interpretation of the 
separateness of persons’ objection that upholds it as a genuine objection to classical 
act utilitarianism but not to reciprocal classical utilitarianism.  It does not establish 
the injustice of embracing the classical principle of utility as the predominant 
distributive principle for society.  And my interpretation has located the objection 
firmly within Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity: its core is best 
understood as an objection to violations of the mutual advantage condition.  So it is 
not, as some have supposed, an objection to utilitarianism that is independent of 
Rawls’s conception of Justice as Reciprocity. 
 
4.4.29 In conclusion of this final chapter and the thesis, I hope to have shown that 
Justice as Reciprocity is at least reconcilable with the classical principle of utility.  
This should be a welcome result for those who, as I described my own position in 
Chapter 12, were attracted to the classical principle of utility as a principle of 
benevolence but were concerned about its justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 As already remarked, (Footnote 4 above) Nozick (1974) and Vallentyne (2006) are two 
philosophers who maintain that taking the separateness of persons’ objection to utilitarianism 
motivates claim-rights. 
2 §§1.0.1 – 1.0.5 
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